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Executive summary 
 
The European Union and its Member States have been engaged in product market reforms 
over a long period with notable reforms including the Single Market Program and the Lisbon 
Agenda launched in March 2000. The Lisbon Agenda is a comprehensive 10-year strategy 
covering product, labour and capital market reforms which aim to transform the EU into the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by increasing the 
employment rate and the level of labour productivity as well as contributing to raise the rate 
of potential output growth.  
 
In the past decade, the European Union’s product market reforms have included the 
dismantling of barriers to trade in the Internal Market, the liberalisation of network industries 
(telecommunications, electricity, gas, transport and postal services), reductions in State Aid, 
reforms to competition policy and the deregulation of product markets. The main aim of these 
reforms is to increase productivity given the sharp decrease in EU productivity growth rates 
compared with those of the United States after 1995, which has led to EU GDP per capita 
being only 70% of US levels. 
 
Product market reforms are seen as exerting both a direct and an indirect impact on 
productivity. The direct effect on productivity is due to the removal of barriers to penetrate 
new markets and to the decrease in the costs of doing business. However, the net effects of the 
direct effect were found to be small. 
 
The indirect effect on productivity is transmitted through three channels. Product market 
reforms are expected to lead to a gain in allocative efficiency by reducing incumbent firms’ 
market power and by increasing market contestability through an increase in the number of 
competitive firms on the market as well as in the threat of firm entry. The rise in the level of 
competition on the market will lead to a reduction in price mark-up and to a better allocation 
of resources as less efficient firms exit the market and are replaced by more productive new 
entrants. The second transmission channel is through an increase in productive efficiency by 
raising the incentives for managers and workers to organise their work more efficiently, trim 
fat and reduce slack, thereby minimising the under-utilisation of production factors. The third 
channel is by increasing the incentives of firms to carry out research and innovate and hence 
allowing them to move to the technology frontier more rapidly. While the allocative and 
productive efficiency gains are expected to take place rapidly and only once, the dynamic 
efficiency gains are expected to take place over a longer period of time, but have a larger 
impact on productivity. 
 
In this study, we concentrate on the impact of product market reforms on firm entry and 
exit that can itself be decomposed into two effects: internal restructuring which refers to 
productivity growth of individual firms present in the industry and external restructuring 
whereby the process of market selection leads to a reallocation of resources among individual 
firms. The change in firm entry and exit will in turn affect macroeconomic performance. 
 
The theoretical literature generally predicts a positive impact of firm entry and exit and of 
product market reforms on productivity and performance. Product market reforms will affect 
firm entry and exit through internal restructuring by modifying factors internal to the firm 
such as organisational change, the introduction of new technologies, increased competition, 
R&D activities or a change in the mix of labour and capital. There is also an external 
restructuring effect whereby the process of market selection leads to a reallocation of  
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resources among individual firms. This is done in two ways: first, there is a process of 
creative destruction by which low productivity firms exit the market and are replaced by new 
entrants that are themselves heterogeneous. Among them, the most efficient ones will survive, 
while the least efficient ones will exit the market in subsequent periods. Second, there is a 
change in market shares among incumbents, which will also have an impact on aggregate 
productivity growth. The latter will for example increase if high productivity firms gain 
market shares. At the same time, there are a number of important interactions between the 
various sources of aggregate productivity growth mentioned above. Existing firms may for 
instance increase productivity by enhancing their investment in order to preserve their market 
shares when faced with entry of new and more productive firms. 
 
The deregulation of product markets will also have a positive effect on capital 
accumulation if it leads to a reduction in the mark-up or lowers the costs of adjusting the 
capital stock. There are however instances in which product market reforms may have 
negative effects on economic performance. If for example regulation imposed a ceiling on the 
rate of return on capital invested, firms may invest in additional capital in order to increase the 
base to which the constrained rate of return on capital is applied to increase the total 
remuneration for capital. Removing the constraint may lead to a decrease in the desired level 
of the capital stock and in investment. In addition, if public companies were heavy investors 
before deregulation, the privatisation process consisting in reducing the role of public 
companies in the sector may lead to a decrease in investment. 
 
The empirical literature considers the direct effects of product market regulations on 
investment and productivity. Evidence was found that tight regulation on product markets has 
large negative effects on investment and that deregulation leads to an increase in investment 
in the long run. Entry liberalisation was found to increase productivity gains, with countries 
most behind in terms of technology adoption and reform having the largest productivity gains. 
In this report we consider the indirect effect of product market regulations on economic 
performance through the impact on firm entry and exit. 
 
We used a two stage approach in the econometric framework, where we first estimated the 
relationship between firm entry and exit and our indicators of product market reforms and 
regulations while controlling for country and industry structural characteristics such as entry 
barriers. In the second step, we estimated the relationship between firm entry and exit rates 
and different macroeconomic outcomes. 
 
We found that an increase in the level of deregulation leads to an increase in both the 
entry and exit rates. Among the individual regulation indicators, we found that a decrease in 
price controls and hidden import barriers, as well as an increase in regulatory quality and the 
ease of starting a new business have positive and significant effects on firm entry and exit. A 
decrease in transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP and in the mean tariff rate has a negative 
effect on firm entry, results that are contrary to expectations. Finally, we did not find a 
significant impact of a reduction in the time spent with government bureaucracy or of the 
restrictions on FDI on the entry and exit rates. 
 
There is some evidence of a changing relationship between an increase in the entry rate 
and the impact on output growth, with a rise in the contemporaneous entry rate leading to 
higher output growth and an increase in the once-lagged entry rate having a negative impact 
on output growth. An increase in the once-lagged exit rate will have a negative effect on 
output growth.   
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A rise in the contemporaneous entry rate was found to have a positive impact on labour 
productivity, whereas an increase in the twice-lagged exit rate will lead to higher labour 
productivity growth. 
 
A higher contemporaneous entry rate will lead to stronger employment growth, but a rise 
in the once lagged entry rate will have a negative effect on employment growth. No 
significant relationship was found between contemporaneous or lagged exit rates and 
employment growth.  
 
We found that a higher contemporaneous and twice lagged entry rates will lead to higher 
R&D investment growth, but an increase in the once lagged entry rate will decrease R&D 
investment growth. The exit rate does not have a significant impact on R&D investment 
growth. There is some weak evidence that a higher contemporaneous entry rate will have a 
negative impact on R&D intensity. 
 
We did not find a significant relationship between entry or exit and the growth of physical 
capital investment, but we did find some evidence of a negative impact of a rise in the 
contemporaneous exit rate on physical capital intensity. 
 
The general policy implications that we can draw from these results is that it is desirable 
to pursue economic policies that improve firm entry and exit since the variation of the latter 
will generate significant and generally positive changes on macroeconomic performance with 
the magnitude of these changes being relatively large. One such policy is an increase in 
deregulation that will significantly increase both firm entry and exit leading to a more 
efficient allocation of resources within industries. The study by sector showed that an increase 
in the entry and exit rates would lead to sharp increases in labour productivity growth for the 
office machinery and computers as well as the radio, television and communication sectors. 
The result can be explained by the high-tech nature of these sectors that leads to only the most 
productive firms entering these industries. A rise in the exit rate also leads to a sharp increase 
in labour productivity growth in these industries, which can be explained by the high degree 
of competition that takes place in these sectors leading to the exit of the least productive 
firms. Another interesting exception is that an increase in the entry rate will lead to a decrease 
in employment growth for more traditional manufacturing sectors such as tobacco products, 
textiles, wearing and leather. This could be explained by the delocalisation of firms away 
from the European Union that is taking place in these sectors. A rise in the entry rate will also 
lead to a decrease in employment growth in the motor vehicles and electricity and water 
supply sectors.  
 
The present study can be extended by using a more complete data set that would allow us 
to control for firm specific characteristics such as size, age or type of entrant as well as by 
using product market regulation indicators that vary across sectors. A longer period will likely 
lead to interesting results, given that product market reforms have an impact on firm entry and 
exit over a number of years. Future research could also include more countries in the sample 
such as the new EU members, as well as other entry deterring strategies such as filling in all 
product niches or masking the results of highly profitable units. Finally, it should be 
mentioned that there are two other channels through which product market reforms can 
impact macroeconomic performance, namely through their influence on firms’ mark-up and 
by affecting firms’ incentives to engage in R&D and innovation.   
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Objectives of the study and context 
 
The purpose of the study is to analyse the impact of product market reforms on firm entry 
and exit and macro-economic performance. This would help in assessing the likely future 
costs and benefits of the Lisbon process on European macroeconomic performance. 
Since the Single European Act in 1986/87, the EU has implemented several reforms to 
achieve the completion of the Single Market. These reforms dealt with key market distortions 
and were aimed at removing obstacles and trade barriers to market integration, the 
liberalisation of network industries (telecommunications, electricity, gas, transport and postal 
services), reductions in State aid, reforms to competition policy and the deregulation of 
product markets. More recently, the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 set an objective 
for the EU to become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world”. The Lisbon strategy is a comprehensive 10-year strategy covering product, labour and 
capital market reforms aimed at enhancing the functioning of the labour, product and capital 




A large amount of empirical research, including work by the European Commission and 
the OECD, shows a positive relationship between product market deregulation facilitating 
entry, productivity, investment and growth. The economic literature suggests that product 
market reforms may affect business and overall economic performance in various ways. First, 
the effect of different product market reforms may directly affect business performance 
through cost reductions (for example, decreasing administrative burdens for companies) and 
through the removal of barriers to penetrate new markets. Second, product market reforms 
may have an indirect impact on productivity and macroeconomic performance by changing 
the framework of competition and the incentives for innovation. The economic literature 
usually identifies three main channels through which product market reforms will indirectly 
influence macroeconomic performance. First, product market reforms are expected to boost 
competition among firms. This will in turn force firms to bring prices more in line with 
marginal costs and lead to a more efficient allocation of scarce resources (allocative 
efficiency). Second, firms will also seek to improve the utilisation of their production factors 
by organising their work more efficiently, trimming fat, and reducing slack (productive 
efficiency). Product market reforms also have an impact on macroeconomic performance 
through the possibility for firms to enter and exit markets. Barriers to entry and exit clearly 
influence the possibility for least efficient firms to exit and more efficient firms to enter, 
moving the market share from lower productivity to higher productivity firms. Third, product 
market reforms have an influence on the incentives of firms to carry out research, to innovate 
and to move to the technological frontier (dynamic efficiency). 
 
1.3. Previous work 
 
A recent report by the European Commission (2004) emphasises the central role played by 
product market reforms in the Lisbon strategy as they improve the framework conditions in 
which business operates, reduce the economic rents in the economy, promote business 
dynamism and stimulate innovation. Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that the medium 
to long-term gains in productivity due to product market reforms could be substantial and that 
these gains mainly operate through indirect effects.   
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Another recent report by Griffith and Harrison (2004) looked at the first channel and 
found that several product market reforms reduced the mark-up and that this increased 
competition is associated with higher levels of employment and investment; that reforms that 
increase competition are (perhaps counter-intuitively) associated with lower levels of labour 
productivity and lower levels of total factor productivity; and that there is also a non-linear U-
shaped relationship between competition and the levels of R&D expenditure, the growth rate 
of labour productivity, and the growth rate of total factor productivity. The objective of the 
present study is to analyse the second channel by measuring the impact of product market 
reforms on macroeconomic performance, in particular through their effects on firms’ entry 
and exit. 
 
1.4. Outline of the study 
 
The study is divided in six sections. Section 2 establishes a critical and exhaustive survey 
of the economic literature that analyses the impact of product market reforms on 
macroeconomic performance via entry and exit, and its possible interactions with competition. 
The entry and exit of firms is determined by a series of factors that are specific to firms, 
industries or countries and at the same time it is part of the market selection process by which 
resources are reallocated within industries, thereby having an impact on economic 
performance. Apart from purely economic variables, government also plays an important role 
in shaping industry and country parameters by the amount of regulation it chooses across the 
economy and within given sectors. In section 2, we survey the literature that deals with these 
three aspects. We begin by presenting the studies that explain the determinants of firm entry 
and exit both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. We then proceed to survey the 
literature on the impact of firm entry and exit on economic performance, measured mainly by 
aggregate productivity growth. In addition, we look at how the amount of business and 
economic regulation affects economic performance. 
Section 3 aims at presenting the different available data sources necessary to carry out the 
study. In particular, the suitability of the information and data for modelling purposes is 
verified. The study covers 9 EU Member States and focuses on the period 1997 to 2003 as 
well as the US for the sub-period 1999-2001. Whenever possible, the study differentiates the 
impact on performances across countries and across sectors at the NACE 2 level. Among the 
main product market reforms and regulations indicators available, we can mention the 
decrease in red tape and administrative burdens for companies, the ease of starting a new 
business, the level of price controls, the size of the public sector in the economy and the 
liberalisation of network industries. 
Section 4 discusses the methodology and the modelling strategy used to assess the impact 
of product market reforms on firm entry-exit and macroeconomic performance.  
In a first stage, the direct impact of product market reforms on entry-exit is estimated by 
means of appropriate estimation methods and relevant controls. In a second stage, we estimate 
the indirect effects of product market reforms on several macroeconomic performance 
indicators that include growth of output, labour productivity, employment, and investment in 
both physical and intangible capital. 
Section 5 presents the results of the study. The objective here is to evaluate - both 
theoretically and empirically - the direct effects of product market reforms on firm entry-exit 
and the indirect ones on macroeconomic performance. 
Finally, some relevant policy conclusions and issues for further investigation are 
discussed in the final section.  
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2. Entry, exit, economic performance and the degree of economic and 




Firm entry and exit is part of the market selection process by which resources are 
reallocated within industries and encourages the introduction of new technologies, thereby 
having an impact on economic performance. At the same time, a series of firm, industry and 
country specific factors as well as entry barriers and entry deterrence strategies help determine 
the amount of entry and exit. In fact, the process of entry and exit influences economic 
performance through different channels such as factors internal to the firm, reallocation of 
resources among firms and changes in market shares of incumbents. Finally, public 
intervention through the implementation of different product market reforms can also 
influence the entry and exit of firms, which in turn affect economic performance. In this 
section, we survey the vast theoretical and empirical literature that deals with these different 
aspects. Figure 1 illustrates the red line followed in this exercise.  
 









We begin in section 2.2 by presenting a series of theoretical studies that model the entry 
and exit process. They can be classified into models of passive and active learning, capital 
vintage models and product life cycle models. 
In Section 2.3, we present a number of stylised facts on the types of entry into the 
industry, the correlation between firm entry and exit rates and of firm growth rates. We then 
review the main determinants of firm entry and exit. These determinants can be classified into 
‘basic’ and entry deterrence strategic ones. A further distinction is made according to which 
they are specific to the firm, the industry and the country or they are determined by both firm 
and industry characteristics. 
In Section 2.4, we look at the impact of firm entry and exit on economic performance. As 
we will see, a large majority of studies focus on the impact of entry and exit on aggregated 
productivity growth. After presenting the various decomposition methods of aggregate 
productivity growth used in the literature as well as the measures of the level of aggregate 
productivity, we summarise the findings on the contributions of entry and exit, within firm 
productivity growth and market share reallocation to aggregate productivity growth. After 
evoking a series of stylised facts on the productivities of entrants, survivors, firms that exit the 
industry, exporters and non-exporters and firms switching from one industry to another, we 
continue the review by discussing the indirect impact of entry on productivity growth through 
its effect on innovation.  
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In Section 2.5, we review the empirical studies that investigate the impact of product 
market reforms on both firm entry and exit and economic performance. We begin this section 
by briefly discussing the direct and indirect channels through which these reforms enhance the 
functioning of the economy.  
Section 2.6 summarises and presents the main findings of this survey of the literature, 
which serves as a basis for the modelling of the regressions and the data necessary to carry out 
the analysis. 
 
2.2. Theoretical models on entry and exit 
 
Firm entry and exit is an important process that determines the evolution in industry 
productivity and structure and which has generated a substantial amount of literature aimed at 
better understanding this process from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. In this 
section, we discuss the main theoretical models describing the entry and exit process. These 
models can be considered as different variants of the models of creative destruction first 
introduced by Schumpeter (1942). Entry and exit play an important role in this process since 
they facilitate innovation and the adoption of new technologies by transferring resources from 
less productive firms to ones that are more productive. These models can be classified into 
passive and active learning models, capital vintage models and product life cycle models. 
 
a) Passive learning models 
 
The theoretical models of passive and active learning seek to model the entry and exit 
process that takes place within an industry as a function of firm and industry specific 
determinants. In passive learning models, heterogeneous firms enter the industry without 
knowing what their true productivity is and they gradually learn about it over time. In the 
early passive learning models such as the one developed by Jovanovic (1982), industry and 
firm characteristics are given and are not changed. The entry and exit process is modelled as a 
number of heterogeneous firms that enter the market without knowing their true costs and 
therefore their efficiency. Once they pay a one-time cost to enter the market, they experience 
productivity shocks and gradually learn about their true costs in the following way. The firm 
uses all the information it has up to the prior period in order to choose the level of output that 
maximises its expected profits. Once it has taken its output decision, the productivity shock 
occurs and the firm observes its true costs for that period. It then decides whether to remain in 
the industry for one more period by comparing the value of doing so and behaving optimally 
to the expected present value of its fixed factor if it is employed in a different activity. In 
equilibrium, the profitable firms remain in the industry whereas the unprofitable ones leave. 
The way in which the entry and exit process is modelled implies a link between firm size and 
growth respectively, and firm exit and survival. Survivors have a larger size and a higher 
growth rate over time than those that exit the industry. 
Passive learning models have since been extended to show how changes in the structural 
characteristics of an industry such as entry costs, demand and the productivity shock 
process affect firm turnover and distribution. Such an extension is presented by Hopenhayn 
(1992). Here, more specific assumptions are made on the productivity shock process in that 
the higher the productivity shock in the present, the more likely are productivity shocks in the 
future. At the same time, the firm bases its decision to exit or remain in the industry in a given 
period on whether the productivity shock in that period is lower than the minimum 
productivity level necessary for it to have positive discounted expected profits over future 
periods. All incumbent firms must pay a fixed cost each period. In equilibrium, there are 
simultaneous flows of entering and exiting firms if the entry cost is sufficiently small.  
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Increasing the cost of entry into the industry insulates the incumbent firms from the effects of 
market selection and allows them to endure low productivity for longer periods before exiting 
the market. It also decreases the number of firms that enter the market, thereby decreasing the 
firm turnover rate. An increase in the cost of entry also leads to a larger divergence between 
the productivity of surviving and exiting firms. 
 
b) Active learning models 
 
In active learning models such as the one proposed by Ericson and Pakes (1995), a firm 
enters the market and actively invests to increase its productivity. The outcome of the 
investment is uncertain, but if it is favourable, the firm advances to a better state in which it 
increases its profitability. The firms will move to less favourable states if the outcomes of its 
competitors, of which the firm does not know the amount of investment, are favourable or if 
there are advances in alternatives to the industry’s products. Exit takes place if the firm’s 
investment generates a series of unsuccessful outcomes and the firm decides that it is better 
off by salvaging its remaining resources and committing them to other ends. 
 
c) Capital vintage models 
 
Another class of models that falls under this category is the capital vintage models
1, which 
assume that new technology is embodied in more recent vintage capital. Here the entry of 
new firms plays an important role in the adoption of new technologies since, unlike 
incumbents, they do not have to incur the costs of upgrading their capital. In endogenous 
R&D based models of economic growth (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 
1992), firms invest in R&D to create new varieties of existing products or to replace existing 
products with higher quality ones. Those firms that are successful in their innovation process 
enter the market and replace old firms producing obsolete goods. 
 
d) Life cycle models 
 
Finally, in product life cycle models (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper, 1996), firm 
creation and innovation depend on the degree of maturity of the industry with high levels of 
firm creation and innovation in young industries and a slowdown in firm creation and a 
change in the nature of innovation once the maturity of the industry increases. Starting from 
the observations that firm entry tends to come in waves that peak fairly early in the life of 
many markets and that the entry of new firms allows the introduction of innovations that 
would not be introduced in the absence of entry, Geroski (1995) proposes the following 
mechanism. At the beginning of the introduction of innovations, the industry is characterised 
by high entry rates as new firms propose a large number of new product designs. However, 
with the passage of time consumers learn about the properties of the new product designs and 
start focusing on particular characteristics and in the end on a particular design. Firms then 
stop competing in terms of product design and start competing in terms of prices and costs in 
supplying that particular design. Entrants may be at a severe disadvantage in the second type 
of competition and consequently their impact on industry structure and performance 
decreases. However, at various points in time, there are exogenous shifts in demand or costs, 
which decrease entry barriers and if the incumbent firms fail to adapt to these shifts, entry into 
the industry increases again and plays an important role in determining industry structure and 
performance. 
                                                 
1 See for example Campbell (1997) or Cooper et al. (1997).  
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e) Summary 
 
In this section, we reviewed a number of theoretical models of firm entry and exit. In 
particular, we looked at passive learning and active learning theoretical models of firm entry 
and exit. These models can be considered as part of a larger class of Schumpeterian models on 
creative destruction along with capital vintage models, R&D based models of economic 
growth and product life cycle models. In passive learning models, firms are unsure about their 
productivity when they enter the market and gradually learn about it over time. If they find 
out that their productivity is too low they exit the market. At the same time, changes in 
industry structure affect firm entry and exit, with increases in entry costs leading to a low firm 
turnover rate. In active learning models, firms invest in enhancing their productivity once they 
have entered the market. If they are successful, they remain in the market and grow, whereas 
if they are unsuccessful they exit the market. In capital vintage models, new technologies are 
embodied in new vintage capital and the entry of new firms plays an important role in 
adopting new technologies. In R&D based models of economic growth, firms invest in R&D 
in order to create new products or higher quality versions of existing products. Successful 
firms in innovation enter the market and replace firms producing obsolete goods. Finally, in 
product life cycle models the amount of firm creation and the type of innovation depend on 
the degree of maturity of the industry. 
 
2.3. Determinants of firm entry and exit
2 
 
It follows from the review of theoretical models that firm and industry specific 
determinants play a major role in the entry-exit process. In this section, we survey more 
carefully the different determinants of entry and exit found in the theoretical and the empirical 
literature and which can be classified into ‘basic’ determinants and entry deterrence strategies. 
Within each of these categories the determinants can be specific to the firm or the industry; 
they can be influenced both by firm and industry characteristics or be specific to the country. 
 
2.3.1. Basic determinants 
 
Studies in the theoretical and the empirical literature have examined the relationship 
between firm entry and exit and a number of basic determinants. Size, age, firm growth rates 
or the turnover of managers in small businesses are all specific to the firm. The relationships 
between lagged entry and exit are determined at the industry level, whereas past profits, 
adjustment costs and firm survival are influenced by both developments within the firm as 
well as within the industry. Finally, the degree of economic development and macroeconomic 
shocks also have an impact on entry and exit rates and are specific to the country under 
investigation. 
 
a) Firm specific determinants 
 
Empirically, the literature has uncovered a number of stylised facts regarding the different 
types of entry into the industry, the correlation between entry and exit rates, the 
variability of entry and exit rates and the variance of the firm growth rate
3. According to 
Mata (1993), firms can enter an industry through various forms. He distinguishes between de 
                                                 
2 For a summary of the main findings of the studies presented in this section, see Table A.1 in Appendix 1. 
3 Most of these stylised facts are presented in comprehensive surveys (see Geroski, 1995 and Caves, 1998), 
whereas the paper by Bartelsman et al. (2003) offers a number of comparisons between European countries and 
the US.  
  - 14 -
novo entry, the opening of new establishments by incumbents, the opening of new 
establishments by firms established in related industries that may be seeking economies of 
scope by expanding their activities and the opening of new establishments by firms from 
related industries engaged in pure diversification.  
There is a relationship between firm entry and size in that entrants tend to have a small 
size that is lower than the average firm size found in the industry
4. Some authors
5 have 
uncovered evidence that firms that enter the market with a small size do so because they 
consider that their chance of success is small. However, if after entry, results seem promising, 
small sized firms have the option of investing heavily. The implication of this finding is that 
the structural factors characterising an industry and which were originally thought of as 
constituting barriers to entry for firms may in fact constitute barriers for successful entry. A 
relationship was also found between firm exit and size, with firms exiting the industry having 
a smaller size than the average size of the industry and with many small firms exiting the 
industry before reaching their efficient scale of production, which may reflect the intensity of 
the market selection process. In general, the size of incumbent firms was found to vary across 
countries and regions, but as a general tendency, Bartelsman et al. (2003) found that the size 
of firms in Europe is smaller than in the US because of industry peculiarities and differences 
in the sectoral composition of the economies. Firm size also has a larger variability across 
sectors in countries that have large domestic markets. Firm exit was found to be influenced by 
age particularly in the case of small businesses, where firm youth is one of the main factors 
explaining small firms’ high exit rates.  
The finding according to which young firms tend to exit the market after a relatively short 
period of activity is certainly linked to the fact that newly created firms generally enter the 
market with a small amount of own funds. As they are not competitive enough during the first 
years of their existence, they make losses that mechanically decrease the level of their own 
funds. After two or three years, the latter become insufficient to allow the firm to pursue its 
activity and that is the reason why they go bankrupt. The same result may happen to newly 
created firms gaining market shares if they have no access to external funding and if the level 
of their own funds does not allow them to finance their expansion
6. Therefore, one important 
element among the determinants of exit is the initial amount of own funds and more generally 
the financial structure of the company. This refers to the well-known problem of the relatively 
low development of start-ups financing in the EU (such as risk capital funds or business 
angels) as compared to the US. 
At the same time, exits by older firms are less sensitive to industry growth disturbances 
than exits by younger firms. The size and age of firms are correlated with firm growth rates 
that are also influenced by industry and economy growth rates, but the sense of the 
relationship is unclear as there are firms that contract in expanding industries and firms that 
expand in contracting industries
7. At the same time, there is evidence that firms that exit the 
market had declining growth rates for several years prior to exit. The literature also found that 
manager turnover in small businesses had a tendency to predict sales or closures of the firm 
shortly afterwards.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Geroski cites studies by Hause and Du Reitz (1984), Cable and Schwalbach (1991), Geroski and Schwalbach 
(1991), Boeri and Cramer (1992) and Mata (1993). 
5 Studies among others by Churchill (1954), Mata (1991), Wagner (1994), Audretsch (1995a), Audretsch and 
Mahmood (1995) and Mata (1996) found empirical evidence in this sense. 
6 In Cincera (2003), young firms appear to encounter much higher liquidity constraints as regards the financing 
of their physical and R&D investments as compared to older firms. 
7 Caves (1998) cites most notably the studies by Dunne et al. (1989) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). This 
finding confirms Gibrat’s law that the size of units and their growth rate are statistically independent.  
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b) Industry specific determinants 
 
Once firms enter an industry, the literature uncovered various links between entry and exit 
rates, as industries with high entry rates also have high exit rates, but in these types of 
industries the overall impact on employment tends to be small given the lower than average 
size of both entering and exiting firms. An implication of the correlation between entry and 
exit rates in a given industry is that gross entry and exit rates are typically higher than net 
entry rates. Strong correlations were also found between entry and exit rates across industries 
and not just within industries. According to Caves’ (1998) survey, entry and exit rates tend to 
be positively correlated in industries with steady states of maturity, but varying structural 
entry barriers. The correlation between the two turns negative during the early and late phases 
of a product’s life cycle. Examinations of the variability of entry and exit rates found that the 
variance of entry rates within industries over time is higher than the variance of entry rates 
between industries. The variance of entry rates within industries not only changes over time 
but also tends to come in waves, with different waves containing different types of entrants
8. 
Other results show that the cross-sector variance of firms exiting within the first year is 
similar to the variance of entry rates, but the variance of exit rates lags behind that of entry 
rates over time. In terms of the variance of firm growth rates, the literature shows that it is 
large, which is consistent with the existence of adjustment costs, but it declines with the size 
of firms and the sunkness of capacity. 
Studies also found evidence of a lagged relationship between entry and exit rates in US 
manufacturing, with exits being much more responsive to entries over a five-year period than 
entries to exits. The literature also found evidence of a weak relationship between firm entry 
and high profits in that entry only reacts slowly to high profits in the industry. When entry is 
regressed on past industry profits, the relationship between the two is found to be 
insignificant
9. However, the link between entry and adjustment costs is stronger with the 
increase in adjustment costs penalising large-scale entry and rapid post-entry penetration 
rates. In terms of firm survival, studies show that the survival of entrants is low, with a large 
number of entrants failing within the first year
10. The firms that do survive need 5 to 10 years 
to be able to compete properly with incumbents, but the failure rates of these firms decrease 
over time. Firms that survive in the market have a larger size than those that exit and have a 
more rapid growth rate which declines with age however. The average size of surviving firms 
increases towards the efficient scale of production. 
 
c) Country specific determinants 
 
Firm entry and exit are found to be affected not only by firm and industry characteristics, 
but also by country level characteristics, as firm turnover is influenced by the degree of 
economic development, with less developed countries having higher turnover rates since 
they tend to concentrate on activities characterised by smaller sunk costs. Firm turnover is 
also influenced by various macroeconomic shocks. 
 
2.3.2. Entry deterring strategies 
 
An important part of the literature concentrates on the use of entry deterring strategies 
by incumbents to prevent new firms from entering the industry and decreasing their profits, as 
                                                 
8 See for example Saul (1962), Fearan (1969), Brock (1975), Gort and Klepper (1982), Katz and Phillips (1982), 
or Clark (1983). 
9 See for example Orr (1974) and Hilke (1984). 
10 High infant mortality is shown in studies by Churchill (1955), Audretsch (1991) and Baldwin (1995).  
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well as on the existence of structural barriers to entry. The classification of variables 
specific to the firm, the industry, influenced by both firm and industry characteristics and 
specific to the country can also be applied in this case. Entry deterring strategies such as limit 
pricing, predatory pricing, investment in excess capacity, filling in all product niches, 
masking the results of highly profitable units or the financial structure of firms are all 
determined at the firm level. The existence of structural barriers to entry such as economies of 
scale are given at the industry level, whereas some entry deterring strategies such as 
advertising or innovation intensities are partly determined at the firm level, but are also 
industry specific characteristics. Finally, there are also structural barriers to entry such as the 
administrative and legal framework, e.g. access to start-up capital, which are determined at 
the country level. 
 
a) Firms specific determinants 
 
One of the first theories developed on entry deterrence strategies was the limit price 
theory due to Bain (1956). In this theory, the monopolist is not concerned only with 
maximising current profits and thereby charging a price such that marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue, but takes into account the possibility that the extra normal profits that he 
obtains may tempt a new firm to enter the market, which in turn would lead to a decrease in 
profits. The monopolist will therefore charge the limit price, which is the highest price at 
which entry is deterred. The limit price theory has since been criticised because the outcome 
is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium since it assumes that the monopolist will continue 
producing the same output and charge the same price whether the new firm decides to enter 
the market or not and the new firm believes this. However, it is not in the monopolist’s best 
interest to continue producing the same output once the new firm enters the market but rather 
to compete with the new firm as a duopolist. 
Empirically not much evidence has been found to support the limit price theory. Orr 
(1974) is one of the earlier models that rely on the concept of limit pricing. In this model, 
entry is seen as a positive function of the difference between observed and entry limiting 
profit rates since the entry limiting firms will raise their profits until the expected post-entry 
profit rate of an entrant with the cost disadvantages imposed by entry barriers is equal to the 
entrant’s opportunity cost of capital. Entry into an industry will continue until the industry’s 
profit rate is driven to the point in which the expected rate of return on capital is equal to the 
opportunity cost of capital. The expected rate of growth of industry output is also used in 
order to control for the fact that limit pricing is more difficult to use in industries 
characterised by rapid growth where entry opportunities are larger. The long run or entry 
limiting profit rate is calculated as a function of a number of entry barriers, as well as industry 
concentration, with high concentration signalling the possibility that established firms are 
colluding to limit entry. The observed profit rate is measured as the average level of the past 
industry profit rate, and partly captures the extent to which economic rents have been captured 
by existing firms. Orr found that the impact of the difference between observed and entry 
limiting profit rates on entry is insignificant. This result holds both when the estimations are 
done for the entire sample or separately for high and low entry barrier industries. Bunch and 
Smiley (1992) used a different approach and conducted a survey among company product 
managers in the US that asked whether entry deterrence strategies were used in their 
industries and if so what the most frequent ones were. Again, limit pricing was among the 
least often used entry deterrence strategies in both new product markets and in existing 
mature product markets.  
Another way for the incumbent firm to fight entry discussed in the literature is with 
predatory pricing whereby the incumbent threatens that if a new firm enters the market it  
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will engage in a price war and will cause the incumbent to make losses. This theory was also 
criticised because the pay-off for the incumbent will always be higher if he accommodates the 
new entrant than if he initiates a price war making the threat of predatory pricing not credible. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) however showed one exception in which the incumbent can 
successfully threaten the use of predatory pricing if he faces possible entry in an infinite 
number of separate markets. In this case, where the assumption is that new firms will enter 
markets sequentially, the incumbent has the choice between accommodating the new entrant 
on the first market and fighting entry by predatory pricing. He knows that if he accommodates 
the entrant on the first market he will have to do the same in all of the other markets and entry 
takes place in all of the markets since all of the other firms expect to be accommodated once 
they enter. If he fights entry by predatory pricing on the first market, he will avoid entry on all 
the other markets. Predatory pricing is therefore successful in deterring entry, but this no 
longer holds if the incumbent faces possible entry on a finite number of markets.  
The advancements in game theory allowed determining that the reason why neither the 
limit price nor predatory pricing strategies constitute credible threats is the absence of a pre-
commitment mechanism. This has led a number of economists to focus on sunk costs as such 
a mechanism since by incurring irreversible costs in the present the incumbent firm can affect 
competition in the future and be able to deter new entry in a successful way. Sutton (1991) 
made a distinction between endogenous and exogenous sunk costs with firms able to 
influence the former but not the latter.  
One type of sunk cost analysed in the literature is investment in capital in order to build up 
excess capacity. Spence (1977) is one of the first to have developed such a model, which 
assumes that a potential entrant believes that the incumbent’s post-entry output equals its pre-
entry capacity. Knowing this, the incumbent firm increases its pre-entry capacity to higher 
levels than it will actually use in production, thereby creating excess capacity. Dixit (1980) 
finds that if firms play a post-entry game according to Nash rules, the incumbent firm will not 
invest in additional capacity that would not be used during pre-entry. Empirically, not much 
evidence was found that incumbent firms used excess capacity to deter entry. Lieberman 
(1987) studied US chemical products industries and found that most of the excess capacity 
held by firms was used to accommodate investment lumpiness and demand variability rather 
than deter entry. He found evidence that incumbents held excess capacity for entry deterrence 
purposes in only three of the thirty eight products taken into consideration. The regressions 
also showed that the probability of new plant investment was not influenced by the 
occurrence of entry during the year, but rather by more rapid market growth and higher 
capacity utilisation. Hilke (1984) also found that excess capacity did not have a significant 
impact on entry. In surveys among firms conducted by Bunch and Smiley (1992), Singh et al. 
(1998) and Chang and Tang (2001), the build-up of excess capacity was also cited as being 
one of the least used entry deterrence strategies by firms.  
Other commonly used entry deterrence strategies cited by firms in the surveys conducted 
by Bunch and Smiley (1992), Singh et al. (1998) and Chang and Tang (2001) are refilling all 
product niches and masking the results of highly profitable units. 
Martin (2003) develops a more general version of the Eaton and Lipsey (1980) model in 
which firms use their financial structure as an entry deterrence strategy. In this type of 
model, incumbent firms use specific capital as a pre-commitment mechanism since, because 
an incumbent’s capital costs are unavoidable, entrants know that they will have to compete 
with the incumbent until the latter’s capital wears out. The way the firm finances its capital 
determines whether the use of industry specific capital constitutes an important barrier to 
entry or not. If it chooses to finance a large proportion of its capital by debt, the use of 
specific capital will not constitute a high barrier to entry since part of the costs are avoidable 
from the point of view of shareholders given that debt embodies the option to default which  
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becomes all the more attractive as the amount of debt increases and debt also postpones the 
payment of capital investment. This model has a Markov perfect equilibrium in which 
incumbent firms limit the amount of capital financed by debt and replace their capital before it 
wears out producing the monopoly level of output. The amount of capital that can be financed 
by debt increases with duopoly profits and the durability of capital and decreases with capital 
costs and the discount rate. In equilibrium, entry does not occur since incumbents maintain 
their barrier to entry. Martin (2003) also tested his model empirically by using data on 
Canadian industries. The results show that the turnover rate has a positive impact on the debt 
to asset ratio since industries with low turnover rates use highly specific firm capital thereby 
having high barriers to entry. Incumbents in such industries will limit the amount of debt 
financing in order to avoid compromising the entry barrier. There is also a negative 
relationship between the degree of concentration in an industry and the debt to asset ratio 
since for firms in highly concentrated industries the consequences of being displaced are 
greater than in industries that are more competitive and therefore they will limit the amount of 
capital financed by debt. 
 
b) Industry specific determinants 
 
A frequently mentioned exogenous sunk cost at the industry level is the presence of 
economies of scale, which leads to the necessity of investing in the construction of plants of 
minimum efficient scale. The minimum efficient size plant is also seen as a barrier to entry 
in the limit price theory since in industries where economies of scale are high enough that a 
plant of efficient size is large relative to the size of the industry, a limit price significantly 
higher than the competitive level price can be set without attracting entry. Empirically, Hause 
and Du Reitz (1984) found that an increase in the minimum efficient size of new 
establishments leads to a decrease in the entry rate. At the same time, when scale economies 
are measured as the minimum efficient size of new plants relative to industry employment, 
they have an insignificant impact on the entry rate. Kessides (1990a) finds that the rate of 
entry varies inversely with the required scale of entry. Kessides (1990b) also uncovers 
evidence that minimum efficient scale constitutes a significant barrier to entry. There is also 
some evidence in the literature of a relationship between economies of scale and the use of 
entry deterring strategies by firms. Bunch and Smiley (1992) found that in research intensive, 
concentrated markets populated by large firms, the presence of entry barriers caused by the 
necessity of having a minimum efficient scale of production acts as a substitute for entry 
deterring strategies, but is not very significant. In existing mature product markets, entry 
deterrence strategies are used particularly in industries where the entry barriers caused by the 
necessity to have a minimum efficient scale of production are low. 
Resource intensity can also be used to capture economies of scale as well as variances in 
demand and in the fundamental conditions of technology among different industries
11.  
Advertising and R&D intensities are variables that on the one hand represent endogenous 
sunk costs which can be influenced at the firm level and on the other hand are characteristic at 
the industry level.  
Advertising is seen as having an important influence on entry in empirical studies. 
According to Kessides (1986), advertising generates two opposite effects on entry. On the one 
hand, it creates a sunk cost barrier to entry, but on the other hand potential entrants perceive a 
greater probability of success in markets where advertising is important thereby encouraging 
entry. Advertising constitutes a sunk cost barrier to entry for the potential new entrant since it 
                                                 
11 See for instance Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman (1995) who use the OECD’s classification of manufacturing 
industries into natural resource-based, labour intensive, scale-economies-based, product differentiated and 
science-based.  
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is a necessary cost that cannot be recovered in the event of exit. Advertising increases product 
loyalty and reduces the perceived number of substitutes by enhancing differentiability. As a 
result, entry into an industry characterised by high levels of advertising poses a high risk of 
failure for the new entrant. At the same time, advertising can also be seen as reducing 
consumers’ search costs and inertia by informing them about the attributes and prices of 
products. It is therefore a means of overcoming product loyalty and increases the perceived 
number of product substitutes. In the regressions, Kessides includes the unrecoverable portion 
of the original investment in advertising in the event of exit, as well as the industry’s pre-entry 
level of advertising expenditure to sales. The results show evidence in favour of the fact that 
advertising has a sunk cost barrier effect on entry. At the same time, advertising is found as 
playing an information role and reducing consumers’ search costs and inertia. There was no 
evidence found that advertising plays a persuasive role and increases product loyalty while 
reducing the perceived number of substitutes. Therefore, while advertising constitutes a sunk 
cost barrier to entry, potential entrants also perceive a greater probability of success in 
industries where advertising plays an important role. Thomas (1999) found that incumbent 
firms use advertising to limit the scale of entry. At the same time, incumbent firms are more 
likely to respond to large-scale entry, but less likely to respond aggressively to new name 
entry since new brands are less likely to capture a large market share. On the contrary, 
product extensions are more likely to lead to new product introduction by incumbents since 
they are likely to capture significant market shares. Orr (1974) also found that advertising 
intensity is a strong barrier to entry. Dividing the sample into consumer goods and producer 
goods industries shows that advertising intensity is a statistically significant barrier to entry in 
the consumer goods, but not the producer goods industries. In the survey approach used by 
Bunch and Smiley (1992), advertising was found to be one of the most frequently used entry 
deterrence strategies aimed at creating product loyalty in new product markets that are 
research intensive, concentrated markets populated by large firms. Advertising is also used as 
an entry deterrence strategy in existing mature product markets characterised by high 
concentration and low entry barriers caused by the necessity to have a minimum efficient 
scale of production. 
Another endogenous sunk cost to entry presented in the literature is R&D intensity. 
Gilbert and Newberry (1982), for instance, develop a model in which they showed that firms 
that have benefited from monopoly profits would increase R&D spending strategically and 
patent the new product in order to prevent entry. If a new firm knows that this strategy is 
rational for the monopolist, it will not enter the industry. Furthermore, in this model, if the 
monopolist faces a perfect market for R&D inputs it has a credible threat of overtaking any 
rival firm that would run a competitive research program and the cost of pre-emption 
decreases towards 0. Empirically, Orr (1974) found that R&D intensity measured as R&D 
expenditures to sales only has a moderate importance as an entry barrier. Singh et al. (1998) 
however, surveyed firms working in the UK food, electrical engineering and chemicals 
industries and found that a large number of firms mentioned the use of R&D for preventing 
new entry as well as meeting existing competition, with a somewhat higher priority given to 
the latter than the former. Chang and Tang (2001) used a similar approach for manufacturing, 
services sectors in Singapore, and found that R&D and patent pre-emption are chosen as 
frequent entry deterrence strategies. 
The impact of the entry deterrence strategies presented above varies with the different 
types of entry (Mata, 1993). De novo entry is sensitive to most entry barriers, whereas entry 
through pure diversification seems to be the form of entry that is least affected by the 
presence of entry barriers with capital requirements and incumbent’s diversification being the 
only two effective entry deterrence strategies. Entry through expansion occurs less in 
industries where economies of scale are important and is induced by product differentiation.  
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Entry through extension is also deterred by the presence of economies of scale as well as by 
product differentiation. 
 
c) Country specific determinants 
 
Finally, there are structural entry barriers such as access to start up capital that are 
determined at the country level. Brito and Mello (1995) develop a model in which firms do 
not have equal access to credit because of the presence of binding liquidity constraints. They 
show that firms that perform well after entry are able to signal that they are viable companies 




The theoretical and empirical literature on firm entry and exit identifies different 
determinants that can be classified into three categories according to whether they are firm, 
industry or country specific. Some determinants are both firm and industry specific. Table 1 
summarises the determinants of entry and exit according to these three categories. 
 
Table 1. Determinants of entry and exit at the firm, industry and country levels 
Firm specific determinants  Industry specific determinants  Country specific determinants 
type of entrant 
size 
age 
manager turnover for small firms 





filling in all product niches 
masking results of highly profitable 
units 
debt/asset (financial structure) 
lagged entry 
lagged exit 










subsequent growth rates of survivors 
advertising intensity 
R&D intensity, innovation 
degree of economic development 
macroeconomic shocks (business 
cycle) 
access to start-up capital 
 
There is generally a large number of small firms entering the industry and replacing a 
large number of obsolete firms exiting the industry, but not significantly altering the total 
number of firms present. At the same time, the survival rate of firms entering the industry is 
low and those firms that do survive need a number of years to increase their productivity 
levels to those of existing firms. Firms’ failure rates tend to decrease with the passage of time 
and firms usually enjoy a long tenure in leading positions. There is also evidence that exiting 
firms have had low productivity for several years prior to exit. Firm entry rates vary across 
time within an industry and tend to come in waves with different waves containing different 
types of entrants. Both entrants and firms exiting the industry have below average size with 
many small firms exiting before reaching their efficient size of production. Firm youth is one 
of the main factors explaining small firms’ high exit rates. Firm growth rates are correlated 
with the size and age of firms and are influenced by industry and economy growth rates. 
Manager turnover in small businesses can predict sales or closures of the firm shortly 
afterwards. There is also evidence of a lagged relationship between entry and exit rates.  
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In the final part of the section, we looked at entry barriers and entry deterrence strategies. 
The limit price theory is among the first theories developed concerning entry deterrence 
strategies. Here the producer charges the limit price, which is the highest price at which entry 
is deterred, instead of the traditional monopoly price. In the predatory pricing theory, 
incumbent firms threaten potential entrants with a price war if they enter the market. 
Advancements in game theory led to criticisms that both of these theories are flawed since 
they do not pose credible threats to entry because of the absence of a pre-commitment 
mechanism. New game theory models have generally focused on sunk costs such as 
advertising costs, excess capacity or R&D intensity as pre-commitment mechanisms and have 
studied their impact on firm entry empirically. The presence of economies of scale also has an 
influence on firm entry. The amount of capital financed by debt is also considered as an entry 
deterrence strategy since it influences the firm specific capital used as a barrier to entry. 
Finally, the entry rate can also be influenced by firms’ access to credit financing. 
 
2.4. The impact of firm entry and exit on economic performance
12 
 
A large part of studies on the impact of firm entry and exit on economic performance 
concentrate on the relationship between firm entry and exit and productivity growth. The 
direct impact of firm entry and exit on aggregate productivity growth comes through the 
latter’s decomposition into three sources
13. The first source known as the ‘within effect’ or 
internal restructuring refers to productivity growth of individual firms in the industry. It 
comes from factors internal to the firm such as organisational change, the introduction of new 
technologies, increased competition, R&D activities or a change in the mix of labour and 
capital. The other two sources of productivity growth at the aggregate level refer to so-called 
‘external restructuring’ whereby the process of market selection leads to a reallocation of 
resources among individual firms. This in turn is done in two ways. First, there is a process of 
creative destruction by which low productivity firms exit the market and are replaced by 
new entrants that are themselves heterogeneous. Among them, the most efficient ones will 
survive, while the least efficient ones will exit the market in subsequent periods. Second, there 
is a change in market shares among incumbents, which will also have an impact on 
aggregate productivity growth. There are also a number of important interactions between the 
various sources of aggregate productivity growth.  
In this section, we present the empirical results of studies concerning the contributions of 
each one of the three sources mentioned above to aggregate productivity growth. The 
literature also uncovered a number of stylised facts concerning the relationships between the 
productivities of entrants, survivors and firms that exit the industry. The productivities of 
exporting and non-exporting firms and those switching from one industry to another were also 
analysed. Apart from the direct impact of firm entry and exit on aggregate productivity 
growth, there is also an indirect effect through the impact of firm entry and exit on innovation, 
which in turn affects productivity. Here we present one of the most recent theoretical models 
of the impact of firm entry and exit on innovation, as well as the main empirical findings 
based on this model. 
 
 
                                                 
12 For a summary of the main findings of the studies presented in this section, see Table A.2 in Appendix 1. 
13 Box 1 in Appendix 1 presents the different ways of decomposing aggregate productivity growth into these 
three sources as well as the ways of measuring the level of productivity with studies generally choosing both 
total factor productivity and labour productivity since each has a number of advantages and disadvantages. This 
decomposition into three sources is also closely related to the concepts of allocative, productive and dynamic 
efficiencies as discussed in Section 2.5.a.  
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a) Impact of entry-exit on aggregate productivity growth 
 
The contributions of the three sources of growth to aggregate productivity growth vary 
from one study to another, depending on the method of decomposition used, on the 
measurement of aggregate productivity, the time horizon over which changes occur, the 
business cycle, as well as on the country or industry under investigation. The entry and exit 
of firms from the industry is generally found to have an important contribution to aggregate 
productivity growth
14.  
Scarpetta et al. (2002) analysed several OECD countries and found that entry and exit 
contributed to between 20% to 40% of aggregate productivity growth. There were significant 
differences in the contributions of entry to aggregate productivity growth between Europe and 
the US. In the former, the entry of firms has a positive contribution to growth, but the effect is 
small, whereas in the latter, firm entry has a negative contribution to growth. On the contrary, 
the exit of low productivity firms has a positive contribution to aggregate growth across all 
countries. Differences were also found in terms of the importance of the contribution to 
aggregate productivity growth across manufacturing sectors. In high technology sectors, the 
entry of new firms has a larger than average contribution to total growth, whereas in mature 
industries the exit of firms has larger contributions to growth. The results also differ according 
to whether aggregate productivity is measured by TFP or labour productivity, with net entry 
having a strong contribution to TFP growth. Disney et al. (2003) found that the contribution 
of entry and exit to aggregate productivity growth, when the latter was measured by TFP, was 
sensitive to the business cycle and was larger in periods of economic slowdown (a higher 
contribution of entry and exit in periods of economic slowdown was also found by Hahn, 
2000). According to Foster et al. (1998), the contribution of net entry to aggregate growth 
depends on the horizon over which the changes are measured. When high frequency data are 
used, the contribution of entry and exit to productivity growth is low, but with intermediate (a 
5-year time horizon) or long run (a 10-year time horizon) data, the contribution of net entry is 
large. Baily et al. (1992) and Griliches and Regev (1995) found that firm entry and exit only 
had a small contribution to aggregate productivity growth for US manufacturing and Israeli 
industries respectively.  
Martin and Jaumandreu (1999) uncovered evidence that entry and exit play an important 
role in aggregate productivity growth in Spain. When distinguishing between entry with 
displacement effects where new entrants with superior technologies replace firms already 
established in the industry, and entry and exit due to market enlargements or contractions, 
they find that the former dominate the latter. They also find that gross entry and exit rates 
have a positive and significant effect on aggregate productivity growth if they are included 
separately in the regression, but the effect of exit rates becomes insignificant when they are 
both included together in the regressions. At the same time, structural tests show that firm 
turnover had a stronger impact on productivity in the period before Spanish integration in the 
EU. 
The contribution of increases in incumbent firm productivity was also found to be an 
important source for aggregate growth
15. Foster et al. (1998) uncovered evidence that the 
contribution of the within plant effect to aggregate growth is lower if the within plant effect is 
weighted by fixed initial weights for plant multifactor or labour productivity than if it is 
weighted by the average time series share of activity. Scarpetta et al. (2002) uncovered 
evidence that across manufacturing industries, the within effect had larger contributions to 
growth in mature industries. It also has a higher contribution to growth in periods of economic 
expansions. The contribution of the within effect to aggregate productivity growth remains 
                                                 
14 See among others Aw et al. (1997), Foster et al. (1998) or Hahn (2000). 
15 See Griliches and Regev (1995), Aw et al. (1997), and Scarpetta et al. (2002).  
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important, but is smaller when productivity is measured by TFP than when it is measured by 
labour productivity. The results on the contribution of market share reallocation to aggregate 
productivity growth are mixed. Griliches and Regev (1995), Aw et al. (1997) and Hahn 
(2000) found that the contribution is small, whereas Baily et al. (1992) and Foster et al. (1998) 
found that the contribution is important among US industries. According to Scarpetta et al. 
(2002), the contribution of market share reallocation is positive but typically small and varies 
widely from one country to another. It also increases in periods of economic slowdown. 
 
b) Types of entry and exit 
 
A number of stylised facts regarding the relationship between productivities of entrants, 
survivors and firms that exit the market, as well as those of exporting and non-exporting 
firms and those switching from one industry to another have been uncovered by the 
literature. 
Foster et al. (1998) found large and persistent productivity differentials across 
establishments in the same industry. The same study along with Disney et al. (2003) 
uncovered evidence that the productivity of entrants is higher than the productivity of firms 
exiting the industry. Griliches and Regev (1995) found the same relationship, but the 
difference in productivity between the two only becomes large in the last period before exit. 
Hahn (2000) found the reverse in Korean industries, whereas according to Baily et al. (1992) 
both entrants and firms exiting the industry have below average productivity. Firms entering 
the industry with low productivity also failed more often several years after entry, according 
to Aw et al. (1997). Entrants have lower productivity than incumbent firms (Olley and Pakes, 
1996; Aw et al., 1997; Hahn, 2000), but firms that survive in the industry experience an 
increase in productivity over time until it becomes approximately equal to that of incumbent 
firms (Aw et al., 1997; Hahn, 2000; Disney et al., 2003). The productivity of firms that exit 
the industry is lower than the productivity of survivors according to Griliches and Regev 
(1995) and Hahn (2000), but in the latter study the productivity differential between the two is 
not noticeable in the first year after entry. A productivity gap develops in subsequent years 
and persists over time. Both studies also found that firms that exit the industry in the future 
have significantly lower productivity in the present. Hahn (2000) also compared the 
productivity of firms that switch from one industry to another and found that it is comparable 
with the productivity of incumbent firms and higher than the productivities of firms entering 
and exiting the industry in question. Aw et al. (1997) also studied the Taiwanese export 
market and found that the productivity of firms entering the market is higher than the 
productivity of non-exporting firms after entry and in the years prior to entry. The 
productivity of firms that entered the export market and then left is higher than the 
productivity of firms that never entered the export market, whereas the productivity of 
continuous exporters is higher than that of new exporters. Baily et al. (1992) found that the 
productivity of old plants is only slightly lower than the productivity of new plants, whereas 
Griliches and Regev (1995) found that the productivity of older survivors decreases over time 
relative to that of firms established later. The latter study also found that the productivity of 
well run plants remains high for long periods, whereas the productivity of badly run plants 
remains low for long periods. 
 
c) Indirect effect via innovation 
 
Apart from their direct effect on productivity growth, firm entry and exit can also affect 
productivity growth indirectly, by stimulating innovation. Aghion et al. (2002) provide one 
of the most recent models on the impact of firm entry or the threat of entry on incumbent  
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firms’ incentives to innovate which in turn affects aggregate productivity growth. Firm entry 
or the threat of entry produces two effects on incumbents’ incentives to innovate. On the one 
hand, there is an escape entry effect according to which an increase in the threat of entry of 
new firms will increase the incentives to innovate in sectors that are close to the technological 
frontier because firms close to the frontier know that they can escape entry by new firms 
through innovation. On the other hand there is also a discouragement effect of entry 
according to which an increase in the threat of entry may discourage innovation in sectors that 
are initially far below their current technological frontier. In this case, firms know that they 
are too far away from the frontier to win against a new entrant and they decrease innovation 
since the increase in the threat of entry leads to a decrease in the expected payoff from 
investing in R&D. The model assumes an economy in which a final good is produced from 
intermediate inputs and is used in consumption, as an R&D input and as an input in the 
production of intermediate inputs. The firms producing the intermediate good differ in the 
technology used and can be situated on the technological frontier, one step or two steps 
behind. They can engage in innovation, which if successful, allows them to increase their 
productivity and keep up with the exogenous advancement in technology or if unsuccessful 
makes them fall behind the technology leader. The firms that are two steps behind have their 
technologies automatically upgraded by one step. In equilibrium, an increase in the threat of 
entry has a positive effect on innovation in sectors close to the technological frontier and may 
have a negative effect on innovation in sectors far below the frontier. An increase in the threat 
of entry also has a more positive effect on productivity growth in sectors close to the 
technological frontier and may have a negative effect on productivity growth in sectors below 
the frontier. Finally, a reduction in the incumbent firm’s ability to fight entry because of cash 
constraints for example, reduces the positive impact of an increase in the entry threat on 
innovation and productivity growth for firms that are already close to the frontier. 
In the second part of the paper, the authors test the model empirically using micro-level 
data for productivity growth and patenting activity for UK firms over the 1987-1993 period. 
US firms are considered as representing the world technological frontier. The results confirm 
the positive and significant effect on TFP growth in period t and a positive and significant 
effect of the import share variable on TFP growth showing that a stronger trade inflow leads 
to a similar reaction of domestic incumbents as foreign firm entry. Incumbent firms located 
far from the technological frontier are more likely to catch up by increasing their productivity 
faster than the industries closer to the frontier. In addition, the productivity of incumbent 
firms reacts more positively to entry in industries that are close to or above the world 
technological frontier. The results are similar when the patent count is used as the dependent 
variable and an inverted U-relationship is found between competition and innovation. 
Geroski (1989) used data for 79 3-digit industries in the UK to study the effects of 
competition embodied in new firms and ideas on aggregate productivity growth. He used an 
econometric model in which the difference between output and capital can be written as the 
difference between labour and capital and a variable θ  that describes all other changes in 
output. In the model variations of this variable is considered to illustrate the degree of 
competition in the markets. The results from the estimated regressions show that the domestic 
entry of firms and innovation led to an increase in productivity growth, with innovation 
playing the most important role, but domestic firm entry still having a contribution of around 
30% to productivity growth. On the contrary, foreign firm entry has a negative impact on 
productivity growth. In addition, according to the results, competition leads to movements to 
and outward of the production frontier that would not have occurred without it. 
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d) Summary 
 
The impact of firm entry and exit on aggregate productivity growth is summarised in 
Table 2. While most studies found a positive effect, results depend largely on the method of 
decomposing productivity growth, on whether productivity is measured using TFP or labour 
productivity, on the time horizon, the business cycle as well as on the country and industry 
under consideration. In the last two cases, the literature does not specifically identify the 
causes of these differences mainly because most of the studies are done for individual 
countries using national data sources that do not allow for international comparisons. 
However, the main causes may be found in the country and industry specific determinants of 
entry and exit which have been discussed in Section 2.3. Another main conclusion of this 
survey is that only a few studies in the literature have estimated the impact of entry and exit 
on other measures of economic performance than aggregate productivity growth
16. 
 
Table 2. Impact of Firm Entry and Exit on Economic Performance 
Type of effect  Type of impact 
direct via contribution to aggregate 
productivity growth 
positive effects which depend on: 
decomposition of aggregate productivity used 
time horizon over which changes are measured 
business cycle 
country and industry specific effects 
indirect via impact on innovation  inverted-U relationship which depends on closeness of the sector or 
country to the technology frontier 
 
Some studies found that firm entry and exit constitutes an important source of growth, 
whereas others found that the effect is close to zero. Studies on the indirect effect of entry and 
exit on aggregate productivity growth through innovation found an inverted U-relationship 
between competition and innovation. An increase in the threat of entry has a positive effect on 
innovation in sectors close to the technological frontier and may have a negative effect on 
innovation in sectors far below the frontier. At the same time, an increase in the threat of entry 
has a positive effect on productivity growth in sectors close to the technological frontier and 
may have a negative effect on growth in sectors below the frontier. Studies also found a 
positive relationship between innovation and productivity growth. Generally, studies have 
found that entrants have lower productivity than survivors do, but their productivity level 
compared to that of firms exiting the industry varies across studies. Firms exiting the market 
tend to have lower productivity than survivors do and a number of studies found that firms 
exiting an industry tend to have low productivity for a number of years before exit.  
 




In this section, we consider a further dimension and examine the impact of regulatory 
reforms in product markets on firm entry and exit as well as on macro-economic performance 
across EU countries, in particular investment and productivity growth in manufacturing and 
services sectors. 
We begin by reviewing the three main channels at the theoretical level through which 
product market reforms improve the functioning of the economy. We then look at the impact 
of labour market reforms on firm dynamics and productivity growth and we explore whether 
product market reforms led to a convergence of the business environment in OECD countries 
                                                 
16 To the best of our knowledge, Brandt (2004) is the only study in that respect. 
17 For a summary of the main findings of the studies presented in this section, see Table A.3 in Appendix 1.  
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and whether diverging patterns of reforms can explain different evolutions in terms of 
productivity growth among OECD countries. We also examine the empirical effects of the 
deregulation of the US telecommunications market on the allocation of output, firms’ capital 
stock and productivity as well as the probability of exit. 
 
a) Economic theory 
 
Besides the direct impact (cost reduction and removal of barriers to penetrate new 
markets), the indirect effects of product market reforms on productivity and macro-economic 
performance operate through their impact on market efficiency
18. More precisely, these 
indirect effects are usually viewed as operating through three main channels. 
 
•   Restoring allocative efficiency (Pareto optimal allocation of resources). When 
producers have market power, prices deviate substantially and persistently from marginal 
costs. As a result, the structure of consumption is distorted, total output is kept below its 
socially optimal level, not fully exhausting economies of scale and resources and factors 
of production are not used efficiently (internal allocative efficiency)
19. Furthermore, when 
competition increases, less efficient firms exit the market and market shares move to more 
productive firms (external allocative efficiency). 
•   Restoring productive efficiency. While firms produce at the lowest cost under conditions 
of competition
20, they begin to operate inefficiently (through overstaffing, higher wages, 
lack of response to new opportunities, poor management) in situations of weak 
competition. 
•   Fostering dynamic efficiency. This channel is an extension of the productive efficiency 
one and concerns product and process innovations. In the long run, such activities speed 
up the move to the technology frontier, which is a major source of growth. 
 
The indirect effects of product market reforms, as compared to the direct ones, on 
productivity gains are shown to be much more important (European Commission, 2004). The 
immediate impact of product market reform is in terms of allocative efficiency. On a given 
market, increased competition reduces monopoly rents, which translates into lower prices (i.e. 
prices closer to marginal costs). Even with unchanged nominal income, the outcome is higher 
demand and output in real terms. At the macroeconomic level, markets that are more 
competitive contribute to increased production, employment (through labour demand) and 
income. However, allocative efficiency gains are neither the only nor the most important 
outcomes of reforms. Pelkmans (1984) and Geroski and Jacquemin (1985) argue that 
productive and dynamic efficiency effects are far more important than allocative ones.  
 
b) Empirical studies. 
 
Alesina et al. (2003) study the impact of regulatory reforms in product markets on 
investment using a panel data approach. Their analysis concentrates on 21 OECD countries 
and three broad sectors: transport, communications and utilities. The underlying theoretical 
model assumes that a monopolistic competitive firm uses capital and labour as inputs in order 
                                                 
18 See Nicodème and Sauner-Leroy (2004) for a discussion. 
19 Since total output in the sector is below the social optimal level, some factors of production are allocated in 
other sectors. 
20 More precisely, in the short term, when at least one production factor is fixed, a firm will produce efficiently 
when the factors of production are organised in such a way that the average cost of production is at the lowest 
point.  
  - 27 -
to produce a differentiated product. Initially, the number of firms in an industry is determined 
by the regulatory authority and so a deregulation of the product market leads to a larger 
number of firms and to a decrease in the price mark-up. The model also assumes that product 
market reforms affect adjustment costs, and in particular, deregulation decreases costs. This 
allows capturing the reduction in the shadow and actual cost of doing business associated with 
red tape and other administrative impediments that hamper firms’ choices. The model shows 
that an unanticipated permanent increase in the number of firms allows operating a decrease 
in the price mark-up and leads to an increase in the steady state value of the capital labour 
ratio. It also leads to an increase in the shadow value of capital, which in turn produces an 
increase in the investment rate until the new steady state is reached. At the same time, a 
decrease in the adjustment cost parameter for a given mark-up, leads to an increase in the 
steady state level of the capital labour ratio. Therefore, a regulatory reform that decreases the 
price mark-up or the adjustment cost parameter or both leads to a higher capital stock and to a 
higher marginal product of labour. The decrease in the mark-up leads to higher labour demand 
because the mark-up acts as a tax on the use of labour for each given level of the capital 
labour ratio. Given that labour is available in fixed supply, this also leads to higher 
equilibrium wages. The number of firms is then assumed endogenous and is influenced by the 
government indirectly through the regulation of entry. The number of firms present on the 
market is derived as a function of entry costs, the adjustment cost parameter, the depreciation 
rate and the fixed labour supply. The effect of a change in entry costs is decomposed into the 
impact of entry on the number of firms and the effect of the number of firms on the capital 
stock. According to the model, a decrease in entry costs generates an increase in the number 
of firms on the market, a decrease in the mark-up and an increase in the capital stock. In the 
end, the deregulation of product markets will have a positive effect on capital accumulation if 
it leads to a reduction in the mark-up or lowers the costs of adjusting the capital stock.  
Regulation affects investment through two additional channels. If it imposes a ceiling on 
the rate of return on capital invested, firms may invest in additional capital in order to increase 
the base to which the constrained rate of return on capital is applied to increase the total 
remuneration for capital. This leads to an alteration in the choice of factor proportions in 
favour of more capital use. Regulatory reforms consisting in removing the constraint on the 
rate of return of capital invested will then lead to a decrease in the desired level of the capital 
stock and in investment. The presence of public or semi-public companies will also influence 
the impact of regulatory reforms on investment. If public companies were heavy investors 
before deregulation, either because of a political mandate imposed on the managers to 
increase political support by setting prices below the profit maximising level or because of a 
manager’s incentives to increase the size of the company in order to increase his monetary 
compensation or power or perks, then privatisation processes consisting in reducing the role 
of public companies in the sector may lead to a decrease in investment. 
In the empirical part of the paper, the authors constructed a series of regulation indicators 
based on barriers to entry, public ownership, market share of new entrants and price controls. 
The investment capital ratio for each country, year and sector is regressed on the indicator of 
regulation, values of the investment capital ratio lagged once and twice, country fixed effects, 
sector fixed effects and common or sector specific dummies. The results show that tight 
regulation on product markets has large negative effects on investment and that deregulation 
leads to an increase in investment in the long run. Among the different deregulation measures, 
entry liberalisation is found to play the most important role for investment, with the reduction 
of entry barriers leading to a decrease in the mark-up and to greater investment. Industry level 
measures of privatisation are not found to affect investment significantly and contrasting 
forces are found to be at work for public ownership. 
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Griffith and Harrison (2004) studied the impact of product market reforms carried out in 
the European Union over the 1985-2000 period on macro-economic performance at the 
aggregate level across EU countries, as well as separately for the manufacturing and services 
sectors. The authors used the mark-up of price over marginal cost to capture the effects of 
changes in the regulatory regimes over time on the level of competition in product markets. 
The estimation is performed using a two step instrumental variable approach in order to solve 
certain endogeneity issues. First, the mark up is regressed on a vector of time and 
country/industry varying indicators of product market regulation, a measure of the output gap 
which captures country specific cyclical factors, country fixed effects and year dummies. In 
the second stage of the regression, the authors estimate the effects of the predicted levels of 
rents captured by the mark-up and estimated in the first stage on the demand for input factors, 
labour productivity and TFP. Therefore, the log of each of the factor inputs (investment for 
tangible capital, labour and intangible capital) are regressed separately on a function of the 
mark-up estimated in the first stage, the output gap, country fixed effects and year dummies. 
The results show a different impact on economic rents of product market reforms aimed at 
decreasing tariff rates, regulatory barriers to trade and public involvement in production, at 
removing price controls and easing market entry. There is evidence that labour and credit 
market reforms aimed at increasing competition and reducing the level of economic rents 
available in the economy led to an increase in employment and investment, especially in the 
services sector. At the same time, the reduction in the level of economic rents led to lower 
levels of labour productivity and TFP. The authors also find evidence that there is a non-linear 
relationship between the level of economic rents and levels of R&D and the growth rates of 
labour productivity and of TFP, with most countries having levels of economic rents where a 
decrease in rents leads to a reduction in R&D and labour productivity and TFP growth. The 
result that product market reforms in different countries led to different experiences leads to 
the question of whether it is possible to impose a common structure across different countries. 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) analysed whether the product market reforms implemented 
in OECD countries led to a convergence of the business environment and whether the 
diverging patterns of reforms can explain the different evolutions in terms of productivity 
growth among OECD countries. They do this by constructing a series of regulation indicators 
that cover both economy and industry regulations and are based on the assumption that 
regulatory patterns reflect regulatory failure or policies adverse to competition and not cross-
country differences in terms of public concern about the market failures that led to the 
regulations. The authors regress MFP growth for a given industry j of country i on the 
instantaneous effect of changes in the growth of the leader country, the pace of technological 
transfer, the technology gap between country i and the technology leader and an error term 
which captures all the other influences on MFP growth including the differences coming from 
different regulatory patterns across industries and countries. The error term can be 
decomposed into a vector of covariates including the structural features and the regulatory 
policies potentially affecting the level of MFP, unobserved country and industry effects, 
world macroeconomic shocks and a serially uncorrelated error term. The technological 
frontier is defined as the highest value of the MFP level relative to the geometric average in 
each industry in year t. The technological gap is then defined as the difference between the 
level of MFP and the frontier level in each industry and year. The results show significant 
links between product market policies and productivity performance, with entry liberalisation 
leading to productivity gains in all of the countries under consideration regardless of their 
position relative to the technology frontier. However, the countries most behind in terms of 
technology adoption and reform were found to benefit the most in terms of productivity gains 
from state retrenchment and the liberalisation of potentially competitive markets. There is also 
evidence that the privatisation process leads to additional productivity gains but this may  
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depend on whether the state maintains large stakes in the newly privatised companies and 
whether the process is accompanied by adequate promotion of competition in the markets 
where privatised companies operate. These results imply that there may still be sizeable 
benefits from further progress in reforming the regulatory environment and from decreasing 
the role of the state in business activities. Evidence was also found of a two fold effect of 
entry liberalisation over a ten year time horizon. Entry liberalisation in the services industries 
is estimated to boost annual MFP growth in the overall business sector, but an indirect effect 
of the removal of trade and administrative barriers to entry was also found. The latter depends 
on the technology gap that some countries accumulated in some manufacturing industries that 
were heavily regulated.  
Scarpetta et al. (2002) look at the impact of policies and institutions on the product and 
labour markets on firm dynamics and productivity growth. They regress the entry rate on 
market profitability which is proxied by the smoothed growth rate of industry value added, 
potential entry costs proxied by a measure of industry capital intensity and by indicators of the 
stringency of regulations susceptible of having an impact on entrepreneurship, industry 
specific indicators of product market regulations, an aggregate time varying indicator of the 
stance of regulation, indicators for employment protection legislation and the size of firms. 
The results show that the differences in entry rates across countries are statistically 
significant, but decrease once the differences in the industry composition across countries are 
controlled for. They find evidence of a non-linear relationship between entry rates and firm 
size, as well as of a different impact of industry growth on the entry of small firms with 
respect to the others. Administrative regulations of entrepreneurial activity are found to have a 
strong negative impact on firm entry and this effect is even larger for small and medium sized 
firms. When introducing labour adjustment costs, the negative effect of tight regulation on the 
product market on the entry rate is confirmed and additional evidence is found of a negative 
impact of tight regulations on hiring and firing on firm entry. 
The authors also look at the influence of policies and institutions in the product and labour 
markets on the differences in terms of productivity levels across industries and countries. TFP 
is regressed on country and industry specific factors and a catch-up term that is measured by 
the difference between the TFP level in a given industry and the highest TFP level amongst 
countries for that industry. The results show that the distance from the technological frontier 
has an important impact on productivity growth, with countries further behind the frontier 
experiencing higher rates of productivity growth. There is also evidence of a more rapid 
technological catching up process in the service industries compared with manufacturing. 
Tight product market regulations are found to have a direct negative effect on productivity 
and this negative effect is larger the further a country is from the technological frontier. 
Olley and Pakes (1996) studied the evolution in the US telecommunications industry 
before and after the deregulation that took place in 1987. They found that the more 
competitive industry structure that resulted after the deregulation of 1987 generated a less 
efficient allocation of output conditional on the total output produced and on the existing joint 
distribution of fixed factors, compared to the allocation of output before deregulation. 
Deregulation was also found to have increased the probability of exit from the market. The 
latter is also negatively related to the firm’s capital stock and productivity. Evidence was 
uncovered of firm entry and exit having contributed to the reallocation of capital and 
particularly the shutdown of unproductive plants led to a reallocation of capital that increased 
aggregate productivity. The estimations conducted above do not allow assessing the long-term 
effect of deregulation on the telecommunications industry since the latter will depend on the 
effects of R&D activity. 
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Finally, Brandt (2004), using a new data set from EUROSTAT covering nine EU 
countries on firm entry, exit growth and survival, examines both the role of policies and 
institutions on firm entry and survival and the link between new firm creation and economic 
performance. His results suggest that high rates of firm entry coincide with rapid productivity, 
output and employment growth, especially in the ICT related services sectors and in some 
business services industries, while in the more mature manufacturing industries marked by 
lower entry rates, expenditure on formal research and development (R&D) seems to be more 
important as a determinant of productivity growth. The author also reports a positive 
relationship between firm entry rates and policy regulations and institutions that support firm 
entry. In particular, the results suggest that an overly complicated license and permit system 




Table 3 summarises the types of product market regulations and the impact of 
deregulation on entry and economic performance. In a nutshell, studies found that regulatory 
reform leads to a higher capital stock or a higher marginal product of labour by decreasing the 
price mark-up and/or the adjustment cost parameter. They also lead to higher labour demand 
and higher equilibrium wages. A decrease in entry costs leads to an increase in the number of 
firms on the market, a decrease in the price mark-up and an increase in the capital stock. 
However, if there is a ceiling on the rate of return on capital invested, regulatory reforms 
removing the constraint will lead to a decrease in investment. Also, if public companies were 
heavy investors before deregulation, privatisation may decrease investment. Empirically, tight 
regulation on the product market was found to have a negative impact on firm entry, and 
investment, with deregulation and especially entry liberalisation increasing investment in the 
long run. 
 
Table 3. Types of product market regulations and impact of deregulation on firm entry 
and economic performance 
Product Market Regulations  Impact of Deregulation on Entry and Economic 
Performance 
barriers to entrepreneurship 
constraints to business operations 
red tape, administrative burdens 
public ownership 
price controls 
barriers to entry 
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers 
foreign direct investment restrictions 
market share of new entrants 
increase in investment 
increase in employment 
unclear effect on productivity (most studies found 
positive effect, but some found negative effect) 
positive impact on entry (in particular SMEs) 
 
Evidence was found that labour and credit market reforms led to an increase in 
employment and investment, particularly in the services sector, whereas the reduction in 
economic rents led to lower levels of labour productivity and TFP. A non-linear relationship 
was found between the level of economic rents and levels of R&D and the growth rates of 
labour productivity and TFP. Entry liberalisation led to productivity gains, with countries that 
were the most behind the technological frontier benefiting the most from state retrenchment 
and the liberalisation of potentially competitive markets. Privatisation leads to additional 
productivity gains under certain conditions. Administrative regulations of entrepreneurial 
activity have a strong negative effect on firm entry, which is larger for small and medium 
sized firms. The introduction of labour adjustment costs confirms the negative impact of tight 
regulation on firm entry and produces evidence of a further negative effect of tight hiring and  
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firing regulation on firm entry. Tight product market regulations also have a negative effect 





In this survey of the literature, we started by presenting a number of theoretical studies 
modelling the entry and exit process based on the Schumpeterian concept of creative 
destruction. In passive learning models, firms enter the industry without knowing their true 
costs about which they gradually learn over time. They then decide whether to exit or remain 
in the industry. In these models, increasing the cost of entry leads to low firm turnover. In 
active models, firms enter the industry and invest to increase their productivity. If they are 
successful, they remain in the market, if not they exit. Capital vintage models are based on the 
assumption that new technology is embodied in new vintage capital and new entrants have the 
advantage of not having to incur the costs of upgrading their capital. In R&D based models of 
economic growth, firms use R&D investment to create new products or higher quality 
versions. Successful innovators enter the industry and replace firms producing obsolete goods. 
Finally, according to product life cycle models, the amount of firm creation and the nature of 
innovation change with the degree of maturity of the industry. 
We then presented the ‘basic’ determinants of firm entry and exit, which can be specific to 
the firm, the industry, determined by both firm and industry characteristics or be country 
specific. The main conclusions and implications of the theoretical models appear to be 
consistent with these determinants as well as with a series of stylised facts about firm entry 
and exit. In particular, we found a positive correlation between entry and exit rates in 
industries with steady states of maturity and a negative correlation in sectors in the early and 
late phases of the product’s life cycle. The variance of entry rates within industries is higher 
than the variance between industries, it changes over time and tends to come in waves. The 
variance of firm growth rates is large, but declines with the size of firms and the sunkness of 
capacity. 
Firms entering and exiting the industry have lower than average size and the size of 
European firms is smaller than that of US firms. Young, small firms are the ones that most 
frequently exit the industry. Firm growth rates are influenced by the size and age of firms and 
are also influenced by industry and economy growth rates. Manager turnover in small 
businesses plays an important role in firm exits. A relationship was also found between lagged 
entry and exit rates, whereas only a weak relationship was uncovered between entry and past 
industry profits. The survival of new entrants is low and those that do survive need an average 
of 5 to 10 years to become competitive with incumbents. Lower degrees of economic 
development correspond to higher turnover rates. The latter are also affected by 
macroeconomic shocks. Entry deterrence strategies and structural barriers to entry also affect 
the entry and exit process and can again be classified into firm, industry or country specific, 
or determined by both firm and industry characteristics. Limit pricing where incumbent firms 
charge the highest price at which entry is deterred, and predatory pricing in which incumbents 
engage in a price war with new entrants were both criticised for not constituting credible 
threats to entry. Empirically, little evidence was uncovered for the use of limit pricing by 
firms. The use of sunk costs as a pre-commitment mechanism to deter entry was also analysed 
by the literature. The use of excess capacity to deter entry was found to be infrequent 
empirically, but some evidence was uncovered that firms use specific capital as a pre-
commitment mechanism. Advertising and R&D intensity were found to be used frequently as 
entry deterrence strategies, whereas economies of scale constitute an important structural 
barrier to entry that influences the use of entry deterring strategies by incumbent firms. The  
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impact of entry deterring strategies was found to depend on the type of entrant. Firm access to 
credit capital also plays a significant role in firm entry and exit. 
In the third step, we looked at the impact of entry and exit on economic performance as 
mainly measured by aggregate productivity growth. There is a debate in the literature on how 
to best decompose aggregate productivity growth into the contributions of within firm 
productivity growth, entry and exit and market share reallocation. Studies also differ on the 
best way to measure aggregate productivity with both TFP and labour productivity having 
certain advantages and disadvantages. In the end, the contribution of entry and exit to 
aggregate productivity growth can be high or low depending on the decomposition of 
aggregate productivity used, the time horizon over which changes are measured, the business 
cycle and the country and industry under investigation. Studies found that in general entrants 
have lower productivity than survivors as do firms exiting the market. The latter also tend to 
have lower productivity for several years before exit, whereas the relationship between the 
productivities of entrants and of firms exiting the industry is unclear. Entry and exit also 
affect aggregate productivity indirectly by influencing firms’ incentives to innovate. For 
sectors close to the technological frontier, an increase in the threat of entry has a positive 
effect on productivity growth, whereas for sectors far below the technological frontier the 
effect may be negative. Empirical evidence was found in favour of this last conclusion. 
One of the main objectives of this study is to assess the link between product market 
reforms and macroeconomic performance via their direct impact on firms’ entry and exit. The 
last section of the review of the literature explicitly addresses this question. In a nutshell, 
product market reforms aimed at enhancing the functioning of product markets can be viewed 
as public actions deregulating and facilitating entry or the threat of entry. These reforms 
concern the barriers to entrepreneurship, the constraints to business operations as well as red 
tape and administrative burdens on the one hand and price controls and entry barriers such as 
for instance tariff and non-tariff trade barriers on the other hand. Overall, these market 
reforms are shown to have a direct positive impact on firm entry (in particular SMEs) as well 
as an indirect positive effect on investment and employment. As regards productivity 
performance, no clear-cut conclusion seems to emerge as some studies report a negative 
impact of product market reforms on productivity growth while a majority of them found a 
positive effect.  
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3. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
Based on the findings of the literature review, this section aims at identifying the main 
data sources and indicators necessary to analyse the effect of product market regulations and 
determinants of firm entry and exit on economic performance via the entry and exit of firms 
and at presenting the main features of four different data sets constructed for the purposes of 
this study. The first data set contains information on entry and exit by country, sector and 
year, the second on entry barriers, the third on product market reforms and the fourth on 
aggregate economic performance indicators. For each type of information, the main available 
data sources, their strengths and weaknesses are briefly discussed and the definition and 
construction of the main variables used in the empirical analysis are documented. Finally, the 
main descriptive statistics for each data set are also presented. 
 
3.1. Data on firm entry and exit (business demography) 
 
a) Data sources 
 
In this study, we make use of a newly constructed data set
21. The information comes from 
the DUN & BRADSTREET database, which contains series on the number of entering (new), 
exiting (out of business) and continuing (active) firms by year, sector and country. The 
industry and services sectors are broken down into 35 classes according to the NACE 2 digit 
level (Table A.4 in Appendix 2). The database is a balanced panel data set that covers nine 
EU member countries over the 1997-2003 period: Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom
22. In addition, US data from the 
Census Bureau over the sub-period 1999-2001 have also been integrated into the analysis
23.  
 
b) Main variables used 
 
The entry-exit data set contains three basic variables: 
 
Tit = total number of firms active in the ith industry at the end of period t, 
Eit = number of new firms that entered the ith industry between period t and t+1, and 
Xit = number of firms that exited (out of business) the ith industry between period t and t+1. 
 
From the three basic variables, four additional variables have been constructed: 
 
NEit = Eit – Xit = net entry of firms in the ith industry at the end of period t, 
ERit = Eit/Tit = entry rate in the ith industry at the end of period t, 
XRit = Xit/Tit = exit rate in the ith industry at the end of period t and 
NERit = NEit/Tit = net entry rate in the ith industry at the end of period t. 
 
                                                 
21 See Box 2 in Appendix 2 for a brief discussion on other existing databases on entry-exit. 
22 Data for 2003 are only available for the first 11 months. 
23 In 1997, the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) has replaced the US Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC). Unfortunately, data between both industrial classifications are not directly comparable so 
that data prior to 1998 have not been considered in the analysis. Further comparability issues arise between the 
NAICS and the NACE 2 classifications and the US data refer to establishments while the Dun & Bradstreet 
database covers the enterprise unit. See Table A.4 in Appendix 2 for a correspondence between the NACE 2 and 
the NAICS.  
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c) Strengths and weaknesses of data 
 
Before presenting the main features of the data set, it is important to draw some attention 
on its main strengths and weaknesses. The main advantages of the entry-exit data set used in 
this study rest in the cross-country comparability of the underlying data thanks in particular to 
the harmonisation of the unit of measurement, the full coverage of the business registers and 
firms’ population, and the availability of recent data that ensure that up-to-date trends can be 
presented.  
 
Nevertheless, the data set has also some important weaknesses. A first drawback concerns 
the representativeness in terms of the number of countries covered. For instance, despite the 
large number of studies that have analysed the impact of entry barriers on firm turnover and 
aggregate economic performance for the US economy, this country is not available in the data 
set. A second shortcoming is that no information on the characteristics of entrants/exitors 
and/or mode of entry/exit is available. Among these characteristics, the size of new entrants 
and exiting firms, as discussed in the previous section, is important since entry is mostly the 
fact of small sized firms. As a consequence, while the entry rate can be significantly high, the 
market penetration rate (share of new entrants’ output in total industry output) is generally 
modest and so is its influence on incumbent strategies and on the industry post-entry 
evolution. The probability of firm exit has also been found to be decreasing with size and post 
entry growth is negatively related to the initial size. Furthermore, entry and exit can take 
several forms. As regards entry, new firms can be established from scratch (de novo entry) or 
by diversification
24. Firms can also exit an industry through a merger or an acquisition by a 
competitor. Finally, a distinction should also be made between domestic and foreign entry
25. 
As the determinants of entry/exit have different effects on different types of entrants/exitors 
and modes of entry/exit, the availability of this kind of information would allow a more 
detailed analysis of the impact of entry and exit on macro-economic performance. A third 
limitation of the data set rests in the lack of information as regards the post-entry performance 
of firms. As emphasised in Section 2, what happens to new entrants subsequent to their entry 
is as least as important as the entry process itself. The survival rates of new entrants for 
instance is found to be low and firms that survive in the market need some time (on average 
five to ten years) before they can properly compete with incumbents. Here also, data on post-
entry performance would allow one to better identify the role played by entry barriers and 
product market reforms on the market selection process and its long run dynamics. 
 
d) Descriptive statistics 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide some descriptive statistics based on the entry-exit 
data set and to highlight some stylised facts about entry and exit that emerge from these 
statistics. It follows from Figure 2, that aggregated entry rates for the nine EU Members are 
substantial. Large numbers of firms enter and exit most markets in most years. This figure 
also indicates that aggregated entry rates are, except in 2003, above exit rates and that the net 
entry rate is globally decreasing over the period investigated. The finding that there is both 
decreasing entry rates and increasing exit rates over the period may be explained by the 
                                                 
24 Mata (1993, p. 103) classifies established entrants according to the main industry of the parent company. “An 
entrant plant is classified as an expansion entry if it operates in the same industry where the owner firm was 
already operating, as extension entry if the parent firm operates in a different five-digit but in the same three-
digit industry, and as a purely diversifying entry if it operates in a different three-digit industry.” In his review of 
the literature, the author finds that the de novo entry type clearly dominates with 60%. 
25 See for instance Baldwin and Gorecki (1987).  
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influence of the cyclical effects. There seems indeed to be some correlation between the 
business cycle (as measured by the annual GDP growth in the Euro area) and entry and exit 
rates. Hence, this factor should be considered as a control variable in the econometric 
analysis. 
 
















Sources: Entry-exit data set, own calculations. 
Notes:   a) Belgium; Germany; France; Ireland; Italy; The Netherlands; Spain; Portugal, United Kingdom and US. 
b) First 11 months for 2003, 1999-2001 for the US. 
 
As can be seen in Figure A.1 in Appendix 2, the annual growth rate of the total number of 
active firms is generally positive but tends to decrease at the end of the analysed period, 
except for Germany and Portugal. Moreover, a similar trend is observed for most of the 
countries. This finding suggests the presence of common macro-economic shocks and 
common cyclical fluctuations across countries. 
 
Another stylised fact that emerges from the data set is that entry, exit and net entry rates 
differ substantially across countries (Figure 3). Spain and The Netherlands are the two 
countries with the highest net entry rates for the whole period analysed. As regards Spain, the 
growth of value added is among the highest among the countries for which data is available 
(Table A.10 in Appendix 2). At the other end, Italy and the US are characterised by the lowest 
net entry rates. Italy is also the country that exhibits the lowest entry rate. In terms of capital 
intensity, this country has the highest intensity (Table A.10 in Appendix 2). Small net entry 
rates are however not synonym of low firm turnover activity. For the US in particular, the net 
entry rate represents only a small fraction of the gross entry and exit rates. A similar finding, 
though of less importance, emerges for the UK economy. 
 
The importance of firm entry and exit also differs considerably across industry and 
services sectors (Figure 4). Post & telecommunications, real estate, renting & business  
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activities and electricity, gas & water supply represent the three sectors that experienced the 
highest net entry rates. This finding is mainly due to the size of entry, which is significantly 
higher as compared to the other sectors. The rapid pace of technological change in computer 
services that belong to the second services sector may involve a lot of creative destruction 
whereby innovations destroy obsolete technologies and entails the creation of a large number 
of firms. The size of entry can also be explained by the importance of regulatory reforms, in 
particular deregulation policies to open the market that have played a significant role in the 
two other sectors. In terms of capital intensity, however, real estate, renting & business 
activities and electricity, gas & water supply are the two services sectors that are the most 
capital intensive. As a result, economies of scale, which are considered as an important 
structural barrier to entry, are potentially important in these sectors and entry rates can be 
expected to be lower. The lowest entry rates are to be found in the wood, non metallic mineral 
products, instruments, fabricated metal products and machinery & equipment industries, while 
both entry and net entry rates tend to be small in paper and textile manufacturing sectors. 
These last two sectors are characterised by the lowest R&D intensities (Table A.9 in 
Appendix 2), whereas the wood sector is among the ones with the highest capital intensity. 
Finally, transport & telecommunications and office machinery & computers exhibit the 
highest entry rates. The importance of technological opportunity and because of innovation 
activities characterising these sectors as well as the importance of deregulation policies in the 
former sector can be seen as two major determinants explaining this finding. 
 
Figure 3. Aggregated entry, exit and net entry rates (in %) by country (1997-2003a) 















Sources: Entry-exit data set, own calculations. 
Notes:   a) First 11 months for 2003, 1999-2001 for the US. 
 
The examination of standard errors shows that the heterogeneity of net entry rates varies 
substantially across countries and industries and somewhat less across time (Table A.5 in 
Appendix 2). Furthermore, this heterogeneity does not appear to be related to the importance  
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of the net entry rate
26. Hence, countries or sectors with low net entry rates can be associated 
with an important variability of both entry and exit rates and conversely for high net entry 
rates. A similar pattern can be observed for the entry and exit rates variables. Yet, the standard 
deviations of entry rates are globally relatively more important as compared to exit rates. 
Several determinants can explain this heterogeneity across countries, time and industries. At 
the country level, more dynamic industry sectors in terms of firm entry may simply account 
for a larger part of the economy. At the industry level, the importance of structural 
determinants such as entry barriers as well as the scale and scope of product market reforms 
can vary a lot from one country to the other. 
 
Figure 4. Aggregated entry, exit and net entry rates (in %) by industry (1997-2003a) 


























Electricity, gas & water supply





Sources: Entry-exit data set, own calculations. 
Notes:   a) First 11 months for 2003, 1999-2001 for the US. 
 
The empirical literature on firm dynamics also suggests that most of the total variation in 
entry and exit is within industry rather than between industries. This finding is also verified in 
the present analysis. As shown in Table A.6 in Appendix 2, the comparison of entry, exit and 
net entry rates’ heterogeneity (or variability) across and within industries through the analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) indicates that most of the total variability is within rather than between 
industries
27. The same finding holds when within and between countries and time periods 
ANOVA are performed. 
                                                 
26 For instance, the tobacco industry has an average net entry rate of 0.9% and an associated standard error of 
7.5, which is much higher than the corresponding figures, observed in the electricity, gas & water supply 
services sector (average net entry rate of 5.9% and standard error of 4.3). 













µ − µ + σ = σ ∑ ∑   
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Another well established stylised fact in the literature concerns the positive correlation 
between contemporaneous rates of entry and exit across industries
28. As can be seen in Table 
A.7 in Appendix 2, this finding is also found in our data set, though the correlation 
coefficients turn out to be statistically significant only in a few industry sectors. Furthermore, 
these coefficients are also negative in some cases. According to Agarwal and Gort (1996), 
these positive correlations “make most sense for samples of industries in steady states of 
maturity but varying in structural entry barriers and the sunkenness of resource commitments. 
In early and late phases of a product’s life cycle these correlations indeed reverse to 
negative.”
29 Finally, for some sectors, the correlations between entry and exit rates are not 
significant. One reason explaining such a finding is that the determinants of entry may be 
different or may have a different timing than the ones inducing exit. Profitability is another 
argument, as supranormal profitability in a given sector with low entry barriers should 
stimulate market entry (and market exit in sectors with subnormal profit rates). 
 
Table A.8 in Appendix 2 shows the correlation between countries for entry and exit rates. 
This measure appears to be in general statistically significant and positive, especially for 
entry. Consequently, when entry (respectively exit) is important in one country, it is also 
important in other countries. This finding again suggests the presence of joint determinants of 
entry and exit as well as common business cyclical factors that affect firm turnover in the EU 
Member States and the US. 
 
e) Summary of main findings 
 
In a nutshell, the main findings emerging from the descriptive statistics of the entry-exit 
data set may be summarised as follows: 
•   Entry and exit are common. Large numbers of firms enter and exit most markets in most 
years; 
•   Entry (and exit rates) differ substantially across countries and industries; 
•   The annual growth rate of the total number of firms is generally positive but tends to 
decrease over the period 1997-2003; 
•   Heterogeneity of net entry rates varies substantially across time periods, countries and 
industries; 
•   Most of the total variation in net entry rates across industries is within-industry variation 
rather than between-industry variation. The same finding holds for within-country and –
time period and between-country and –time period variation; 
•   Entry (and to some extent exit) rates across countries are generally significantly and 
positively correlated. 
                                                                                                                                                         
where σ ² is the total variance, σ k² the variance in industry k, N the total number of observations, Nk is the 
number of observations in industry k, µ the total average and µk the average in industry k. 
28 See Caves (1998) for a review. According to the studies surveyed by the author, exit rates are found to be even 
more responsive over a five-year period than are entries to exits.  
29 Quoted in Caves (1998, p. 1957). The correlations between the two-year lagged entry and the current exit rates 
do not change the conclusions that follow from Table A.7 in Appendix 2.   - 39 -
3.2. Data on structural barriers to entry 
 
a) Data sources 
 
The construction of the main determinants of firm entry and exit are based on the OECD’s 
STAN and ANBERD databases. Part of the industry specific variables that will figure as basic 
control variables in the regressions come from the OECD’s STAN database. The STAN 
database contains information on production, value-added, gross fixed capital formation, 
employment and the volume of gross and net capital stock by country, sector and year. The 
industry and services sectors are broken down into 39 classes according to the ISIC Rev. 3 
classification code at the 2 digit level. The database covers all the countries in our sample 
except for Ireland, starting from 1970 through 2002. For the descriptive statistics section, we 
covered the 1990-2002 period. The R&D intensity variable is based on data taken from both 
ANBERD and STAN databases. The ANBERD database contains R&D expenditure by 
country, sector and year in national currencies and in PPP US dollars. The database covers 58 
manufacturing and services sectors according to the ISIC Rev. 3 classification from 1987 until 
2001. We have taken the series from 1990 to 2001 for the descriptive statistics section. All of 
the countries in our sample are covered with the exception of Portugal, but given that we do 
not have the production series for Ireland in the STAN database, we also dropped this country 
when we calculated the R&D intensity. 
 
b) Main variables used and data weaknesses 
 
Given the availability of data and the importance of the different determinants presented 
in the empirical literature, we selected the following variables: capital intensity, resource 
intensity and minimum efficient scale are alternative variables aimed at capturing economies 
of scale. The literature (Hause and Du Rietz, 1984; Kessides, 1990a; Kessides, 1990b) found 
evidence of a negative relationship between the existence of economies of scale and firm 
entry. According to Bunch and Smiley (1992), the presence of economies of scale acts as a 
substitute to the use by firms of entry deterring strategies. Industry concentration is an 
endogenous variable that can be considered as capturing the degree of structural economic 
barriers in an industry (Caves, 1998; Baldwin and Caves, 1998). High industry concentration 
can indicate high structural entry barriers, thereby having a negative effect on firm entry. At 
the same time, there is also empirical evidence (Baldwin, 1995) of a strong negative effect of 
turnover due to entry and exit on concentration. We also used a R&D intensity variable as a 
determinant of firm entry and exit because of the strong empirical evidence found in the 
literature (Singh et al., 1998; Chang and Tang, 2001) on the strategic use of R&D spending by 
firms to contest new entry as well as meet existing competition. We lack a series on 
advertising intensity, which is also identified as being a frequently used entry deterrence 
strategy by firms (Kessides, 1986, Thomas, 1999, Orr, 1974, Bunch and Smiley, 1992). 
However, the degree of differentiation within an industry is partly the result of entry 
deterrence strategies used by firms such as advertising intensity and R&D intensity, and 
therefore is used as a determinant of firm entry and exit. The growth rates of industry value-
added and employment are used to capture macroeconomic shocks as well as market growth, 
which also influence entry and exit. 
 
We also used a series of variables that capture market structure given the latter’s influence 
in determining the entry and exit of firms from industries. These indicators were taken from 
Davies and Lyons (1996) and Martins et al. (1996) and include minimum efficient scale, 
industry concentration measured in 1993, a dummy variable for whether industries are  
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differentiated or not
30 and a dummy variable that measures market segmentation. The main 
drawback for the market structure variables is that they are only available at the sector level 
and not at the country or year levels. We therefore assumed that the variables for a given 
sector are the same across all countries. Given that the sectors for which these variables are 
measured are classified using the NACE Rev. 1 classification code, it was necessary to 
convert these sectors according to the ISIC Rev. 3 classification code so that they can be 
compatible with the entry and exit determinants variables calculated above. In some instances, 
this implied aggregating several NACE sectors in order to obtain the corresponding ISIC 
sector. In this case, we took the average of the variables by NACE sector as the value of the 
variables for the global ISIC sector
31. For the dummy variables, this meant that there were 
cases in which one NACE sub sector was differentiated or segmented while the other sub 
sector was not. The global ISIC sector can therefore be classified as fully differentiated or 
segmented or not if all of the NACE sub sectors have dummy variables with the same value, 
or semi-differentiated or semi-segmented if the dummy variables have different values. 
 
c) Variables constructed 
 
Based on the series provided in the STAN database, we calculated the following variables: 
 
Capital intensity = gross fixed capital formation (in value terms)/production (at current prices), 
Resource intensity = production (at current prices)/value added (at current prices), 
Value-added growth = yearly annual growth rate of value added (at current prices) in percentage, and 
Employment growth = yearly annual growth rate of total employment (in persons) in percentage. 
 
We calculated value-added growth and employment growth in order to control for 
whether a given industry is expanding or contracting, given that according to the literature, we 
can have a high firm entry rate into industries that are contracting or a low entry rate into 
expanding industries. One way of capturing economies of scale, which are considered as an 
important structural barrier to entry, is by calculating the resource intensity of a sector. The 
capital intensity variable serves a similar purpose
32. 
 
Given the importance of R&D as a barrier to entry stated in the literature
33, we consider 
the R&D intensity to proxy this barrier.  
 
R&D Intensity = R&D expenditure (in national currencies)/production (at current prices). 
 
                                                 
30 This variable is constructed by using the level of advertising costs and R&D expenditure to measure whether 
an industry produces a differentiated product or not. 
31 It was necessary to calculate a simple arithmetic average since production values were only available at the 
global ISIC sector and therefore could not be used as weights for the NACE sub sectors. 
32 We also calculated capital intensity as the ratio between the gross and net capital stock respectively (in volume 
terms)/Production (at current prices), which are more accurate measures. However, because of a large number of 
missing observations for the net and gross capital stock we settled for the ratio of gross fixed capital formation in 
value terms to production as measuring capital intensity. In terms of employment growth, we took the series on 
total employment in persons, but we also looked at the series on total employment and employees in full time 
equivalent. The problem with the last two series was a large number of missing observations that would put too 
many limitations on our sample. 
33 The R&D intensity variable is also often used to capture technological opportunity, i.e. the potential for 
technological progress in general or within a particular field. As an alternative, patent indicators by industry 
sectors may also be considered. Whatever the indicator chosen, technological opportunity is in general difficult 
to distinguish from technological barriers.  
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d) Descriptive statistics: Summary of main findings 
 
The main conclusions from the descriptive statistics as regards the variables discussed in 
this section can be summarised as follows
34. In terms of evolution, there is little variation in 
R&D intensity in a given sector across countries and years. We found moderate variation in a 
given sector across countries and years for capital and resource intensity, as well as for value-
added and employment growth.  
 
There are sectors where the standard deviation is substantially higher for certain variables 
compared to other industries: real estate, renting and business activities for capital intensity, 
tobacco for resource intensity, office machinery and computers for R&D intensity and 
employment growth, refined petroleum and office machinery and computers for value added 
growth.  
 
In terms of averages, the most capital-intensive sectors are real estate, renting and 
business activities, post and telecom, electricity, gas and water supply and land and other 
transport. Real estate, renting and business activities and post and telecom are also the most 
resource intensive together with wholesale and retail trade. The highest R&D intensity is 
found in office machinery and computers and radio and TV, whereas the strongest value 
added growth by far is registered in the refined petroleum sector. There are also two 
traditional sectors that have negative value added growth on average: wearing and leather.  
 
In terms of employment growth, sectors generally register a negative average, a notable 
exception being real estate, renting and business activities. At the other end, wearing has the 
lowest employment growth average. The variation in a given sector across countries and years 
is a lot stronger for the gross fixed capital formation and the labour productivity per person 
engaged variables compared with the others.  
 
The highest standard deviations for the Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) variable 
are registered in real estate, renting and business activities, wholesale and retail trade and post 
and telecom. For labour productivity, the highest variation by far is found in office machinery 
and computers and radio and TV. The highest GFCF averages are in real estate, renting and 
business activities, wholesale and retail trade and post and telecom, whereas the highest 
labour productivity is found in office machinery and computers and radio and TV. We found 
moderate variation in a given country across sectors and years for capital intensity, R&D 
intensity and employment growth. Slightly higher variation was found for resource intensity 
and value added growth, whereas the highest standard deviations were found for GFCF and 
labour productivity. The variations in terms of resource and R&D intensity are fairly similar 
across countries. Portugal has a substantially higher variation in capital intensity, employment 
growth and value added growth compared with the other countries. The standard deviations 
for value added growth are more heterogeneous across countries. 
 
The US has the strongest variation for the GFCF and the labour productivity variables 
followed by Germany for GFCF and Ireland for labour productivity. The average is fairly 
similar across countries for capital intensity, resource intensity, R&D intensity and value 
added growth. Portugal has a substantially higher value added growth average compared with 
the other countries. Most countries have a negative employment growth average, the only two 
exceptions being Portugal and Spain. Countries are a lot more heterogeneous in terms of the 
                                                 
34 Box 3 in Appendix 2 presents a more detailed discussion.  
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GFCF and labour productivity averages, with the highest values for GFCF being registered in 
the US and Germany and the highest values for labour productivity being in the US and 
Ireland. The standard deviation is fairly stable across time for capital and resource intensity, it 
is mostly stable for value added and employment growth, it increases across time for GFCF 
and labour productivity and it fluctuates moderately for R&D intensity. The average for 
capital intensity is stable across time. It increases for GFCF and labour productivity, decreases 
for resource and R&D intensity and fluctuates for value added and employment growth. 
 
The correlation matrix generally shows low correlation among the variables, the 
exceptions being moderate and significant correlation between market structure variables 
(scale economies, concentration, differentiation and segmentation) and capital intensity, 
GFCF, a moderate correlation between resource intensity and scale economies and a 
moderately negative correlation between scale economies and R&D intensity. We also found 
significant correlation between the market structure variables and most notably between 
differentiation and segmentation with concentration and concentration and segmentation with 
scale economies. There is a moderate correlation between R&D intensity and labour 
productivity. 
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3.3. Data on economic and business reform and regulation 
 
The third data set constructed is on product market regulations, which according to the 
literature (Section 2.5), have an impact on economic performance. Whereas a majority of 
studies in the literature measure the effect of product market regulations directly on 
productivity growth and investment, in this study, we measure this effect indirectly through 
the influence of product market regulations on firm entry and exit which in turn affects 
economic performance through the contribution to aggregate productivity growth and through 
its influence on firms’ incentives to innovate, which also influences productivity growth 
(Section 2.4). 
 
a) Definition of Product Market Regulations (PMRs) 
 
There is no generally accepted definition of regulation applicable to the very different 
regulatory systems in the EU countries. The OECD defines regulation as “the diverse 
instruments by which governments set requirements on enterprises and citizens” (OECD, 
1997). Regulations include laws, formal and informal orders and subordinate rules issued by 
all levels of government, and rules issued by non-governmental or self-regulatory bodies to 
which governments have delegated regulatory powers.  
 
Regulations fall into three categories: 
•   Economic regulations intervene directly in market decisions such as pricing, 
competition, market entry or exit. 
•   Social regulations protect public interests such as health, safety, the environment, and 
social cohesion. 
•   Administrative regulations are paperwork and administrative formalities, so-called 
“red tape”, through which governments collect information and intervene in individual 
economic decisions. Administrative regulations are important tools to support public 
policies in many areas such as taxation, safety and environmental protection. 
 
b) Data sources 
 
Developments and cross-country comparisons in the field of economic regulation, 
administrative burdens on businesses, as well as on the time and costs necessary to set up a 
new company, are difficult to establish because data on these topics are relatively scarce. 
Despite these difficulties, a number of empirical studies have attempted to investigate the 
effects of economic and business regulatory reforms on economic performance
35. These 
effects are quantified thanks to several regulations and product market reforms constructed 
indicators based on different sources of information available.  
 
Among these sources, which are based –at least partly– on survey data, we can mention: 
 
•   The OECD database on regulatory reforms
36. It contains indicators providing detailed 
information on regulatory and administrative policies as well as on administrative 
requirements for business start-ups. As these indicators are dating from 1998, the OECD 
                                                 
35 These studies have been surveyed in Section 2.5. 
36 Data retrieved from :  
http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,2340,fr_2649_37421_2367345_119656_1_1_37421,00.html  
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launched a project aimed at updating them. However, the new data will not be available 
before October 2004. 
•   The composite indicators available from the Fraser Institute
37. Among 38 indicators 
based both on survey data and on data provided by different national and international 
sources, five refer to business regulations: price controls; administrative conditions 
(procedures) for starting a new business; time spent with government bureaucracy; ease of 
starting a new business; and irregular payments connected with, among others, 
import/export permits, with business licences or with exchange controls. These indicators 
are designed to identify the extent to which regulatory restraints and bureaucratic 
procedures limit competition and the operation of markets. 
•   The ENSR surveys, which are carried out by the Observatory of European SMEs
38, have 
for several years included questions on the appreciation by SMEs of administrative 
burdens. 
•   The World Bank measure of the time and costs necessary to start a business is computed 
on the basis of a questionnaire filled out by local professionals such as corporate lawyers 
and consultants. The OECD also provides a synthetic indicator in this field. The World 
Bank database on Governance indicators presents six aggregated indicators among 
which one index referred to as “Regulatory Quality”
39. This index includes measures of 
the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank 
supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in 
areas such as foreign trade and business development. 
•   Following the Lisbon European Council in March 2000, the EU has developed several 
structural indicators (EUROSTAT) to assess the level of achievement of the main 
strategic goals agreed upon in Lisbon. These indicators fall into four priority areas: 
employment, innovation, economic reform and social cohesion. As regards economic 
reforms, a distinction is made between indicators of market integration and of market 
efficiency. For product markets, the indicator list includes an indicator of trade 
integration, and an indicator of relative price levels to reflect both market integration and 
efficiency. In addition, the evolution of prices in network industries is considered as an 
indicator of progress in the liberalisation of these sectors. Finally, two indicators 
measuring possible distortions in the functioning of product markets caused by public 
intervention are proposed. For capital markets, the list consists of two indicators on 
financial market integration and efficiency. 
•   The European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation (CEEP) Statistical 
Review
40 provides information on the importance of enterprises with majority public 
participation. These data are available for 1991, 1995 and 1998 in the non-agricultural 
private business sector. 
 
c) Data weaknesses 
 
A main drawback of these data sources is that in many cases, the indicators are available 
for only one year, which prevents the use of time series. As we will see in the section 
presenting the econometric framework, it is important to consider the time dimension. 
Whenever possible, data containing time variations have been used and these data have been 
linearly intra and extrapolated to fit the 1997-2003 period of the entry-exit data set. A second 
main shortcoming of data is that only a few sources provide indicators at the industry level. 
                                                 
37 See Gwartney and Lawson (2004). Data retrieved from www.freetheworld.com. 
38 Data retrieved from : www.freetheworld.com.http://www.eim.nl/Observatory_Seven_and_Eight/start.htm 
39 Data retrieved from : http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/ 
40 http://www.ceep.org/  
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d) Data set on regulatory reforms (and FDI restrictions) 
 
Among the main indicators on product market reforms and regulations used in the 
econometric analysis, a distinction can be made between indicators available at the macro 
economic level and those available at the meso-economic one. Table A.13 in Appendix 2 lists 
the main indicators on product market reforms at the aggregated economy level
41. 
 
These indicators are classified into five categories: ease of starting a new business, trade 
tariffs and barriers, state involvement in the economy, and importance of administrative 
burdens and regulatory quality. These indicators correspond to the ones retained in Griffith 
and Harisson (2004) and have been updated according to the latest data available
42. Most of 
these indicators come from the Fraser Institute, which reports them on a five-year interval 
basis and annually from 2000 onwards
43. The latest period currently available is 2002. Thus, 
four time periods are available and in order to have a continuous series over the period 1997-
2003, data have been linearly intrapolated for 1996-1999 and extrapolated after 2002. The 




The World Bank “Regulatory Quality” index is measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 
2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. The index, which is 
reported for four years (1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002) has also been intra- extrapolated for 
1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003, and rescaled to make it comparable with the other indicators. 
Table A.14 in Appendix 2 reports the correlation matrix of all of these indicators. It follows 
that the correlation coefficients are relatively high which may lead to some multicollinearity 
problems in the estimations. 
 
The second set of regulations and reforms indicators considered in this analysis are 
industry-specific indicators. These indicators are classified into three categories: degree of 
friendliness to competition, product market regulation indicators and restrictions to foreign 
direct investment. 
 
The indicators in the first category measure the “degree of friendliness to competition” of 
regulation
45. The scale of the indicator is 0-6, from most to least friendly to competition and 
the period covered is 1975-1998. These indicators have been compiled by the OECD and 
concern seven network industries over the period 1975-1998
46. They are obtained from a finer 
data set including information on barriers to entry, public ownership, vertical integration, 
market structure and price controls. Two versions of these indicators are available: one 
including, and the other excluding, public ownership and their precise sectoral composition 
depends on both economic and coverage considerations. To harmonise these data with the 
                                                 
41 We wish to thank Rachel Griffith and Rupert Harrison for providing their data set on product market 
regulations. 
42 The authors investigate several other regulation and reforms indicators that come from different sources 
among which the OECD and the EU and identify the most effective ones in terms of the empirical analysis. 
Accordingly, the same indicators have been selected in this study. 
43 As emphasised in Griffith and Harrison (2004), two key advantages of the Fraser Institute indicators are their 
time-series dimension and the fact that they have been collected consistently over time. 
44 A value of 10 indicates the highest level of economic freedom and the lowest level of economic regulation. 
45 As these data are still preliminary and may change in the future, only aggregate indicators are available. 
Furthermore, as the data have not been published yet, no table has been produced. 
46 The sectors are airlines, electricity, gas, post, telecom, railways and road freight. See Nicoletti et al. (2001) for 
a description of these data.  
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entry-exit data set and the other regulation indicators, they have been rescaled from 1 to 10 
and extrapolated to 2003. 
 
The second category of indicators covers several dimensions of industry-specific 
regulations for the year 1998. These indicators are “detailed” or “binary”. Detailed indicators 
are usually smoother and come either from the OECD or from the Australian Productivity 
Commission. Binary indicators generally come from the OECD International Regulation 
Database. All original indicators are in 0-2 scale - increasing in the degree of restrictions put 
on market mechanisms and competition. Indicators are not comparable across industries, i.e. a 
value of 2 in electricity indicates legal public monopoly, and a value of 2 in retail distribution 
indicates some entry barriers, price controls, and administrative burdens. To be comparable, 
the detailed indicators have been rescaled taking into account the average or structural 
characteristics of industries across OECD countries and aggregated in summary indicators 
(covering all dimensions of regulation) for each industry using average industry employment 
shares in the OECD area. Table A.15 in Appendix 2 presents the summary product market 
regulation indicators for 2-digit non-manufacturing industries. Indicators range from 0 to 10 
from most to least restrictive. 
 
The third category of indicators relates to restrictions in different sectors for four time 
periods (1981, 1986, 1991 and 1998)
47. They are presented in Table A.16 in Appendix 2. The 
data come from the UN Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS) and were rescaled 
from 0 to 10 and intra- and extrapolated over the 1997-2003 period. 
 
3.4. Economic performance indicators 
 
As discussed in Section 2.4, a majority of studies examining the impact of firm entry and 
exit on economic performance concentrate on the relationship between firm entry and exit and 
aggregated productivity growth, the latter being decomposed into three components, i.e. 
internal and external restructuring and creative destruction (see Box 2 in Appendix 1). 
Unfortunately, the lack of information on the entrants’ and exitors’ initial shares in terms of 
output prevents us from implementing this method. Following the literature, we estimate the 
impact of the entry and exit rates on aggregated productivity growth at the industry level as 
well as on the demand for input factors, i.e. labour and investment in physical capital
48. We 
also investigate the effect of entry and exit on output performance and on innovation 
activities, which we proxy with R&D expenses
49. 
 
a)  Data sources 
 
The data sources for these variables are the same as the ones for the entry and exit 
determinants (Sections 3.2), i.e. the OECD’s STAN and ANBERD databases except for total 
factor productivity and labour productivity that come from the ICOP database from the 
University of Groningen. 
 
                                                 
47 This data is described in Golub (2003). 
48 According to Alesina et al. (2003), deregulation in particular decreases the entry costs which generates an 
increase in the number of firms on the market and as a result an increase in the capital stock. 
49 Following Aghion et al. (2002), in sectors that are close to the technological frontier, entry stimulates 
innovation through an escape effect but can also discourage firms engaging in such activities (discouragement 
effect) for those firms far away from the frontier.  
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b)  Weaknesses of data 
 
Given data availability constraints for TFP
50, we use the labour productivity rather than 
the total factor productivity. It should be noted that results will in general differ according to 
whether aggregate productivity is measured by TFP or labour productivity, with net entry 
having a strong contribution to TFP growth. Disney et al. (2003) found that the contribution 
of entry and exit to aggregate productivity growth, when the latter was measured by TFP, was 
sensitive to the business cycle and was larger in periods of economic slowdown and a higher 
contribution of entry and exit in periods of economic slowdown was also found by Hahn 
(2000). Another main drawback of these data is the lack of information for some sectors 
and/or countries and years. R&D expenditure, for instance, was not available for Portugal and 
production for Ireland, so that it was not possible to investigate these countries in the 
regression analysis.  
 
c)  Main variables used 
 
Based on the series provided in the STAN, ANBERD and ICOP databases, we calculated 
the following variables: 
 
Output growth = yearly annual growth rate of total employment (in persons) in percentage, 
Labour productivity growth = yearly annual growth rate of labour productivity per person engaged, 
Employment Growth = yearly annual growth rate of total employment (in persons) in percentage, 
Investment growth = yearly annual growth rate of investment in gross fixed capital formation, 
R&D growth = yearly annual growth rate of R&D expenditure, 
Investment intensity = investment in gross fixed capital formation (in value terms)/production (at current prices), 
R&D intensity = R&D expenditure (in national currencies)/production (at current prices). 
 
Finally, besides the growth of labour productivity and employment, we also consider the 
levels of these variables as performance indicators in the regression analysis. 
 
d)  Stylised facts 
 
As most of these variables have already been documented in the structural barriers to 
entry data section, we refer to Section 3.2 and Box 3 in Appendix 2 for a summary of main 
findings and descriptive statistics. 
                                                 
50 TFP at the sectoral level is only available for 5 countries of the data set.  
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4. Econometric framework 
 
This Section presents the methodology and the models implemented to assess the impact 
of product market reforms on entry-exit and macroeconomic performance. By means of 
appropriate estimation techniques and relevant controls, the effects of product market reforms 
on entry-exit and on macroeconomic performance are quantified. Indicators of 
macroeconomic performance include growth of output, labour productivity, employment as 
well as investment in both physical and intangible capitals. 
 
4.1. Two-stage approach 
 
The econometric framework implemented for analysing the impact of product market 
regulations on entry-exit and on different aspects of macroeconomic performance bears on a 
two-stage approach. In the first stage, we estimate the relationship between firm entry and exit 
and our indicators of product market reforms and regulations. In addition to product market 
reforms, we also control for country and industry structural characteristics. We assume that 
the product market reform indicators directly affect firms’ turnover and indirectly the 
macroeconomic outcomes via the entry-exit process. Following economic theory, we assume 
that product market reforms affect economic outcomes mainly indirectly through their impact 
on market efficiency, which can itself be decomposed into three main channels. 
 
First, product market reforms aimed at decreasing the costs of entry or at reducing entry 
barriers have a positive impact on firm entry. Second, product market reforms and the 
deregulation of the economy increase competition, which in turn force firms to reduce their 
price mark-up (internal allocative efficiency). When competition increases, less efficient firms 
exit the market and market shares move to more efficient firms (external allocative 
efficiency). In a situation of poor competition, firms do not produce at their lower costs 
(productive efficiency), which can lead (new) more efficient firms to enter the market. More 
competition can also foster dynamic efficiency in the long run by stimulating firms to invest 
more in innovation activities to remain competitive. 
 
In the second stage, we estimate the relationship between firm entry and exit rates and 
different macroeconomic outcomes, in particular the growth of output, labour productivity, 
employment, investment in tangible and intangible capitals as well as R&D and physical 
capital intensities. In order to control for the possible endogeneity of the entry-exit variables 
due to unobserved factors which can simultaneously affect these variables and 
macroeconomic performance, entry and exit are instrumented using an appropriate set of 
instrument variables. This instrumental variable approach allows us to also control whether 
product market reforms affect macroeconomic performance only indirectly through their 
direct impact on entry and exit. 
 
4.2. Impact of PMR on entry-exit equation 
 
The rate of entry of firms (ER) in a given country, industry and time period is expected to 
be affected by our different indicators of product market reforms as well as other structural 
characteristics. More specifically and following the literature, the entry rate of firms can be 
written as a function of ‘basic’ determinants and entry deterrence strategies and barriers at the  
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firm, industry and country levels (see Table 1 in Section 2.3. for a summary of these 
variables). These determinants are contained in the vector of variables X in equation (1)
51.  
 
The review of the literature also suggests that the level of product and labour market 
regulations in general has a positive effect on entry rates (see Table 3 in Section 2.6)
52. In our 
model, we only use data on product market regulations available to us (see Section 3.3) which 
are included in the vector Z in equation (1). These variables can be classified into indicators at 
the macro level which are divided into five categories (ease of starting a new business, trade 
tariffs and barriers, state involvement in the economy and the importance of administrative 
burdens and regulatory quality) and indicators available at the meso level which are divided 
into three categories (degree of friendliness to competition, product market regulation 
indicators and restrictions to foreign direct investment). Given the high contemporaneous 
correlation present among the product market reform indicators, the estimation of these 
variables may be affected by multicollinearity, i.e. the model fits the data well, but the 
regressors are not statistically significant. One way to cope with this issue is to reduce the 
number of regressors and replace them by their principal component scores. 
 
In equation (1) we also include the entry rate lagged by one year as an explanatory 
variable since there is evidence in the literature (Geroski, 1995) that previous entry deters 
current entry. We also control for unobserved year, country and industry specific effects, 
which have an impact on entry. According to Geroski (1995), only a modest part of entry rate 
variations are explained by observed determinants, with transitory variations in the 
unobserved factors explaining the remaining large part. Formally, we have: 
 
ijt j i t ijt ijt 1 ijt ijt u Z X ER ER + µ + µ + λ + δ + β + ρ = −        ( 1 )  
 
where   j i t , , µ µ λ  are year, industry, country specific effects
53, 
ijt u  is a random error component, 
i, j and t index industries, countries and years. 
 
In equation (1), the dependent variable is the entry rate. It may also be worth considering 
two alternative models with the exit rate and the turnover rate, i.e. the sum of entries and exits 
divided by twice the total number of firms, as dependent variables. Indeed, as the literature 
suggests, the impact of product market reforms and entry and exit determinants is not the 
same on entry and exit. Furthermore, in order to be able to identify the key parameters of 
interest separately from other country and industry differences, we need to use product market 
                                                 
51 Given the constraints of data availability, we only use the variables constructed in section 3.2, i.e. the height of 
entry barriers (capital intensity, resource intensity), the rate of profitability, the current and expected level of 
demand (value-added growth and employment growth), R&D intensity, as well as the degrees of industry 
concentration, product differentiation and market segmentation at the beginning of the period. All these 
variables, except the last three, vary over industries, countries and time periods. 
52 For instance, Scarpetta et al. (2002), inter-alias, find that strict product market regulations have a negative 
effect on the entry of small firms. Tight employment protection legislation, however, has a positive, but weakly 
significant effect on firm entry for micro firms, which employ less than 20 people, and a negative effect on small 
and medium sized firms. This can be because countries with tight labour policies usually exempt firms below a 
certain size from some aspects of the legislation. Therefore, entry occurs with these types of firms or with large 
companies in which firing and hiring costs only represent a small fraction of the total entry cost. 
53 These variables reflect left-out variables that are time-persistent in the sense that for each country and industry, 
they remain roughly the same over time and capture unobservable country and industry heterogeneity. The 
period-specific component translates in omitted variables, such as common macro-economic shocks, which 
affect all individuals in period t.  
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regulations indicators that vary differentially over time across countries and industries
54. 
Unfortunately, such information does not always exist, due to data availability or because of 
similar reforms across countries or similar timing of implementation. 
 
4.3. Impact of entry-exit on macro-economic performance equation 
 
In the second stage, we start from a standard industry and country level production 
function that depends on labour, physical and intangible capital inputs and total factor 
productivity growth. In the regressions we assume that the physical capital can be proxied by 
investment in fixed capital, whereas intangible capital inputs are measured by R&D 
expenditures. According to the literature, the entry and exit of firms does not significantly 
affect total employment since both entrants and firms exiting the industry have below average 
size. We therefore expect a limited impact of firm entry and exit on the labour input. The 
effects of entry on firms’ incentives to innovate and therefore on R&D expenditures depends 
on the position of the firm compared to the technology frontier (Aghion et al., 2003). Finally, 
the entry and exit of firms has an impact on both the level and the growth rate of total factor 
productivity (see Table 2 in Section 2.4). 
Different aspects of macroeconomic performance are measured. Formally, the equilibrium 
output at the country or industry level is given by: 
 
( ) ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt TFP , K , C , L f Y =           ( 2 )  
 
where  L, C and K represent labour, physical capital and intangible capital inputs and  
TFP measures total factor productivity growth. 
 
The entry rate is assumed to affect the growth rate of output through the growth rate of 
input demand and the growth rate of productivity:  
 
TFP
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    (3) 
 
where  I = Gross Fixed Capital Formation and  
R = R&D expenditures 
 
In addition, we also estimate equations (3) with the exit rate and the turnover rate as 
dependent variables (and their one and two period lagged values as explanatory variables). 
Given data availability constraints, we use labour productivity rather than total factor 
productivity. As an alternative to the growth rates of labour productivity, physical investment 
and R&D expenditures, we also consider the impact of entry on the level of labour 
productivity, fixed capital intensity and R&D intensity. 
                                                 
54 Time invariant indicators cannot be included since they would be exactly correlated with the country and 
industry specific effects. However, these fixed effects control for them.   - 51 -
4.4. Estimation issues 
 
a) Estimation of aggregate variables on micro units 
 
A first issue encountered in the regression analysis concerns some product market 
reforms. The Fraser Institute indicators are only available at the aggregate macro level that 
raises estimation issues when we estimate the entry and exit rates, which vary at the sector, 
country and industry level, on these indicators that only vary across countries and time, but 
not across sectors. Brandt (2004) cites Moulton (1990) who showed that when estimating the 
effects of aggregate variables on micro units, the standard errors resulting from these 
estimations can have a strong downward bias because they are usually correlated among the 
observations within a given group. This can lead us to conclude that the aggregate variables 
have a significant impact on the micro unit variables, when in fact this is not the case. 
According to Brandt (2004), one way to address this issue is by eliminating the time and 
industry dimensions by averaging the variables across time and sectors. Another way is to 
conduct a two-step estimation where in the first equation the individual specific observations 
are regressed on the adequate covariates and on time and industry dummies. The residuals 
resulting from the first equation that would then only capture country specific effects are 
regressed on the country level variables. The problem with this estimation method is that it 
has a low explanatory power, which can lead us to conclude that the impact of a variable is 
insignificant when in reality it is. 
 
b) Short term versus long-term effects 
 
In order to address this issue, we estimated a fixed effect model on the average values of 
variables over the time period investigated
55. This method allows us to capture also both the 
short term and the long-term effects of product market regulations on firm entry and exit and 
of the latter variables on macroeconomic performance
56. In order to capture the long-term 
effects we assumed that in the long term, the variables converge towards their steady state and 
we eliminated the time dimension of the variables by averaging them over the period under 
consideration. The short-term effects will be captured by incorporating the time dimension of 
the variables. We then conducted a fixed effects panel data estimation in which we considered 
the fixed effects at the sector level. In the first estimation, we imposed the same coefficients 
across all sectors, whereas in the second part of the estimation we allowed the coefficients 
associated with the regulation indicators to vary across sectors. In a different specification, we 
allowed the coefficients associated with the regulation indicators to vary across countries. 
 
c) Multicollinearity of product market reform variables 
 
Another estimation issue encountered when we included the different regulation indicators 
was the presence of multicollinearity. To address this issue, we conducted a principal 
components analysis in which we first included all the Fraser regulation indicators. We took 
the principal component from the analysis that constitutes the REG1 variable
57. We conducted 
                                                 
55 This eliminates the time dimension as well as the individual (industry) fixed effects. 
56 Averaging the variables over time also allows us to compare the results with the ones based on the intra- and 
extrapolated PMR indicators (full sample). 
57 The first factor represents 64% of the initial variance (see Table A.17 in Appendix 3). In practice, the number 
of factors to be retained is such that the cumulative percentage of the variance explained by the first factors is 
about 70%. We tried to include the second (and third) factors in the regression models but these variables turned 
out to be insignificant at the 10% level.  
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a second principal components analysis in which apart from all the Fraser regulation 
indicators we also included the restrictions on the FDI indicator taken from the UN Trade 
Analysis Information System. The principal component from this second analysis constitutes 
the REG1* variable. 
 
d) Endogeneity between entry-exit rates and economic outcomes 
 
Finally, in order to control for the possible endogeneity of the entry (and exit) rate 
variables, we also estimated an instrumental two stage least square estimator with an 
appropriate set of instruments for the entry and exit variables
58. Among the instruments 
available, we can choose the product market regulations indicators identified in the first 
equation. However, since these indicators do not vary across industry sectors, they turned out 
to have a weak explanatory power in instrumenting the entry and exit rates that do vary across 
industry sectors. Therefore, we used as additional instruments the current, one period and two 
period lagged values of the following variables: the number of active, entering and exiting 
firms, the Fraser product market regulation indicators as well as the restrictions on FDI. The 
explanatory power of these instruments can be tested with the partial R-squared proposed by 
Shea (1997) performed in the first stage regression and which takes the intercorrelations 
among instruments into account. Furthermore, the validity of the instruments can be tested 
through Sargan-Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions
59. This test allows us also to 
validate the assumption that product market reforms do not directly affect macroeconomic 
outcomes, i.e. that they can be excluded from equation (3)
60. 
 
                                                 
58 The presence of common shocks may for instance positively affect both the output growth and the entry rate 
which will in turn exhibit similar responses to these shocks. If these effects are not accounted for, the estimation 
of equation (3) can lead to a (upward) biased or spurious estimated coefficient of the entry rate. 
59 Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982). The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term, and that they are correctly excluded from equation (3). 
60 If this assumption is rejected, then the entry-exit estimates are biased.  
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5. Empirical findings 
 
This section presents the main findings regarding the relationship between the market 
structure and deregulation variables on firm entry and exit. We then analyse the effect of 
current and lagged firm entry and exit on a series of macroeconomic performance variables 
such as output growth, labour productivity growth, employment growth, physical capital 
investment and R&D investment growth and capital and R&D intensity
61. 
 
5.1. Impact of product market reforms on entry and exit 
 
In the first part of the estimation, we are interested in the relationship between the entry 
and exit rates respectively and a series of variables that characterise market structure, some of 
which can also constitute barriers to entry, as well as on variables capturing market 
regulations. The latter are taken from the Fraser Institute and the UN Trade Analysis 
Information System (TRAINS). These indicators are scaled from 1 to 10 with 10 representing 
total freedom and 1 representing total restrictions.  
 
Besides these product market reforms, we also took the log of the capital intensity, R&D 
intensity, market concentration and economies of scale variables. These variables are assumed 
to pick up the importance of barriers to entry (and to exit). We also estimated regressions in 
which we introduced each regulation indicator separately in order to obtain its individual 
impact on firm entry and exit. 
 
a) Long-term effects 
 
We first comment on the results when we impose the same coefficients across all sectors 
and eliminate the time dimension by averaging the variables across time, giving us the 
average long-term effects of the impact of product market regulations on firm entry and exit. 
(Table 4).  
The F-test rejects the hypothesis of a common intercept for all sectors at the 5% 
confidence level for all the specifications. The Hausmann test does not reject the null 
hypothesis that the fixed effects model is more appropriate than the random effects model at 
the 5% confidence level. 
 
In the entry rate equation, we first estimate alternative specifications in which we used the 
REG1 and REG1* variables. The results are very similar in that the coefficients associated 
with these variables are positive and statistically significant at the 5% confidence level 
meaning that an increase in deregulation leads to an increase in the firm entry rate. The 
coefficient associated with the R&D intensity variable is negative and statistically significant 
at the 5% confidence level indicating that a 1% increase in R&D intensity leads to a 0.11% 
decrease in the entry rate, providing evidence that R&D intensity acts as a low barrier to 
entry. The coefficient associated with the capital intensity variable in these two alternative  
 
                                                 
61 Due to data constraints, all the estimations are performed without The Netherlands and the Post and 
Telecommunication sector. No data on R&D intensity are available for Portugal and Ireland and on production 
for Ireland. The time period is 1997-2002.  
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Table 4. Impact of PMR and entry barriers on entry and exit rates (over time ‘averaged’ sample) 
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
ENTRY RATE 
LCAP  -0.20** -1.76 -0.20** -1.75 -0.24** -2.07  -0.13 -0.72  -0.03 -0.14  -0.13 -0.63 
LRD  -0.11* -3.01  -0.11* -3.00  -0.02  -0.49   0.07   1.49  -0.02  -0.72   0.05   1.41 
REG1   0.14*   4.30       0.12*   3.79   0.10**   2.30   0.12*   2.84   0.09**   2.15 
REG1*       0.14*    4.28              
Lconc          0.19*    2.82           
Lscal           -0.25  -0.01        
Difer                0.34*    2.77     
Segme                   0.04    0.31 
R²a  0.31 0.31 0.25 0.10 0.15 0.09 
F-statistic  F(29,96) = 3.5  F(29,96) = 3.5  F(4,73)=7.23 F(4,73)=3.12 F(4,80)=4.69 F(4,74)=3.02 
Hausman-test  χ ²(2) = 19.7*  χ ²(2) = 19.8*  χ ²(2) = 9.5*  χ ²(2) = 11.6*  χ ²(2) = 13.1*  χ ²(2) = 12.7* 
Nob  128  128  77 77 84 78 
EXIT RATE 
LCAP   0.18   1.08   0.19   1.11   0.05  0.57   0.19   1.21   0.23   1.38   0.15  0.85 
LRD  -0.13** -2.19 -0.13** -2.20 -0.01  -0.38   0.05   1.35   0.00   0.04   0.05***  1.67 
REG1   0.20*   4.36       0.12*  3.21   0.12*   2.81   0.13*   3.10   0.11*  2.65 
REG1*       0.21*    4.26              
Lconc          0.20**  2.33           
Lscal             0.00    0.05        
Difer                0.25***    1.94     
Segme                   0.04  0.35 
R²a  0.20 0.20 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.12 
F-statistic  F(29, 96) = 2.4  F(29, 96) = 2.4  F(4, 73) = 5.09  F(4, 73) = 3.81  F(4, 80) = 4.88  F(4, 74) = 3.80 
Hausman-test  χ ²(2) = 14.2*  χ ²(2) = 13.6*  χ ²(2) = 3.9*  χ ²(2) = 4.9*  χ ²(2) = 2.9*  χ ²(2) = 6.9* 
Nob  128  128  77 77 84 78 
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level ; Nob = number of observations; R²a = adjusted R-squared. 
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estimations is negative, but only significant at the 10% confidence level and indicating that a 
1% increase in capital intensity will lead to a 0.20% decrease in the firm entry rate. Finally, 
the regression models succeed in explaining 31% of the variation in the entry rate. 
 
Given that the estimations using the REG1 and REG1* variables render similar results, in 
the remaining estimations where we introduce market structure variables we only concentrate 
on the REG1 variable. The introduction of the market structure variables leads to a significant 
loss in observations which drop from 128 in the first two specifications to a minimum of 77 in 
the alternative specifications. The coefficient associated with the REG1 variable is always 
positive and significant at the 5% confidence level showing that the positive impact of 
deregulation on firm entry is robust to alternative specifications. 
 
When we introduce the market structure variables into the regression the coefficient 
associated with the R&D intensity variable becomes insignificant, whereas the coefficient 
associated with the capital intensity variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5% 
confidence level when the market concentration variable is introduced into the regression, but 
becomes statistically insignificant when the other market concentration variables are 
introduced. 
 
The market concentration coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% confidence level 
meaning that highly concentrated industries at the beginning of the period will have higher 
entry rates than industries with lower concentration. This can be due to the fact that in 
strongly concentrated industries profits are high which attracts new firms. The coefficient 
associated with product differentiation is also positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
confidence level showing that entry rates are higher in industries characterised by high 
product differentiation at the beginning of the estimation period. On the contrary, the 
segmentation and scale economies variables do not have a statistically significant impact on 
the entry rate. One possible explanation for the insignificance of the coefficient associated 
with the scale economies variable is that the latter is introduced simultaneously with the 
capital intensity variable that can be considered as an alternative way of measuring the 
presence of scale economies given that they are generally important in highly capital-
intensive industries. However, the correlation matrix (Table A.12 in Appendix 2) shows a 
very small correlation coefficient between capital intensity and the variable measuring 
economies of scale, of just 0.025, which is also statistically not significant. 
 
We also checked the correlation matrix to search for an explanation as to why the impact 
of the R&D intensity variable becomes insignificant once variables controlling for market 
structure are introduced into the regressions. However, there is only a low negative correlation 
between R&D intensity and the scale economies variable, of 0.15, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level, and a small positive correlation of 0.06 between R&D 
intensity and product differentiation, which is significant at the 5% confidence level. The 
correlation between R&D intensity and the other market structure variables is low and 
statistically not significant. Another explanation for the fact that R&D intensity becomes 
insignificant can be the large drop in observations when we introduce the market structure 
variables mainly because there is no data on these variables for the services sectors. The fact 
that we obtain a significant coefficient associated with R&D intensity in the initial estimation 
which becomes insignificant once we introduce the market structure variables only available 
for manufacturing, can also be explained by the fact that R&D intensity may be a more 
important barrier to entry in services sectors than in manufacturing due to particular industries 
such as real estate, renting and business activities. The explanatory power of the regression  
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model when the market structure variables are introduced decreases by 9% to 25% of the 
variation of the entry rate compared to the first two specifications. 
 
We follow the same method when estimating the exit rate equation, first providing 
alternative specifications using the REG1 and REG1* variables to control for product market 
regulations. The results are similar with the coefficients associated with both variables being 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, indicating that an increase in 
deregulation leads to an increase in the firm exit rate. The result is in line with expectations 
since an increase in deregulation involves a decrease in the level of protection previously 
enjoyed by firms in the market from outside competition, forcing the least productive of these 
firms to exit the market sooner than when regulation on the market was tighter. The capital 
intensity variable does not have a significant impact on the exit rate, whereas the coefficient 
associated with the R&D intensity variable is negative and significant at the 5% confidence 
level. The magnitude of the impact however is relatively small, with a 1% increase in R&D 
intensity leading to a 0.13% decrease in the exit rate. The negative impact of R&D intensity 
on firm exit can be due to the fact that firms in highly research intensive sectors are 
themselves very dynamic and innovative and therefore the number of firms that are forced to 
shut down operations and leave the market is lower compared to sectors where research 
intensity is low
62. These two alternative specifications succeed in explaining 20% of the 
variation in the exit rate. Given the similarity of the results obtained using these alternative 
specifications we only use the REG1 variable in the other regression models. As before, the 
introduction of the market structure variables leads to a significant loss in observations. 
 
The coefficient associated with the REG1 variable is always positive and significant at the 
5% confidence level providing robust evidence that an increase in deregulation leads to an 
increase in firm exit. The coefficient associated with the capital intensity variable is always 
insignificant, while the impact of the R&D intensity variable becomes insignificant. Among 
the market structure variables, market concentration has a positive impact on firm exit, which 
is significant at the 5% confidence level meaning that sectors with high concentration at the 
beginning of the period will have higher firm exit rates than the sectors with low market 
concentration. The coefficient associated with the product differentiation variable is also 
positive and significant at the 10% confidence level indicating that industries with increased 
product differentiation at the beginning of the period will also face higher firm exit rates than 
industries characterised by a low degree of product differentiation. The presence of economies 
of scale and market segmentation does not have a significant impact on firm exit. The 
explanatory power of these regression models varies between 12% and 18% of the variation 
in the exit rate and is lower than the one of the first two specifications, which can be 
explained by the lower number of observations. 
 
When we allow the coefficient to vary across sectors (Table A.18 in Appendix 3), we 
observe that both the capital intensity and R&D intensity variables have a negative impact on 
firm entry rates which is significant at the 5% confidence level. The magnitude of the effect is 
higher for capital intensity compared with R&D intensity, with a 1% increase in capital 
intensity leading to a 0.42% decrease in the entry rate and a 1% increase in R&D intensity 
leading to a 0.15% decrease in the entry rate. Among the various sectors, an increase in 
deregulation has a positive impact on the firm entry rate that is significant at the 5% 
confidence level in the following sectors: tobacco products, coke and refined petroleum 
products, chemicals and chemical products, basic metals, electrical machinery and apparatus, 
                                                 
62 In addition, R&D projects typically involve large fixed costs that can represent an important barrier to exit.  
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motor vehicles and trailers, other transport equipment, furniture and manufacturing n.e.c. The 
impact of an increase in deregulation on entry in the electricity, gas and water supply sector is 
also positive, but only significant at the 10% confidence level. We also found that an increase 
in deregulation has a negative impact on firm entry that is significant at the 5% confidence 
level in the food products and beverages and the office machinery and computers sectors. The 
effect of deregulation on firm entry in the other sectors is statistically insignificant. The model 
explains 26% of the variation in the firm entry rate. 
 
When we allow the coefficient to vary across sectors in the exit rate equation, the effect of 
R&D intensity on firm exit remains negative and significant at the 5% confidence level, with 
a 1% increase in R&D intensity leading to a 0.17% decrease in firm exit. The capital intensity 
variable does not have a significant effect on firm exit. Among the different sectors, an 
increase in deregulation has a positive and significant effect at the 5% confidence level on exit 
rates in the following industries: food and beverages, tobacco products, textiles, wood and 
products of wood, coke and refined petroleum products, other non-metallic and mineral 
products, machinery and equipment n.e.c., medical, precision and optical instruments, 
construction and transport and storage. The effect of deregulation on the other sectors under 
consideration is insignificant. The specification explains 22% of the variation in the firm exit 
rate. 
 
We also considered the interaction terms between product market regulations and country 
effects (see Table A.19 in Appendix 3). An increase in the level of deregulation will lead to a 
positive and significant rise in the firm entry and exit rates in Belgium, France and Italy. For 
Germany and Spain, the results are counter-intuitive in that an increase in the level of 
deregulation leads to a statistically significant decrease in the entry and exit rates in Germany, 
whereas for Spain an increase in deregulation leads to a significant decrease in the exit rate, 
apart from the increase in the entry rate. These last results should be taken with caution since 
they are not confirmed by the estimates based on the full sample (i.e. the model without 
interacted country effects). In the latter sample, an increase in the level of deregulation does 
not have a significant effect on the entry and exit rates for Germany, whereas more 
deregulation has a significantly positive effect on the exit rate for Spain. The results showing 
that deregulation leads to lower entry and/or exit for Germany and Spain are counterintuitive 
at first sight but could be explained by the fact that in the short-run companies may have 
difficulties to adapt to the new environment, leading to low rates of entry and high rates of 
exit. With time, as firms adapt to the new environment, new firms start entering the market 
and the number of companies that exit the market decreases. Product market reforms aimed at 
increasing deregulation do not have a significant impact in the long term on firm entry and 
exit for the other countries in the sample. The regression models explain 28% of the variation 
in the entry rate and 27% of the variation in the exit rate. 
 
b) Short-term effects 
 
In Table 5, we report the results of the entry and exit rates equations estimated based on 
the full sample including the time dimension, therefore giving us the short-term effects. The 
time dimension of the sample allows introducing the entry rate lagged by one year as an 
independent variable both in the entry and exit rate regressions. We run two alternative 
regressions in which we include the REG1 variable or the restrictions to FDI variable 
provided by UN TRAINS.  
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Table 5. Impact of PMR and entry barriers on entry and  
exit rates (full sample) 
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
ENTRY RATE 
       
ER_t-1   0.83*   16.06   0.82*   15.30 
LCAP   0.04   1.22   0.03   0.86 
LRD   0.01   1.42   0.01***   1.67 
REG1   0.04*   3.31   0.04*   3.34 
RESFDI     -0.01  -1.16 
R²a  0.66 0.66 
F-statistic  F(30,378) = 7.5  F(29,377) = 7.5 
Hausman-test  χ ²(4) = 0.4  χ ²(4) = 7.1 
Nob  427 427 
EXIT RATE 
ER_t-1   0.48*   7.82   0.48*   7.80 
LCAP  -0.09** -1.99 -0.08** -1.92 
LRD   0.01   0.70   0.01   0.68 
REG1   0.12*   5.44   0.12*   5.43 
RESFDI       0.00   0.12 
R²a  0.29 0.28 
F-statistic  F(30,378) = 3.2  F(29,377) = 3.2 
Hausman-test  χ ²(5) = 4.5  χ ²(5) = 7.1 
Nob  427 427 
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors;  
  * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level;  
  Nob = number of observations; R²a = adjusted R-squared. 
 
The results for the entry rate equation show that the entry rate lagged by one year has a 
positive effect on the current entry rate that is significant at the 5% confidence level. This 
seems to confirm the findings of Geroski (1995) according to which firm entry and exit tends 
to come in waves with periods in which there is a lot of firm entry and exit and periods where 
firm entry and exit decreases. According to the results, if there is a 1% increase in the firm 
entry rate in the previous year, it will lead to a current entry rate higher by 0.82% to 0.83%. 
The capital intensity and R&D intensity variables do not have a significant impact on firm 
entry, whereas the coefficient associated with the REG1 variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% confidence level. This confirms the fact that an increase in deregulation 
will lead to an increase in the firm entry rate. On the contrary, the restrictions to FDI variable 
do not have a significant impact on firm entry. The models explain 66% of the variation in the 
firm entry rate. 
 
The results for the exit rate equation again show a positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% confidence level relationship between the entry rate lagged by one year and the firm 
exit rate, with a 1% increase in the previous year’s entry rate leading to a 0.48% increase in 
the current exit rate. This result suggests that many firms that enter the industry exit after only 
one year, which confirms the low entrant survival rate, found in the literature. The capital 
intensity variable has a negative and significant impact at the 10% confidence level on firm 
exit. The magnitude of the effect however is small, with a 1% increase in capital intensity 
leading to a decrease in firm exit by only 0.08% to 0.09%. This provides some evidence that 
capital intensity also constitutes a barrier to exit with possible explanations being that sectors 
with high capital intensity provide a de facto protection for firms operating in the market and 
insulate incumbent firms from competition by new entrants. A second argument is that sectors  
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with high capital intensity also have a high fixed cost of entry that limits entry to firms that 
are highly confident in their capacity to develop successfully their business once they enter 
the market. The number of firms that ultimately fail is therefore smaller compared to 
industries with low capital intensity because there is a self-selection process before firms enter 
the market. Finally, a third explanation is that firms in highly capital-intensive sectors also 
tend to use very specific capital that cannot be sold if the firm decides to exit the market. This 
constitutes a sunk exit cost that can discourage a number of firms from exiting the market. 
The R&D intensity variable does not have a significant impact on firm exit. The coefficient 
associated with the REG1 variable is positive and statistically significant at the 5% confidence 
level, which confirms that an increase in deregulation leads to a rise in the firm exit rate. The 
restrictions to FDI variable do not have a significant effect on firm exit. The exit rate models 
only explain 28% to 29% of the variation in the exit rate compared with 66 % in the entry rate 
models. 
 
When we allow the coefficients to vary across sectors (see Table A.20 in Appendix 3), the 
entry rate lagged by one year continues to have a positive and significant at the 5% level 
impact on firm entry, with a 1% increase in the entry rate in the previous year leading to a 
0.86% increase in the current entry rate. The capital and R&D intensity variables have an 
insignificant impact on the entry rate. An increase in deregulation has a positive and 
significant at the 5% level impact in the following sectors: pulp, paper and paper products, 
publishing and printing, other non-metallic and mineral products, basic metals, other transport 
equipment and transport and storage. Deregulation has a negative and significant impact at the 
5% level on firm entry in tobacco products and a negative and significant at the 10% level on 
firm entry in the wholesale and retail trade and repairs sector. 
 
When we allow the coefficients to vary in the exit rate equation, the lagged entry rate 
continues to have a positive and significant at the 5% level impact on firm exit, with a 1% 
increase in the prior year’s entry rate leading to a 0.44% rise in the current exit rate. The 
coefficient associated with the capital intensity variable is negative and significant at the 5% 
confidence level, with a 1% increase in capital intensity leading to a 0.10% decrease in the 
exit rate. The R&D intensity variable continues to have an insignificant impact on firm exit. 
The effect of deregulation on firm exit differs from one sector to another, with the coefficient 
being positive and significant at the 5% level in the following industries: wood and products 
of wood, coke and refined petroleum products, rubber and plastic products, machinery and 
equipment n.e.c., electricity, gas and water supply and real estate, renting and business 
activities. In the fabricated metal products and construction sectors, the impact of deregulation 
on firm exit is positive and significant at the 10% confidence level. However, in the tobacco 
products and in transport and storage sectors, an increase in deregulation leads to a decrease 
in the firm exit rate, a result that is significant at the 5% confidence level in both cases. The 
model explains 28% of the variation in the exit rate. 
 
Table A.21 in Appendix 3 presents the estimates regarding the interaction terms between 
product market regulations and country effects. An increase in the level of deregulation will 
lead to a decrease in the firm entry rate in Belgium and Spain, which is statistically 
significant. An explanation for this result may be that some sectors in the economy (notably 
services sectors) were initially heavily protected against foreign competition. Opening these 
sectors up to competition may discourage national firms from entering the market since they 
no longer benefit from the high level of protection that they had before. For these countries, 
we do find that an increase in deregulation will lead to an increase in the firm exit rate. For 
France we found that an increase in the level of deregulation would lead to a decrease in the  
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firm exit rate, however the result is only significant at the 10% confidence level. On the 
contrary, an increase in deregulation does not have a significant effect on firm entry. We also 
found that higher deregulation would have a positive and significant impact on firm entry in 
Italy, whereas the effect on firm exit is insignificant. For the UK, a rise in the level of 
deregulation will lead to a significant increase in both firm entry and exit. For the other 
countries, the impact of product market deregulation reforms is insignificant on both firm 
entry and exit in the short term. The regression model for the entry rate equation explains 68% 
of the variation in the entry rate, whereas the exit rate model explains only 27% of the 
variation in the exit rate. 
 
We also introduced the product market regulators separately into the regressions and 
estimated their individual impact on firm entry and exit in the short term (full sample) (See 
Table A.22 in Appendix 3). The separate estimations were conducted for the following 
regulation indicators: transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP, mean tariff rate, hidden 
import barriers, price controls, time with government bureaucracy, the ease of starting a new 
business, regulatory quality indicator and the indicator for restrictions on FDI. We obtained 
counter intuitive results for the transfers and subsides as a share of GDP and mean tariff rate 
indicators in that a decrease in the transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP and mean tariff 
rate indicators leads to a significant decrease in the firm entry rate. A decrease in the transfers 
and subsidies as a share of GDP ratio does indeed lead to a significant increase in the firm exit 
rate. The results show that a decrease in the time spent with government bureaucracy or in the 
restrictions on FDI does not have a statistically significant impact on the firm entry and exit 
rates. We obtained the expected results for the other regulation indicators, namely that a 
decrease in hidden import barriers and price controls as well as better regulatory quality and a 
rise in the ease of starting a new business have a positive impact on the firm entry and exit 
rates that is also statistically significant. 
 
c) Summary of findings 
 
In conclusion, there is some evidence that capital intensity constitutes a barrier to entry 
and exit, as does R&D intensity, even though both of these barriers are relatively low. The 
entry rate lagged by one year has a positive effect on both the current entry and exit rates that 
can be interpreted as a confirmation of the wave theory and of the low survival rate of new 
entrants. The results on the market structure variables show that high levels of concentration 
and product differentiation at the beginning of the period lead to high firm entry and exit rates 
or high firm turbulence, a result that is line with Veugelers (2004) who documented 
considerable turbulence in market leadership in EU manufacturing industries
63.  
 
An increase in deregulation leads on average to an increase in both firm entry and exit, a 
finding that is robust to alternative equation specifications and estimation methods. However, 
when we study specific sectors, the impact of an increase in deregulation on entry and exit 
varies from one industry to another. Generally, the effect of deregulation is positive and 
significant mainly in manufacturing sectors and only in a very limited number of services 
sectors. There are also a very small number of sectors where deregulation has a negative 
effect on firm entry and exit. Finally, there are sectors in which deregulation does not have a 
                                                 
63 Firms’ turnover in industries characterised by initial high diversification can be expected to be important when 
the competitive pressure becomes tougher (as a result of PMRs) since firms have to re-allocate their resources to 
their most efficient activities to ensure survival. In a same vein, the toughening of competition can be expected, 
through reduced prices and increased efficiency, to induce higher entry and exit activities in industry sectors 
characterised by high initial market concentration (Smith and Venables, 1988).  
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significant effect on entry, but it does have a positive and significant effect on firm exit. The 
latter tend to be mainly more traditional manufacturing sectors, the implications in policy 
terms being that while in general an increase in deregulation seems desirable since it leads to 
a more efficient reallocation of resources within industries through higher firm entry and exit, 
attention should be given to the fact that there are more traditional manufacturing sectors 
where deregulation does not significantly affect firm entry, but it does have a significant 
impact on firm exit, which could exacerbate existing problems within these sectors. 
 
The study of specific countries also shows different effects of higher deregulation on firm 
entry and exit both in the short and in the long run. In the short run, an increase in 
deregulation will decrease firm entry in Belgium and Spain and will decrease firm exit in 
France. The entry of firms into the market will increase in Italy and the UK with higher 
deregulation, whereas firm exit will increase in Belgium, Spain and the UK. The short-term 
effects of a rise in deregulation are insignificant for the other countries in the sample. 
 
In the long term, higher deregulation will lead to more firm entry and exit in Belgium, 
France and Italy. The firm entry rate will increase in Spain, but the firm exit rate will 
decrease. An increase in deregulation will lead to lower firm entry and exit in Germany, 
whereas the impact will be insignificant for the other countries in the sample. 
 
Among the individual regulation indicators, we found that a decrease in price controls and 
hidden import barriers, as well as an increase in regulatory quality and the ease of starting a 
new business have positive and significant effects on firm entry and exit. A decrease in 
transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP and in the mean tariff rate has a negative effect on 
firm entry, results that are contrary to expectations. Finally, we did not find a significant 
impact of a reduction in the time spent with government bureaucracy or of the restrictions on 
FDI on the entry and exit rates. 
 
5.2. Impact of entry and exit on economic performance 
 
In the second part of the estimation exercise, we analysed the impact of the entry and exit 
rates on economic performance as measured by the growth in output, the growth in labour 
productivity, the growth in employment, the growth in physical capital investment, the growth 
in R&D investment, capital intensity and R&D intensity. Estimations were done separately 
for the entry and exit rates. Estimations based on the turbulence rate, i.e. entry plus exit rates 
on twice the number of active firms, were also investigated. However, the results turned out to 
be insignificant in most cases, which suggests that since entry and exit depend on different 
variables, mixing both might be misleading. 
 
In the entry rate equation, we first introduced separately the current entry rate, the entry 
rate lagged by one year and the entry rate lagged by two years. We then introduce the three 
entry rates together with and without controlling for industry, country and year specific 
effects. We proceed in a similar manner for the exit rate equation. We introduce current and 
lagged entry and exit rates in order to analyse the timing of the impact of firm entry and exit 
on the economic performance variables. When we add interaction terms between entry, exit, 
industry and country dummies, this allows us to examine the sectors and countries for which 
the relationship between entry, exit and economic performance is contemporaneous and the 
ones for which the relationship is lagged.  
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The results based on the sample where we eliminated the time dimension by averaging the 
variables across time (giving us the average long terms effects of the impact of firm entry and 
exit on economic performance) turned out to be insignificant in most cases
64. This finding 
leads one to the conclusion that entry and exit may have effects that appear with different lags 
and may partly cancel out in the long run. 
 
By introducing country, industry and year specific effects, we can control for endogeneity 
issues since we can have a common shock that simultaneously affects firm entry, exit and 
economic performance. Without controlling for these issues, we can conclude that firm entry 
or exit has a significant impact on economic performance when in fact both variables are 
influenced by a common economic shock. Because of this reason, we will concentrate our 
analysis on the regression where we introduce the current and lagged entry (and exit) rates 
simultaneously and control for individual specific effects
65. 
 
Controlling for individual specific effects is likely to slightly change the results of the 
regressions since part of the variations in entry and exit rates are specific to certain sectors, 
variables rather than to the ‘actual’ effect of the variable in question. Comparing the results of 
the two types of specifications (with and without controlling for individual specific effects) is 
useful since it provides a robustness test for the different explanatory variables. If the impact 
of a given explanatory variable continues to be significant even after controlling for individual 
specific effects then we can conclude with some certainty that the variation in the variable in 
question does have a significant effect on the dependent variable. If however the impact of an 
explanatory variable becomes insignificant when we control for individual specific effects, 
then we cannot say with certainty whether the variable in question was capturing part of the 
individual specific variations or whether the introduction of individual specific effects is 
capturing part of the variation due to firm entry or exit. 
 
Our favourite results for the impact of firm entry on output growth are reported in column 
(2) of Table 6
66. We observe a positive effect of an increase in the current firm entry rate, 
which is significant at the 10% confidence level, with a 1% increase in the current entry rate 
leading to an increase by 2.10% in output growth. The relationship between the current entry 
rate and output growth is robust to alternative specifications. We do not find a significant 
relationship between firm entry lagged by one and two years respectively and output growth. 
The model explains 29% of the variation in output growth. The estimations performed by 
2SLS show a positive impact of current entry and a negative impact, albeit only significant at 
the 10% level, of the one period lagged entry rate on output growth. This negative coefficient 
can be explained by the low survival rate of entrants after one year following the entry in the 
market or by the fact that entrants do not have an important size at the beginning of their 
economic activity and therefore a significant impact on output growth one year later. The 
results for the exit rate do not change. 
 
                                                 
64 We found a significant (at the 10% level) negative impact of entry only on the physical capital intensity and 
the R&D intensity variable, indicating that firms that enter a market have a lower than average intensity with 
respect to these capital variables. 
65 In order to control more explicitly for the potential endogeneity of the entry and exit rates, we also estimate an 
instrumental two-stage least square (2SLS) regression whose results are reported in Column (5*) of the Tables 
reporting the full results in Appendix 3. Table A.32 in Appendix 3 details the explanatory power of the chosen 
set of instruments. It follows that these variables explain between 94% and 98% of the instrumented variables. 
The Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions clearly does not reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are not correlated with the error term and are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. 
66 Full results are reported in Table A.23 in Appendix 3.  
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We find that the exit rate lagged by one year has a negative impact on output growth, 
which is significant at the 10% confidence level, with a 1% increase in firm exit one year ago, 
leading to a decrease in output growth by 0.86%. The lagged relationship between firm exit 
and output growth is robust to alternative specifications. We do not find a significant 
relationship between current firm exit and output growth, nor between the twice-lagged firm 
exit rate and output growth. There are two possible explanations for the fact that we find a 
significant relationship between the once lagged exit rate and output growth, but an 
insignificant contemporaneous relationship between firm exit and output growth. A first 
explanation is that firms exit the market in different months of the year and some of the 
impact from firm exit will be felt mostly on next year’s output growth instead of this year’s 
growth. Another possible explanation is that firms file their accounting books during the year 
rather than at the beginning or at the end of the year, whereas output growth is measured from 
the end of one year to the end of the next year. The exit rate regression explains 16% of the 
variation in output growth. 
 
In a second step, we allow the coefficient of the contemporaneous entry rate and the exit rate 
lagged by one year to vary across different sectors so that we can have a clearer view about 
the sector specific impact. From the results reported in Table A.24 in Appendix 3, we 
conclude on a positive effect of an increase in firm entry on output growth in the following 
sectors: coke and refined petroleum products, radio, TV and communication, wholesale and 
retail trade and repairs, transport and storage, real estate, renting and business activities. An 
increase in the entry rate by 1% in the coke and refined petroleum products sector increases 
the output growth rate by 4.44%. A rise in the entry rate by 1% in the other sectors leads to an 
increase in output growth of between 1.34% and 1.88%. We also find a positive impact of an 
increase in firm entry and output growth which is significant at the 5% confidence level in the 
following sectors: wood and products of wood, pulp, paper and paper products, chemicals and 
chemical products, other non-metallic and mineral products, office machinery and computers, 
other transport equipment, furniture and manufacturing n.e.c. and construction. A 1% increase 
in firm entry leads to an increase in output growth by 1.16% to 2.74%. Finally, there is also a 
positive relationship that is significant at the 10% confidence level in the following sectors: 
publishing and printing, medical, precision and optical instruments, motor vehicles and 
trailers, electricity, gas and water supply. A 1% increase in firm entry in these sectors leads to 
an increase in output growth of between 1.02% to 1.08%. The impact of firm entry on output 
growth is not significant for the other sectors under consideration. The explanatory power of 
the model increases to 35% of the variation in output growth. 
 
In the exit rate equation, we find a negative impact of the once lagged exit rate on output 
growth that is significant at the 1% confidence level in the following industries: textiles, 
wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing, tanning and dressing of leather, basic metals, office 
machinery and computers. An increase in the exit rate during the prior year leads to a decrease 
in current output growth of between 0.93% to 2.83%. The relationship between the once 
lagged exit rate and output growth is negative and significant at the 5% confidence level in 
the following sectors: rubber and plastic products and fabricated metal products, with a 1% 
increase in the once lagged exit rate leading to a decrease in output growth of between 1.28% 
to 1.37%. Finally, there is also a negative impact of the lagged exit rate on output growth that 
is significant at the 10% confidence level in the following sectors: machinery and equipment 
n.e.c. and construction, with a 1% increase in the once lagged exit rate leading to a decrease in 
output growth of between 0.66% to 1.30%. The relationship between the once lagged exit rate 
and output growth in the other sectors is not significant. The model explains 13% of the 
variation in output growth.  
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Table 6. Impact of entry-exit on economic performance 
Dependent variable 
  ∆ lny_t  ∆ lnlp_t  ∆ lnl_t  ∆ lni_t  ∆ lnr_t  capint_t rdint_t 
 coefficient t-statistic  coefficient  t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
ENTRY RATE 
C  -0.01  -0.48  -0.01  -0.34   0.00   0.08  -0.10  -1.49   0.06   0.80   5.09*   6.95   0.29   1.23 
ER_t   2.10***   1.86   0.60***   1.70   2.67**   2.01   0.48   0.56   3.06**   2.30   4.67   0.52  -6.25  -1.32 
ER_t-1 -1.24  -1.50  -0.30  -0.96  -2.20** -2.10  -0.18 -0.12  -2.83**  -2.24  -6.08  -0.53   1.98   0.35 
ER_t-2  -0.31  -1.22   0.14   0.69  -0.29  -1.09  -0.04  -0.08   1.60***   1.95  -4.97 -0.91  -2.46 -0.92 
Industry X    X X X  X  X 
Country X    X X X  X  X 
Year X    X X X  X  X 
R²a 0.29    0.43 0.06 0.01  0.81  0.74 
F-statistic  F(38, 443) = 4.81*    F(38, 425) = 5.52*  F(37, 383) = 2.47*  F(36, 387) = 1.03  F( 37, 359) = 40.48* F(36, 336) = 18.89* 
Nob 482    464 421 424  397  373 
EXIT RATE 
C   0.01   0.38   0.00   0.27   0.01   0.21  -0.08  -0.91   0.13**   2.36   5.51*   10.23   0.13**   2.36 
XR_t   0.17   0.39   0.16   0.59  -0.45  -0.92  -0.35 -0.49  -0.98 -1.09  -13.62**  -2.33  -0.98 -1.09 
XR_t-1 -0.86*** -1.87  -0.36  -1.02  -0.43  -0.81  -2.16  -1.28   1.22   0.89  -9.77  -1.20   1.22   0.89 
XR_t-2  -0.40  -1.07   0.68**   2.10  -0.71  -1.43   1.95   0.79   0.68   0.47  -3.69  -0.36   0.68   0.47 
Industry X    X X X  X  X 
Country X    X X X  X  X 
Year X    X X X  X  X 
R²a 0.16    0.13 0.08 0.00  0.81  0.74 
F-statistic  F(38, 443) = 5.27*    F(38, 425) = 8.49*  F(37, 383) = 2.40*  F(36, 387) = 1.09  F( 37, 359) = 40.25* F(36, 336) = 18.74* 
Nob 482    464 421 424  397  373 
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level; R²a = adjusted R-squared; Nob = number of observations. 
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If we compare the impact of firm entry and exit on output growth across various sectors, 
we observe that there are a number of sectors in which firm entry has a significant impact on 
output growth, while the effect of firm exit is insignificant. There are also sectors, which tend 
to be mostly traditional manufacturing industries, where the effect of firm entry on output 
growth is insignificant, whereas the effect of firm exit is significantly negative. In terms of 
interactions between entry-exit rates and country effects (see Table A.25 in Appendix 3), we 
observe a positive impact of entry on output growth in Portugal and Spain and a negative 
impact of exit for Germany, Portugal and The United Kingdom. 
 
When we study the impact of firm entry on labour productivity growth (see Column 3 of 
Table 6), we observe a positive contemporaneous relationship between firm entry and labour 
productivity growth, which is significant at the 10% confidence level
67. The magnitude of the 
effect is relatively large, with a 1% increase in the current entry rate leading to a rise in labour 
productivity by 0.60%. The regression explains 56% of the variation in labour productivity 
growth. There is also a positive relationship between the exit rate lagged by two years and 
labour productivity growth that is significant at the 5% confidence level. This result is 
surprising given that normally we would expect a contemporaneous relationship between firm 
exit and labour productivity growth. A 1% increase in firm exit two years ago leads to an 
increase of 0.68% in the current labour productivity growth rate. The regression explains 55% 
of the variation in labour productivity growth. The estimation performed using two stage least 




When we let the coefficients for the current entry rate and the twice-lagged exit rate 
respectively vary across sectors, we observe a positive impact of an increase in the current 
entry rate on labour productivity growth in the following sectors: office machinery and 
computers and radio, TV and communication. The effect is significant at the 1% confidence 
level and has a strong magnitude with a 1% increase in the current firm entry rate leading to 
an increase in labour productivity of 3.15% for the office machinery and computers sector and 
of 6.90% in the radio, TV and communication sector. We also found that the current entry rate 
has a negative impact on labour productivity growth which is significant at the 1%, 5% or 
10% confidence level in the following sectors: rubber and plastic products, other non-metallic 
and mineral products, machinery and equipment n.e.c., medical, precision and optical 
instruments, motor vehicles and trailers, wholesale and retail trade and repairs and real estate, 
renting and business activities. An increase in the current entry rate by 1% leads to a decrease 
in labour productivity growth of between 0.53% to 1.03%. Globally, the strong increase in 
labour productivity generated in the office machinery and computers and radio, TV and 
communication sectors more than offsets the decrease in labour productivity in the other 
sectors such that the overall effect of the current entry rate on labour productivity growth is 
positive on average, as shown by the initial specification. The fact that we observe a positive 
relationship between the current entry rate and labour productivity growth in some sectors and 
a negative relationship in other sectors can be explained by the fact that in general new 
entrants are less productive than incumbent firms and have a negative influence on labour 
productivity growth, whereas in more dynamic and R&D intensive sectors like office 
machinery and computers and radio, TV and communication, firms that enter the market may 
be more productive than incumbents, thereby having a strongly positive effect on labour 
productivity growth. Another possible explanation is that in some sectors most firm entry may 
                                                 
67 Full results are reported in Table A.26 in Appendix 3. 
68 As alternative to the growth rate of labour productivity, we also considered the level of this variable. However, 
the estimates turned out to be insignificant at the 10% level.   
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take place through diversification or by foreign multinationals that are already highly 
productive and not by de novo entry. It would have been interesting to be able to control for 
firm specific characteristics such as the type of entry, the size and the duration of survival in 
order to investigate further this question. The regression with sector specific coefficients 
explains 46% of the variation in labour productivity growth. In terms of country effects, we 
find a positive impact of exit on labour productivity growth in France and Portugal and a 
positive impact of entry in Ireland and Portugal. 
 
When we vary the twice lagged exit rate coefficients across sectors, we find a negative 
relationship between an increase in the twice lagged exit rate and labour productivity growth 
which is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% confidence levels in the following sectors: textiles, 
coke and refined petroleum products, rubber and plastic products, other non-metallic and 
mineral products, basic metals, fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment n.e.c., 
radio, TV and communication, medical, precision and optical instruments, motor vehicles and 
trailers, furniture and manufacturing n.e.c., construction, wholesale and retail trade and repairs 
and real estate, renting and business activities. The negative relationship between lagged exit 
and labour productivity may be due to the fact that in some sectors like textiles and motor 
vehicles, many large multinationals which are among the most highly productive firms 
relocate production in Eastern Europe or Asia, therefore leaving only the least productive 
firms to operate in the sectors in question and decreasing labour productivity. A 1% increase 
in the exit rate two years ago will lead to a decrease in labour productivity growth of between 
1.19% to 3.40%. We also find a positive relationship between an increase in the exit rate 
lagged twice and labour productivity growth in the following sectors: office machinery and 
computers, radio, TV and communication, electricity, gas and water supply. A 1% increase in 
firm exit two years ago leads to an increase in labour productivity growth by 3.34% in office, 
machinery and computers and by 16.49% in the radio, TV and communication sector, both 
effects being significant at the 1% confidence level. There is also a 1.74% increase in labour 
productivity growth in the electricity, gas and water supply sector that is significant at the 5% 
confidence level. The very strong effects on labour productivity in the radio, TV and 
communication and the office machinery and computers sectors more than offset the negative 
influence of the twice lagged exit rate on labour productivity growth in the other sectors such 
that the overall effect is positive as shown by the initial regression. The regression explains 
32% of the variation in labour productivity growth.  
 
The study of the impact of firm entry and exit on employment growth shows, as can be 
seen in Column 4 of Table 6
69, a positive relationship between an increase in the current firm 
entry rate and employment growth which is significant at the 5% confidence level, with a 1% 
increase in the current entry rate leading to an increase in employment growth by 2.67%. 
There is also a negative effect of the increase in the once lagged entry rate on employment 
growth which is also significant at the 5% level, with a 1% increase in the entry rate one year 
ago leading to a 2.20% decrease in employment growth. We do not find a significant 
relationship between the twice-lagged entry rate and employment. There are two possible 
explanations as to why we find a positive contemporaneous relationship, but a negative lagged 
relationship between firm entry and productivity growth. The first is that firm entry in the 
current year leads to a substantial acceleration in employment growth during this period since 
entrants will hire new employees. However, this effect fades out during the following year 
and the employment growth rate falls back to its normal rate translating into a negative impact 
of the once lagged entry rate on employment growth. Another explanation is the short life 
                                                 
69 Full results are reported in Table A.27 in Appendix 3.  
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span of new entrants, with a significant number of new firms that entered the market in the 
current year exiting the market in the next year and thereby decreasing employment and the 
employment growth rate during this period. The general short life span of new entrants is also 
explained by the financial structure of the companies and in particular by the low amount of 
own funds with which they enter the market. As these firms are not competitive enough 
during the first years of their existence, they make losses that decrease the level of their own 
funds. Within two or three years, the funds become insufficient to allow the firm to pursue its 
activities forcing it to enter into bankruptcy. New entrants may also be unable to finance their 
expansion if their level of own funds is too low and if they do not have access to external 
funding, forcing them out of the market. This problem is more acute in the EU because of the 
relatively low development of start ups financing such as risk capital funds or business angels 
compared to the US. The regression model explains 43% of the variation in employment 
growth.  
 
If we vary the coefficient of the current entry rate across sectors we find a positive 
relationship between firm entry and employment growth which is significant at the 1% and 
5% confidence levels in the following sectors (Column 5 of Table A.24 in Appendix 3): wood 
and products of wood, pulp, paper and paper products, publishing and printing, coke and 
refined petroleum products, chemicals and chemical products, rubber and plastic products, 
other non-metallic and mineral products, basic metals, fabricated metal products, machinery 
and equipment n.e.c., office machinery and computers, electrical machinery and apparatus, 
radio, TV and communication, medical, precision and optical instruments, motor vehicles and 
trailers, other transport equipment, furniture and manufacturing n.e.c., construction, wholesale 
and retail trade and repairs, transport and storage and real estate, renting and business 
activities. The magnitude of the effect of a 1% increase in the current entry rate on 
employment growth varies between 0.97% and 4.10%. The impact of the current entry rate on 
employment growth is insignificant in the other sectors. The regression explains 59% of the 
variation in employment growth. Interactions between country effects and entry rates suggest 
a positive impact of the latter on employment growth for France, Portugal and Spain. 
 
In a separate regression, we also allow the coefficient associated with the once lagged 
entry rate to vary across sectors. The results are reported in Column 6 of Table A.24 in 
Appendix 3. We find a negative influence of the once lagged entry rate on employment 
growth, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels in the following sectors: tobacco 
products, textiles, wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing, tanning and dressing of leather, 
motor vehicles and trailers and electricity, gas and water supply. The magnitude of the effect 
is relatively small with a 1% increase in the once lagged entry rate leading to a decrease in 
employment growth by 0.02% to 0.03%. This specification explains 38% of the variation in 
employment growth. We did not find a significant contemporaneous or lagged relationship 
between the firm exit rate and employment growth. Finally, as an alternative to the growth 
rate of employment, we also considered the level of this variable. However, the estimates 
turned out to be insignificant at the 10% level. 
 
We also study the impact of the firm entry and exit rates respectively on the growth of 
physical capital investment, but we do not find a significant effect in either the entry rate or 
the exit rate equation (Column 5 of Table 6)
70. The explanatory power of the regressions was 
also very low with an adjusted R
2 of 6% to 8%. A likely explanation for these results is that 
investment in physical capital tends to be highly persistent leading to a flat growth rate. 
                                                 
70 Full results are reported in Table A.28 in Appendix 3.  
  - 68 -
 
We also analysed the impact of firm entry and exit on R&D investment growth (Column 6 
of Table 6)
71. Although we found significant contemporaneous and lagged relationships 
between the firm entry rate and R&D investment growth, the adjusted R
2 is extremely low at 
1%, which does not allow us to reach a pertinent conclusion as to the impact of firm entry on 
R&D investment growth. We did not find any significant relationship between firm exit and 
R&D investment growth. The explanation for these results is similar to the one on physical 
capital investment, as R&D investment also tends to be highly persistent and to have a flat 
growth rate. 
 
As an alternative performance measure, we also regressed the current and lagged entry 
and exit rates on R&D intensity and on capital intensity (Columns 7 and 8 of Table 6)
72. Here 
also, we did not find any significant relationship in the R&D intensity equation, but we did 
find evidence of a negative impact of an increase in the current firm exit rate on capital 
intensity which can be explained by the fact that some traditional manufacturing sectors which 
are in decline are also highly capital intensive and therefore the exit of firms from these 
sectors will have a negative effect on capital intensity. 
                                                 
71 Full results are reported in Table A.29 in Appendix 3. 
72 Full results are reported in Tables A.30 and A.31 in Appendix 3.  
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6. Summary and conclusions 
 
Product market reforms and measures aimed at deregulating the economy and increasing 
competition are essential to improve the framework conditions in which business operates, 
reduce the economic rents in the economy, promote business dynamism and stimulate 
innovation. Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that the medium to long-term gains in 
productivity due to product market reforms could be substantial and that these gains mainly 
operate indirectly through efficiency gains.  
 
The relative performance of the EU economy over the recent past, in particular in terms of 
aggregated productivity gains as compared to the US as well as the challenge of the Lisbon 
strategy to transform the EU into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world ask for a closer examination of the instruments and policies 
implemented to improve the functioning of markets. This study attempts to shed some light on 
one determinant of productivity and growth performance, namely the impact of product 
market reforms implemented in the EU over the last ten years on its macroeconomic 
performance, in particular through their direct effects on the process of firm entry and exit. 
The study is composed of four parts: a review of the literature on the determinants of entry-
exit and product market reforms and their impact on economic performance, a description of 
data and indicators necessary to carry out the analysis, an econometric framework to 
implement the analysis and a discussion of the empirical findings and their main policy 
implications. 
 
a) Literature review 
 
We first conducted a survey of the empirical and theoretical literature on market entry and 
exit, economic performance and the degree of economic and business regulation. The 
literature uncovers a series of empirical facts on the correlation between entry and exit rates 
that is positive in industries with steady states of maturity and negative in the early and late 
phases of the product’s life cycle. The variance of entry rates within industries is higher than 
the variance between industries. It changes over time and tends to come in waves. The 
variance of firm growth rates is large, but declines with the size of firms and the sunkness of 
capacity. Given these empirical observations, a number of theoretical studies modelled the 
entry and exit process based on the Schumpeterian concept of creative destruction. In passive 
learning models, firms enter the industry without knowing their true costs about which they 
gradually learn over time. They then decide whether to exit or remain in the industry. In these 
models, increasing the cost of entry leads to low firm turnover. In active models, firms enter 
the industry and invest to increase their productivity. If they are successful, they remain in the 
market, if not they exit. Capital vintage models are based on the assumption that new 
technology is embodied in new vintage capital and new entrants have the advantage of not 
having to incur the costs of upgrading their capital. In R&D based models of economic 
growth, firms use R&D investment to create new products and processes or higher quality 
versions. Successful innovators enter the industry and replace firms producing obsolete goods. 
Finally, according to product life cycle models, the amount of firm creation and the nature of 
innovation change with the degree of maturity of the industry. 
 
We then presented the ‘basic’ determinants of firm entry and exit, which can be specific to 
the firm, the industry, determined by both firm and industry characteristics or be country 
specific. Firm growth rates are influenced by the size and age of firms and by industry and 
economy-wide output growth rates. Firms entering and exiting the industry have lower than  
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average size and the size of European firms is smaller than that of US firms. Young and small 
firms are the ones that most frequently exit the industry. Manager turnover in small businesses 
plays an important role in firm exits. A relationship was found between lagged entry and exit 
rates, whereas only a weak relationship was uncovered between entry and past industry 
profits. The survival of new entrants is low and those that do survive need an average of 5 to 
10 years to become competitive with incumbents. Lower degrees of economic development 
correspond to higher turnover rates. The latter are also affected by macroeconomic shocks. 
Entry deterrence strategies and structural barriers to entry also affect the entry and exit 
process and can again be classified into firm, industry or country specific, or determined by 
both firm and industry characteristics. Limit pricing where incumbent firms charge the highest 
price at which entry is deterred, and predatory pricing in which incumbents engage in a price 
war with new entrants were both criticised for not constituting credible threats to entry. 
Empirically, little evidence was uncovered for the use of limit pricing by firms. The use of 
sunk costs as a pre-commitment mechanism to deter entry was also analysed in the literature. 
The use of excess capacity to deter entry was found to be infrequent empirically, but some 
evidence was uncovered that firms use specific capital as a pre-commitment mechanism. 
Advertising and R&D intensity were found to be used frequently as entry deterrence 
strategies, whereas economies of scale constitute an important structural barrier to entry that 
influences the use of entry deterring strategies by incumbent firms. The impact of entry 
deterring strategies was found to depend on the type of entrant. Firm access to credit capital 
also plays a significant role in firm entry and exit. 
 
In the last part of the survey, we looked at the impact of entry and exit on economic 
performance as measured by aggregate productivity growth
73. There is a debate in the 
literature on how to best decompose aggregate productivity growth into the contribution of 
within firm productivity growth, entry and exit and market share reallocation. Studies also 
differ on the best way to measure aggregate productivity with both TFP and labour 
productivity having certain advantages and disadvantages. In the end, the contribution of entry 
and exit to aggregate productivity growth can be high or low depending on the decomposition 
of aggregate productivity used, the time horizon over which changes are measured, the 
business cycle and the country and industry under investigation. Studies found that in general 
entrants have lower productivity than survivors, as do firms exiting the market. The latter also 
tend to have lower productivity for several years before exit, whereas the relationship between 
the productivities of entrants and of firms exiting the industry is unclear. Entry and exit also 
affect aggregate productivity indirectly by influencing firms’ incentives to innovate. For 
sectors close to the technological frontier, an increase in the threat of entry has a positive 
effect on productivity growth, whereas for sectors far below the technological frontier the 




In Section 3, we presented the data sources necessary to carry out the study, as well as the 
suitability of the information and data for modeling purposes. The firm entry and exit rates are 
taken from the DUN & BRADSTREET database which contains series by year, sector and 
country for 9 EU countries over the 1997-2003 period. We also integrated data from the 
Census Bureau for the US for the 1999-2001 period. An examination of the entry and exit 
variables enable us to draw a series of conclusions which mostly confirm the findings of the 
                                                 
73 Brandt (2004) also studied the impact of firm entry on output and employment growth and found a significant 
correlation between firm entry rates and output and employment growth respectively across services sectors, but 
the relationship between these variables is less clear in manufacturing industries.  
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empirical literature: entry and exit are common, with large numbers of firms entering and 
exiting most markets in most years. Both entry and exit rates substantially differ across 
countries and industries, with the annual growth rate of the total number of firms being 
generally positive, but tending to decrease over the 1997-2003 period. We also found that the 
heterogeneity of net entry rates varies substantially across time periods, countries and 
industries, while most of the total variation in net entry rates across industries is within-
industry variation rather than between-industry variation. The same finding holds for within-
country and time period and between-country and time period variation. Finally, entry and to 
some extent exit rates across countries are generally significantly and positively correlated. 
 
We used a second database for variables describing market structure, some of which also 
constitute structural barriers to entry. We based the construction of the capital, resource and 
R&D intensity variables and the value-added and employment growth rates on the OECD’s 
STAN and ANBERD databases which provide coverage by sector, country and year for all the 
countries in the sample except Ireland and Portugal over the 1990 to 2001 or 2002 period. We 
also used a series of variables that capture market structure which were taken from Lyons 
(1996) and Martins et al. (1996) and include minimum efficient scale, industry concentration, 
product differentiation and market segmentation. Among the indicators of economic 
performance we used data on labour productivity per person engaged from the Groningen 
Growth and Development Center’s 60-Industry Database. The series covers all the countries 
in the sample by sector and year over the 1997-2001 period. The main conclusions from the 
descriptive statistics done on these variables is that there is little variation in R&D intensity in 
a given sector across countries and years, but moderate variation for capital and resource 
intensity, as well as for value-added and employment growth. On the contrary, the variation in 
a given sector across countries and years is much stronger for the gross fixed capital formation 
and the labour productivity per person engaged variables compared with the others. There are 
sectors where the standard deviation and average differ substantially compared with those of 
the other industries. We found moderate variation in a given country across sectors and years 
for capital intensity, R&D intensity and employment growth. Slightly higher variation was 
found for resource intensity and value added growth, whereas the highest standard deviations 
were found for gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and labour productivity. The variations 
in terms of resource and R&D intensity are fairly similar across countries. The average is 
fairly similar across countries for capital intensity, resource intensity, R&D intensity and 
value added growth, whereas countries are a lot more heterogeneous in terms of the GFCF 
and labour productivity averages. The standard deviation is fairly stable across time for capital 
and resource intensity, it is mostly stable for value added and employment growth, it increases 
across time for GFCF and labour productivity and it fluctuates moderately for R&D intensity. 
The average for capital intensity is stable across time, it increases for GFCF, decreases for 
resource and R&D intensity and fluctuates for value added and employment growth. The 
correlation matrix generally shows low correlation among the variables with some exceptions. 
 
The third database we used in the analysis concerns product market reforms indicators. 
Most of the indicators we used are taken from the Fraser Institute which reports them on a 
five year interval basis and annually from 2000 onwards. The main drawback of the Fraser 
indicators is that they are only available at the macroeconomic aggregate level and therefore 
do not have a sector dimension. We also used industry-specific indicators for seven network 
industries which were compiled by the OECD, a second category of indicators which cover 
industry specific regulations for 1998 from the OECD and the Australian Productivity 
Commission and a series of indicators covering restrictions in different sectors for 1981, 
1986, 1991 and 1998 from the UN Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS). All the  
  - 72 -
regulation indicators that did not provide yearly coverage were linearly intra or extrapolated 
so as to provide data for the 1997-2003 period and were rescaled from 1 to 10 according to the 
level of deregulation in the economy. 
 
 
c) Econometric framework 
 
In Section 4, we described in detail the methodology and modelling strategy to assess the 
impact of product market reforms on entry-exit and macroeconomic performance and this 
framework is related to the survey of the literature. We used a two-stage approach, where we 
first estimated the relationship between firm entry and exit and our indicators of product 
market reforms and regulations while controlling for country and industry structural 
characteristics such as entry barriers. In the second stage, we estimated the relationship 
between firm entry and exit rates and different macroeconomic outcomes such as output 
growth, labour productivity growth, employment growth, physical capital and R&D 
investment growth and capital and R&D intensities. We encountered several estimation issues 
during both stages.  
 
In the first part of the regression, we estimated firm entry and exit rates which vary at the 
country, industry and year levels as a function of the Fraser regulation indicators which only 
vary at the country and time levels, but not across sectors. The standard error resulting from 
these estimations can have a strong downward bias because they are usually correlated among 
the observations within a given group. We can therefore conclude that a regulation indicator 
has a significant effect on firm entry and exit when in reality it does not. In order to solve this 
problem we eliminate the time dimension from the regression by averaging the observations 
across years and we use a fixed effects panel data model where the fixed effects are at the 
sector level. Another estimation issue in this first stage is the presence of multicollinearity 
among the different regulation indicators. In order to address this issue, we also conducted a 
principal components analysis and we used the principal component as the regulation 
indicator in the estimations. In the second stage of the estimation, the problem we encountered 
was the possibility of endogeneity of the entry and exit variables because of unobserved 
common shocks that simultaneously affect firm entry and exit and macroeconomic 
performance. We can therefore conclude that entry and exit have a significant influence on 
macroeconomic performance when in fact they are both responding to a common shock. In 
order to solve this problem, we used two approaches: in the first, we regressed the 
macroeconomic variables on current and lagged firm entry and exit rates while simultaneously 
controlling for country, industry and year specific effects, as the latter variables are likely to 
capture any common shocks. The second approach was to use an instrumental variables 
methodology in which we used several indicators of firms’ entry and exit as instrumental 
variables. 
 
d) Main empirical findings 
 
The estimation results for the first equation show evidence that capital intensity constitutes 
a barrier to entry and exit as does R&D intensity, even though both of these barriers are 
relatively low. The entry rate lagged by one year has a positive effect on both the current entry 
and exit rates that can be interpreted as a confirmation of the wave theory and of the low 
survival rate of new entrants. The results on the market structure variables show that high 
concentration and product differentiation at the beginning of the period lead to high firm entry 
and exit rates or high firm turbulence. The industries where market concentration is high also  
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have high profits that can attract new firms, thereby leading to an increase in firm entry. In 
industries with strong product differentiation, there will be higher firm entry since it is easier 
for firms to present new products. As efficiency gains, through the toughening of the 
competitive regime, are likely to be the most important in initially highly concentrated and 
diversified market structures, firm entry and exit can also be expected to be high in these 
industry sectors. An increase in deregulation leads on average to an increase in both firm entry 
and exit, a finding that is robust to alternative specifications and estimation methods. 
However, when we study specific sectors, the impact of an increase in deregulation on entry 
and exit varies from one industry to another. Generally, the effect of deregulation is positive 
and significant mainly in manufacturing sectors and only in a very limited number of services 
sectors. There are also a very small number of sectors where deregulation has a negative 
effect on firm entry and exit. Finally, there are sectors in which deregulation does not have a 
significant effect on entry, but it does have a positive and significant effect on firm exit. These 
sectors tend to be more traditional manufacturing sectors and for some of them firm exit has a 
positive impact on productivity. 
 
In the second part of the estimation, we found a robust positive relationship between the 
current firm entry rate and output growth and a robust negative relationship between the once 
lagged firm exit rate and output growth. In terms of labour productivity, there is a positive and 
significant relationship between current firm entry and labour productivity growth as well as 
between firm exit lagged by two years and labour productivity growth. We can therefore 
conclude that the impact of firm entry on output growth and labour productivity growth 
occurs contemporaneously, whereas the impact of firm exit on these two economic 
performance variables occurs with a certain lag. In both cases, the magnitudes of the impact of 
both firm entry and exit are quite high. The current entry rate has a positive impact on 
employment growth, whereas the once lagged entry rate has a negative effect. There is no 
significant relationship between firm exit and employment growth. We did not find a 
significant relationship between entry and exit respectively and physical capital investment 
growth, whereas the explanatory power of the R&D investment growth regressions is very 
weak so that we are unable to draw any meaningful conclusions as to the relationship between 
firm entry and exit and this economic performance variable. A possible explanation for these 
two results is that both physical capital and R&D investment are highly persistent and 
therefore generally have a flat growth rate. The picture changes slightly if we study the impact 
of firm entry and exit on physical capital and R&D intensity. We found a negative and 
significant relationship between the current firm exit rate and physical capital intensity, but no 
significant impact of firm entry. On the contrary, we found some evidence of a negative and 
significant relationship between the current firm entry rate and R&D intensity, but no 
significant impact of firm exit. While these results are valid on average, a closer inspection by 
sector shows that the significance and even the sense of the relationship between entry and 
exit respectively and the different macroeconomic variables differ. In particular, while there 
are sectors where both entry and exit have a significant impact or both have an insignificant 
effect on the macroeconomic performance variables, there are also sectors where the 
relationship between entry and macroeconomic performance is significant, but not the 
relationship between exit and macroeconomic performance, with the reverse true in other 
sectors. The latter generally tend to be more traditional manufacturing sectors. Finally, there 
are also sectors where the relationship between firm entry or exit and economic performance 
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e) Policy implications and further work 
 
The general policy implications that we can draw from these results is that it is desirable 
to pursue economic policies that influence firm entry and exit since the variation of the latter 
will generate significant and generally positive changes on macroeconomic performance with 
the magnitude of these changes being relatively large. One such economic policy is an 
increase in deregulation that will significantly increase both firm entry and exit leading to a 
more efficient reallocation of resources within industries. However, the results for some 
traditional manufacturing sectors suggest that in some cases, it may be necessary to 
accompany deregulation policies in the short run by certain compensation measures given that 
in sectors that are generally on the decline, deregulation policies may exacerbate already 
existing problems in the absence of compensatory measures. 
 
There are certain limitations of the current study, which are generally due to data 
availability. Apart from the estimation problems mentioned above, we were not able to 
control for firm specific characteristics such as size, age or type of entrant in our regressions. 
Doing so would have likely yielded further interesting results. More detailed information on 
our product market reforms indicators would allow us to investigate further the link between 
the starting point in each country of these reforms and the size of the resulting effect. Our time 
period of 1997 to 2003 was also relatively short. It would perhaps be interesting as further 
research to complete our understanding of the current general results by case specific studies. 
Finally, it should also be noted that we only studied one channel through which product 
market reforms and deregulation policies can have an influence on macroeconomic 
performance, namely through their impact on firm entry and exit. There are however two 
other important channels through which these policies can impact macroeconomic 
performance. The first channel concerns the influence of these policies on the degree of 
competition and firms’ mark-up and the second channel is linked with their impact on firms’ 
incentives to engage in R&D and innovation activities.  
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APPENDIX 1. Summary of empirical findings and decomposition of aggregated productivity growth 
 
Table A1. Main empirical findings on the determinants of firm entry and exit 
Authors Sample  Main  Results 
Relationship between entry and past profits 
Orr (1974)  71 3-digit manufacturing industries 
Canada; 1963-1967 
- past profit rate, past industry output growth are weak incentives to entry 
- entry is lower and profits higher in high barrier group compared to low barrier group 
Hilke (1984)  16 4-digit and 5-digit manufacturing 
industries 
US; 1950-1966 
- past growth rate has positive and significant effect at 10% confidence level 
- past profits have insignificant impact on entry 
Entry barriers/entry deterrence strategies 
a. Limit pricing 
Orr (1974)  71 3-digit manufacturing industries 
Canada; 1963-1967 
- not much evidence in favour of limit pricing 
Bunch and Smiley (1992)  survey 296 managers, 42 product markets 
US; 1985 
- limit pricing among least used entry deterrence strategies in new product and existing, 
mature product markets 
Singh, Utton and Waterson 
(1998) 
survey 296 marketing/product/brand 
managers in food and drink, electrical 
engineering, chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
industries 
UK 
- limit pricing among least used entry deterrence strategies 
Chang and Tang (2001)  survey 111 marketing/product managers and 
business development/planning directors in 
manufacturing and services sectors 
Singapore; 1999 
- limit pricing among least used entry deterrence strategies 
b. Excess capacity 
Hilke (1984)  16 4-digit and 5-digit manufacturing 
industries 
US; 1950-1966 
- excess capacity is an insignificant barrier to entry 
Lieberman (1987)  38 chemical products industries 
US; 20 year period 
- incumbents did not expand preemptively to deter entry  
- firms held excess capacity to accommodate demand variability and investment lumpiness 
Bunch and Smiley (1992)  survey 296 managers, 42 product markets 
US; 1985 
- excess capacity rarely used as an entry deterrence strategy in new product markets and in 
existing, mature product markets 
Singh, Utton and Waterson 
(1998) 
survey 296 marketing/product/brand 
managers in food and drink, electrical 
engineering, chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
industries, UK 
- excess capacity rarely used as entry deterrence strategy  
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Table A1. Main empirical findings on the determinants of firm entry and exit (cont.) 
Authors Sample  Main  Results 
Chang and Tang (2001)  survey 111 marketing/product managers and 
business development/planning directors in 
manufacturing and services sectors 
Singapore; 1999 
- excess capacity rarely used as entry deterrence strategy 
c. Financial structure of firms 
Martin (2003)  188 3-digit industries 
Canada; 1984-1996 
- debt/asset ratio positively related to turnover 
- debt/asset ratio negatively related to concentration 
d. Economies of scale 
Hause and Du Rietz (1984)  39 manufacturing industries 
Sweden; 1954-1968 
- increase in minimum efficient size of new establishments decreases rate of entry 
- increase in minimum efficient size of new plant relative to industry employment has 
negative impact on entry rate, but insignificant 
Kessides (1990a)  4-digit manufacturing industries with net 
entry between 1972-1977 
US 
- inverse relationship between rate of entry and required scale of entry 
Kessides (1990b)  339 4-digit manufacturing industries 
US; 1979; 1982 
- economies of scale constitute a significant barrier to entry 
Bunch and Smiley (1992)  survey 296 managers, 42 product markets 
US; 1985 
- economies of scale act as substitutes for entry deterrence strategies in new product markets 
- in existing mature product markets firms are more likely to deter entry in industries where 
entry barriers caused by the necessity of having a minimum efficient size are low 
e. Advertising intensity 
Orr (1974)  71 3-digit manufacturing industries 
Canada; 1963-1967 
- advertising intensity is strong barrier to entry 
- advertising intensity is statistically significant entry barrier in consumer goods industry, 
but insignificant in producer goods industry 
Kessides (1986)  266 4-digit manufacturing industries 
US; 1972-1977 
- advertising creates sunk cost barrier to entry 
- potential entrants perceive greater likelihood of success in markets with important 
advertising 
- in consumer goods industries positive effect of advertising on entry dominates negative 
effect 
Bunch and Smiley (1992)  survey 296 managers, 42 product markets 
US; 1985 
 
- in new product markets, firms are more likely to adopt entry deterring strategies in 
research intensive, concentrated markets populated by large firms among which creation of 
product loyalty through advertising and patent pre-emption 
- in existing mature product markets, firm advertising among the most frequently used entry 
deterrence strategies 
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Table A1. Main empirical findings on the determinants of firm entry and exit (cont.) 
Authors Sample  Main  Results 
Singh, Utton and Waterson 
(1998) 
survey 296 marketing/product/brand 
managers in food and drink, electrical 
engineering, chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
industries 
UK 
- advertising frequently used entry deterrence strategy 
Thomas (1999)  13 groups of cereals 
US; 1971-1989 
- incumbents accommodate other incumbents on price and new product introductions but 
use advertising to limit the scale of entry 
- if entrant enters on a small enough scale, incumbents may not find it profitable to lower 
price or increase advertising to drive the entrant out of the market 
- new name products are accommodated on price and advertising and are less likely to elicit 
a new name product introduction by incumbents than product extensions which are more 
likely to capture significant market share 
Chang and Tang (2001)  survey 111 marketing/product managers and 
business development/planning directors in 
manufacturing and services sectors 
Singapore; 1999 
- advertising frequently used as a strategic barrier to entry in industries 
f. R&D intensity 
Orr (1974)  71 3-digit manufacturing industries 
Canada; 1963-1967 
- R&D intensity is a moderate barrier to entry 
Singh, Utton and Waterson 
(1998) 
survey 296 marketing/product/brand 
managers in food and drink, electrical 
engineering, chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
industries 
UK 
- R&D (not patenting) is a widely used entry deterrence strategy 
Chang and Tang (2001)  survey 111 marketing/product managers and 
business development/planning directors in 
manufacturing and services sectors 
Singapore; 1999 
- R&D intensity is frequently used as a strategic barrier to entry 
Different impact of entry barriers according to type of entrant 
Mata (1993)  5-digit manufacturing industries 
Portugal; 1982-1986 
- economies of scale are an impediment for de novo, expansion and extension entry 
- de novo entry sensitive to most entry barriers 
- extension entry is deterred by product differentiation 
- expansion entry is induced by product differentiation 
- purely diversifying entry is the least affected by entry barriers 
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Table A2. Main empirical findings on the impact of entry-exit on economic performance 
Authors Sample  Main  Results 
Contribution of entry/exit, within firm growth and market share reallocation to aggregate productivity growth 
Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992)  23 manufacturing 
industries (all years); 5 
manufacturing industries 
(1972-1987) 
US;1963, 67, 72, 77, 82, 
87 
- entry/exit contribution to productivity growth not very large since they have similar relative 
productivity 
- cyclical pattern of contribution of entry/exit to productivity growth 
- increasing share of output going to high productivity plants is important source of 
productivity growth in some but not most industries 
Griliches and Regev (1995)  22 2-digit industries 
Israel; 1979-1988 
- most of the growth in labour productivity occurs within firms, whereas net entry and market 
share reallocation only account for a small fraction of overall growth 
Olley and Pakes (1996)  telecommunications 
equipment industry 
US; 1974-1987 
- entry/exit contributed to the reallocation of capital 
- shutdown of unproductive plants led to the reallocation of capital that facilitated the increase 
in aggregate productivity 
Aw, Chen and Roberts (1997)  manufacturing industry 
Taiwan; 1981, 1986, 1991
- TFP growth of continuing firms is significant source of aggregate productivity growth 
- entry/exit is important source of aggregate growth 
- total contribution of market share reallocation is very close to 0 
Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998)  manufacturing industries 
1977-1987; 3-digit 
automotive repair shop 
sector 1987-1992; US 
- net entry plays an important role in aggregate productivity growth 
- the quantitative contribution of reallocation to the aggregate change in productivity is 
sensitive to the decomposition methodology 
- in the automotive repair shop sector net entry has a large contribution to aggregate 
productivity growth when productivity is measured by labour productivity 
Martin and Jaumandreu (1999)  75 manufacturing 
industries 
Spain; 1979-1990 
- gross entry and exit rates have positive and significant impact on productivity when included 
separately, but effect of exit rates becomes insignificant when both are included 
simultaneously 
- structural changes in industries derived from entry and exit accounts for almost 1/3 of 
average productivity growth 
Disney, Haskel and Heden (2000)  19 2-digit manufacturing 
industries 
UK; 1980-1992 
- magnitude of the between and net entry effects depends on the decomposition used 
- for TFP growth the within effect contributes 5% to 18% of aggregate productivity growth, 
net entry accounts for over 50% of growth, with external restructuring accounting for 70% to 
80% of TFP growth 
- for labour productivity growth the within effect accounts for 47% to 48% of aggregate 
productivity growth 
- in economic slowdowns the contribution of net entry to TFP growth is greater 
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Table A2. Main empirical findings on the impact of entry-exit on economic performance (cont.) 
Authors Sample  Main  results 
Hahn (2000)  5-digit manufacturing 
industries 
Korea; 1990-1998 
- very large effect of entry/exit on aggregate productivity growth which increases in 
percentage terms in periods of cyclical downturns 
-larger role of within effect in aggregate TFP growth during periods of cyclical upturns 
- contribution of market share reallocation varies with the period 
Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel and Woo (2002)  manufacturing and 
services industries 
10 OECD countries; 
1987-1997 
- within firm labour productivity accounted for 50% to 85% of aggregate productivity growth 
- the between effect varies widely across countries and time, but is typically small 
- firm labour productivity growth relative to the industry average was associated with 
restructuring and downsizing rather than expansion 
- net entry accounts for 20% to 40% of total productivity growth 
- within effect has stronger contribution to overall productivity growth, whereas the 
contributions of the between effect and net entry increases during cyclical downturns 
- contributions of entry and exit to productivity growth varies across industries 
Impact of entry on aggregate productivity growth through innovation 
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt 
(2002) 
UK firms; 1987-1993  - positive, significant effect of entry on TFP growth 
- productivity growth of incumbents reacts more positively to entry in industries close to or 
above the world technological frontier 
- inverted U relationship between competition and innovation 
Geroski (1989)  79 3-digit manufacturing 
industries 
UK; 1970-1979 
- effect of domestic entry and innovation is positive, with innovation playing the more 
substantial role; effect of foreign based entry is negative 
- innovation count variable has largest effect on productivity growth of the 3 competition 
variables in the short and long run 
- competition plays an important role in stimulating productivity 
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Table A3. Main empirical findings on the impact of economic and product market reforms on economic performance 
Authors Sample  Main  Results 
Impact of product market regulations on productivity 
Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel and Woo (2002)  23 2-digit manufacturing and business 
services sectors 
19 OECD countries; 1984-1998 
- product market regulations have negative direct effect on TFP growth 
- strict regulations have particular detrimental effect on productivity the further the 
country is from the technology frontier 
- employment protection legislation has negative and significant effect on productivity 
growth when it is not allowed to vary across different industrial relations regimes and 
when it is allowed to vary, the negative impact is stronger and significant only in 
countries with an intermediate degree of centralisation/coordination 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003)  23 2-digit manufacturing and business 
services industries 
18 OECD countries; 1984-1998 
- evidence of more rapid technological catch-up in services than manufacturing 
- economy wide product market regulations that curb competition and private 
governance have a negative effect on productivity by slowing down technological 
catch-up 
- barriers to entrepreneurship has insignificant effect on productivity 
- privatisation generally has positive and significant effect on productivity by increasing 
competitive pressure 
- entry liberalisation has a generalised effect on productivity in all countries regardless 
of position with respect to the technology frontier 
- entry liberalisation in services has positive effect on productivity in the whole 
economy  
- entry liberalisation in manufacturing has insignificant effect 
- slightly positive direct effect of restrictive regulation on MFP is found in service 
industries 
Griffith and Harrison (2004)  manufacturing and services industries 
EU countries; 1985-2000 
- reforms to labour and credit markets reduce the level of economic rents available and 
lower levels of labour productivity and TFP 
- evidence of non-linear relationship between levels of economic rents and levels of 
R&D and growth rates of labour productivity and TFP 
- in most countries the levels of economic rents is such that a reduction in rents leads to 
a reduction in R&D and growth rates 
Impact of product market regulations on investment 
Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti and Schiantarelli (2003) 7 non-manufacturing industries 
21 OECD countries; 1975-1996 
- regulation has significant negative effect on investment 
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Box 1. Decomposition of aggregated productivity growth and measuring the level of 
aggregate productivity 
The impact of firm entry and exit on economic performance is generally investigated by decomposing aggregate 
productivity growth into the contributions made by firm entry and exit, market share reallocation and 
productivity growth at the firm level. The literature debated on the best way of decomposing aggregate 
productivity growth into these three sources. Baily et al. (1992) decompose aggregate productivity growth in the 
contribution of within firm productivity of continuing firms weighted by the firm’s initial shares in the industry, 
a contribution of the change in market shares of continuing firms weighted by final period productivity and the 
contributions of firm entry and exit respectively. 
This decomposition is seen in the literature (see for example Disney et al., 2003) as posing a problem in 
terms of the contribution of net entry to aggregate productivity growth. If the market shares are very low and 
those of exiting firms are high, then net entry may have a negative contribution to aggregate growth, even if 
entrants have high productivity and exiting firms have low productivity.  
Foster et al. (1998) propose a modified version of the Baily et al. (1992) decomposition in which aggregate 
productivity growth is decomposed in the contribution of within firm productivity of continuing firms weighted 
by the firm’s initial shares in the industry, a contribution of the change in market shares of continuing firms 
weighted by the deviation of the initial firm productivity from the initial industry index, a covariance type term 
and the contributions of firm entry and exit respectively. This type of decomposition eliminates the interpretation 
problem of net entry contribution to aggregate growth found in Baily et al. (1992) by using the decomposition of 
productivity relative to the average. This method also has the advantage of isolating the within-firm and 
between-firm contributions to aggregate growth from covariance effects, but has the disadvantage of being 
vulnerable to measurement error. 
Griliches and Regev (1995) when studying the Israeli industry propose an alternative way of decomposing 
aggregate industry productivity growth into the three sources of growth. Aggregate productivity growth is 
decomposed into the within effect which is measured by the weighted sum of productivity changes in continuing 
firms weighted by the average of the firm’s shares in output in the base and end years. The between effect is 
measured as the change in output shares of continuing firms weighted by the deviations of the average plant level 
productivity from the overall industry average, where again, the average is taken between the base year and the 
end year. The contributions to aggregate productivity growth of firm entry and exit is measured such that firms 
that enter the market will have a positive contribution to aggregate growth only if they have higher productivity 
than the overall industry average, and plants that exit the market will have a positive contribution to aggregate 
productivity growth only if their productivity is lower than the industry average. In the literature, this method is 
seen as having the advantage of being less vulnerable to measurement error than the Baily et al. decomposition 
because of the use of weights representing averages. The disadvantage is that the within and between 
contributions to aggregate productivity growth will also capture covariance effects. 
Olley and Pakes (1996), in their study of the US telecommunications industry, propose another 
decomposition of aggregate industry productivity. The latter can be written as the cross-sectional non-weighted 
mean of the productivity across all plants in the industry and the sum over all plants of an individual plant’s 
productivity deviation from the non-weighted mean multiplied by that plant’s output share deviation from the 
output share mean. This decomposition allows seeing whether the cross-sectional allocation of activity has 
become more productivity enhancing over time and whether activity is disproportionately located in high 
productivity plants. The advantages of this decomposition is that it does not rely on the accurate measure of exit 
and entry and that cross-sectional differences in productivity are less affected by measurement errors and 
transitory shocks, but the disadvantage is that it does not show the contribution of entry and exit to aggregate 
productivity growth. 
Apart from the difficulties encountered empirically in measuring the contribution of each one of the three 
sources to aggregate growth, there are also problems with measuring the level of aggregate productivity. Total 
factor productivity is the best theoretical measure because it captures both the technical and the efficiency 
advantages of firms over measured inputs. However, in practice, it is subject to measurement errors which 
mainly come from the method in which the capital stock is derived. A number of studies therefore also use 
labour productivity to measure aggregate productivity. The advantage is that it better captures the market 
selection process if total factor productivity is measured badly, but it does not provide a good measure of 
productivity growth in periods of capital labour substitution. 
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Box 2. Existing Databases on entry and exit 
Over the recent years, more and more longitudinal micro-level databases (LMDs) that follow large numbers of 
firms or plants over time have been developed
74. The Longitudinal Research Database developed by the US 
Bureau of the Census, which consists of a large panel data set of US plants in the manufacturing sector, is one of 
the first databases
75. Several studies have used this database to analyse productivity growth. While several other 
countries have similar databases, there are only a few international datasets with harmonised definitions of 
concepts and units of measurement that allow for cross-country comparisons of entry, exit and survival of firms 
over time and across sectors. Among the main international LMDs available, we can mention: the New Cronos 
database managed by EUROSTAT (2003) which contains data on a harmonised definition of entry and birth of 
enterprises broken down by sectors according to the NACE rev. 1.1 (two digit level) for 10 EU Member States 
and from 1998 to 2000. The data should be updated every year. The database will serve as a basis for computing 
a new structural indicator on business demography. However, information on France and Germany are lacking. 
A DG ENTR database contains information on market entries and exits for all Member States from 1995 to 
2000. However, owing to the fact that the definitions of entry and exit are not harmonised, data are not 
comparable across countries. An OECD database (Bartelsman et al., 2003) contains information on the number 
of exiting, entering and continuing firms by year at the ISIC rev 3 two digit industry level (40 sectors), for five 
firm class sizes and for ten OECD countries from the mid 80s to 1997 or 1998. The EU countries are the 
following: France, Germany, UK, Italy, The Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal and Finland. However, the time 
series available vary from one country to another: for Germany, data are available from 1978 to 1998 (largest 
sample) while for Italy data are available from 1987 to 1993 (smallest sample). Moreover, for the UK there is a 
break in the series due to a change in the enterprise definition in 1994. Consequently, data for the 1994-1997 
period cannot be compared to data for the 1986-1993 period. For Italy and Denmark, no data is available after 
1993 or 1994. 
 
Box 3. Stylised facts on main determinants of firm entry and exit 
According to Table A.9 in Appendix 2, the sectors that have the highest capital intensity are real estate, renting 
and business activities, followed by the post and telecom and electricity, gas and water supply sectors. The least 
capital-intensive sectors are wearing, tobacco and leather. Capital intensity varies moderately to low in a given 
sector across countries and years, with the highest variation being registered in the real estate, renting and 
business activities sector, followed by post and telecom and electricity, gas and water. The industries with the 
least variation in terms of capital intensity across countries and years are wholesale and retail trade, other 
manufacturing and textiles. 
The sectors with the highest gross fixed capital formation (in value terms) average are real estate, renting 
and business activities, wholesale and retail trade, post and telecom and land and other transport. The lowest 
average is found in tobacco, leather and wearing. There is a very strong variation in terms of gross fixed capital 
formation in a given sector across countries and years, with the highest variation being found in real estate, 
renting and business activities, wholesale and retail trade, post and telecom, land and other transport and 
electricity, gas and water supply. The lowest variation is found in the tobacco, leather and wearing sectors. 
The data on resource intensity show that the sector with the highest resource intensity average is other 
transport equipment, whereas the resource intensity for the other sectors is very similar. The other transport 
equipment sector also has the highest variation across countries and years. All the other sectors have a very low 
standard deviation. 
Sectors are heterogeneous in terms of R&D intensity, with the highest R&D expenditures to production 
being in office machinery and computers, radio and TV and other transport equipment. The lowest R&D 
intensity is found in construction, printing, wholesale and retail trade and wearing. The amount of R&D 
expenditure to production is highly similar in a given sector across different countries and years, with notable 
exceptions in office machinery and computers, electrical machinery, radio and TV and instruments where the 
standard deviation is somewhat higher. 
The examination of the value-added growth variable, which captures the sector specific business cycle, 
shows that sectors are very heterogeneous, the highest value added growth being registered in the refined 
petroleum sector followed by real estate, renting and business activities, post and telecommunications and motor 
vehicles. At the other end of the scale is the leather sector which together with wearing registered a negative 
average value added growth rate across countries and time, preceded by textiles, where the value added growth  
 
                                                 
74 See Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for a review. 
75 Times series data from 1990 to 2001 are available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/data.html  
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average was slightly positive. The standard deviation shows significant variation in value added growth within a 
given sector across countries and time period, with the highest standard deviation being registered in the refined 
petroleum sector followed by office machinery and computers. 
The employment growth variable shows a similar picture in terms of heterogeneity across sectors, but most 
sectors have registered negative employment growth on average, among the most notable exceptions being real 
estate, renting and business activities with the highest average employment growth, and office machinery and 
computers. The wearing sector registered the highest negative average employment growth, confirming the 
decline showed by the growth in value added. Employment growth is also subject to significant within sector 
variation, the highest standard deviation being registered in office machinery and computers. The picture that 
emerges when the value added and employment growth variables are taken together is that of a decline in the 
more labour intensive traditional manufacturing sectors like textiles, leather and wearing and expansions in 
newer sectors like office machinery and computers and real estate, renting and business activities. Most of the 
sectors are somewhere in between registering healthy value added growth rates, but negative employment growth 
that could indicate moderate increases in productivity. 
The sectors with the highest labour productivity per person engaged are office, machinery and computers 
followed by radio and TV, electricity, gas and water supply, refined petroleum and chemical products. The 
sectors with the lowest productivity per person engaged are wearing, leather, wood and other manufacturing. 
There is a very high variation across countries and years in a given sector in terms of labour productivity per 
person engaged. The sector with the highest variation by far is office machinery and computers, followed by 
radio and TV. The sectors with the lowest variation are construction and wholesale and retail trade. 
The examination of entry determinant variables across countries shows that the highest capital intensity 
variable is in Portugal followed by Germany and Italy, whereas the countries with the lowest capital intensity are 
Spain, the UK and the US (Table A.10 in Appendix 2). According to the standard deviation, there is a moderate 
variation in terms of capital intensity in a given country and across industries and years, with the highest 
variation being registered in Portugal followed by Germany and the Netherlands. The countries having the 
highest on average gross fixed capital formation (GFCF in value terms) are the US, Germany and France, 
whereas those with the lowest average are Spain, Portugal and Belgium. The variation of the GFCF variable in a 
given country across sectors and years is very high, with the strongest values being registered in the US, 
Germany and France and the weakest values registered in Spain, Portugal and Belgium. The countries in the 
sample have similar resource intensity averages with low variation across sectors and years, the only notable 
exception being Portugal that has a relatively high standard deviation and a slightly higher average compared 
with the other countries. The lowest R&D intensity is found in Spain, followed by Italy and Belgium, whereas 
the highest is in the US. The variation in R&D intensity in a given country across sectors and time is relatively 
low. 
Countries differ in terms of value added growth with Portugal having by far the highest average, followed by 
Spain and Italy. The standard deviation indicates moderate variation in terms of value added growth across 
sectors and across time in a given country, with the highest variation being registered in Portugal followed by 
Germany and Italy. Most countries registered negative employment growth averages with the lowest averages 
being in Germany and the UK and the only exceptions being Spain and Portugal that had positive averages. 
There is also moderate variation in terms of employment growth across sectors and time period in the same 
country. The evolution in terms of value added and employment growth illustrates that countries like Spain and 
Portugal which are relatively less advanced are experiencing the highest increases in productivity and are 
catching up with the others, whereas the more advanced countries are experiencing more modest increases in 
productivity that are not enough to compensate for the destruction in employment that they generate. The 
countries registering the highest averages in terms of labour productivity per person engaged are the US, Ireland 
and France, whereas the lowest labour productivity per person engaged can be found in Portugal, the UK and 
Spain. There is a very high variation in terms of labour productivity across sectors and years in a given country, 
with the US, Ireland, France and Germany having the highest standard deviation, whereas Portugal, Italy and the 
Netherlands have the lowest standard deviation. 
When examining the evolution of data over time (Table A.11 in Appendix 2), we observe that the capital 
intensity average is largely stable, the only notable exception being an increase between 2000 and 2002. The 
variation of the capital intensity variable across time is moderate and fairly stable. The average of the gross fixed 
capital formation variable increased steadily between 1990 and 2002. The variation of the gross fixed capital 
formation variable across countries and sectors also increased in the 1990 to 2002 period. The average of the 
resource intensity variable remained stable across years, the only notable exception being an increase in 1995 
followed by a return to the value that prevailed during the other years. The standard deviation of the resource 
intensity variable also remained stable across years, the only exception being a sharp increase in 1995 followed 
by a return to the normal standard deviation in the following year. The average of the R&D intensity variable  
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decreased between 1991 and 2001, after having increased between 1990 and 1991. The standard deviation of the 
R&D intensity variable was fairly stable over the 1990-2000 period and decreased only slightly in 2001. The 
evolution in the value added growth average has been very fluctuating across years with a stable standard 
deviation, the only notable exception being a sharp increase in variation followed by a sharp decrease over the 
1995-1997 period. The average of the employment growth variable has increased over the 1992-1999 period and 
decreased in the 2000-2002 period. The standard deviation was largely stable over the years with only a sharp 
increase and then decrease in variation over the 1998-2000 period. There is a clear and sharp increase in labour 
productivity per person engaged between the 1997-2001 period, but this is accompanied by an equally sharp 
increase in the variation of productivity. 
According to Figure A.2 in Appendix 2, the industries with the highest economies of scale are motor 
vehicles, tobacco, other transport equipment and basic metals, whereas those with the lowest economies of scale 
are other manufacturing, leather, fabricated metal products, instruments and non metallic mineral products. All 
the other industries occupy intermediate positions. Figure A.3 in Appendix 2 shows that the industries with the 
highest concentration in 1993 were office machinery and computers, other transport equipment, tobacco, motor 
vehicles, radio and television and basic metals, whereas those with the lowest concentration were fabricated 
metal products, wood, printing and leather, with the other industries occupying intermediate positions. The 
positions of these industries changes slightly when concentration was measured in 1987, as shown in Figure A.4 
in Appendix 2. Figure A.5 in Appendix 2 shows that industries can be classified into fully differentiated, 
represented by instruments, radio and television, electrical machinery, office machinery and computers and 
machinery and equipment, semi-differentiated industries represented by chemical products, other transport 
equipment and motor vehicles, with all the other industries for which data is available being non-differentiated.  
Figure A.6 in Appendix 2 shows the classification of industries by segmentation. Non-segmented industries 
are leather, wood, printing, machinery and equipment and instruments, semi-segmented industries are 
represented by food and beverages, rubber and plastics, chemical products and other transport equipment. All of 
the other industries for which data is available are fully segmented. 
The examination of the correlation between variables (Table A.12 in Appendix 2) shows that they generally 
have low correlation, the only notable exceptions being a correlation of 56% between industry concentration and 
differentiation, 55% between resource intensity and capital intensity, 52% between industry concentration and 
segmentation, 49% between resource intensity and GFCF and 47% between capital intensity and GFCF. All of 
these correlations are significant at the 1% confidence level, but some of these results are expected because of 
the way in which the capital intensity and resource intensity variables were constructed. Moderate correlation of 
34% is found between labour productivity and R&D intensity, 32% between scale economies and industry 
concentration, 31% between resource intensity and differentiation, 28% between scale economies and GFCF and 
27% between scale economies and segmentation. The correlation between employment growth and capital 
intensity is 22%, employment growth and GFCF is 20%, as is the one between employment growth and value 
added growth, and between differentiation and capital intensity. There are positive correlations between GFCF 
and the concentration, differentiation and segmentation variables of 16%, 19% and 15% respectively. A positive 
correlation of 14% exists between concentration and capital intensity and there is also a negative correlation of 
15% between R&D intensity and scale economies. Finally, we found positive correlations between resource 
intensity and the concentration and segmentation variables of 15% and 11% respectively. All of these are 
significant at the 1% confidence level. 
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Table A4. Concordance between NACE 2, ISIC Rev. 3 and NAICS 1997 
Entry and exit data set 
Dun and Bradstreet 
Entry barriers data set 
OECD (STAN/ANBERD/…) 
entry-exit data set 
US Bureau of Census 
NACE2  ISIC Rev.3  NAICS 1997 
15  Food products and beverages  15  Food products and beverages  311  Food  
       3121  Beverage   
16 Tobacco  products  16  Tobacco products  3122  Tobacco  
17 Textiles  17  Textiles  313  Textile  mills 
       314  Textile  product  mills 
18  Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing  18  Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur  315  Apparel  
19  Tanning and dressing of leather  19  Leather, leather products and footwear  316  Leather & allied product  
20  Wood and of products of wood  20  Wood and products of wood and cork  321  Wood product  
21  Pulp, paper and paper products  21  Pulp, paper and paper products 322  Paper   
22  Publishing, printing and reproduction   22  Printing and publishing  323  Printing & related support activities 
       511  Publishing  industries 
        512  Motion picture & sound recording 
industries 
23  Coke, refined petroleum products  23  Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear 
fuel 
324  Petroleum & coal products  
24  Chemicals and chemical products  24  Chemicals and chemical products  325  Chemical  
        3346  Mfg & reproducing magnetic & optical 
media 
25  Rubber and plastic products  25  Rubber and plastics products  326  Plastics & rubber products  
26  Other non-metallic mineral products  26  Other non-metallic mineral products  327  Non-metallic mineral product  
27  Basic metals  27  Basic metals  331  Primary metal  
28 Fabricated  metal  products  28  Fabricated  metal products  332  Fabricated metal product  
29  Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  29  Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.  333  Machinery  
        3352  Household appliance  
        3353  Electrical equipment  
        3359  Other electrical equipment & component  
30  Office machinery and computers  30  Office, accounting and computing machinery 3341  Computer & peripheral equipment mfg 
31  Electrical machinery and apparatus  31  Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec  3344  Semiconductor & other electronic 
component  
        3351  Electric lighting equipment  
32  Radio, television and communication  32  Radio, television and comm. equipm.  3342  Communications equipment  
        3343  Audio & video equipment  
33  Medical, precision and optical instrum.  33  Medical, precision and optical instruments  3345  measuring, medical, & control instruments
34  Motor vehicles, trailers  34  Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  3361  Motor vehicle  
        3362  Motor vehicle body & trailer  
        3363  Motor vehicle parts  
35  Other transport equipment  35  Other transport equipment  3364  Aerospace product & parts  
        3365  Railroad rolling stock  
        3366  Ship & boat building 
        3369  Other transportation equipment  
36  Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  36  Furniture; manufacturing, n.e.c.  337  Furniture & related product  
       339  Miscellaneous   
40  Electricity, gas, water supply  40-41 Electricity, gas and water supply  221  Utilities 
41  Collection and distribution of water           
45 Construction  45  Construction  23  Construction 
50  Sale and repair of motor vehicles  50-52 Wholesale and retail trade; repairs   42  Wholesale trade 
51  Wholesale trade and commission trade,       44  Retail Trade 
52  Retail trade, except of motor vehicles           
      55  Hotels & restaurants  72  Accommodation & foodservices 
60  Land transport; transport via pipelines  60-63 Transport and storage  48  Transportation & warehousing 
63  Supporting and auxiliary transport act.        493  Warehousing & storage 
64  Post and telecommunications  64  Post and telecommunications 492  Couriers  &  messengers 
        513  Broadcasting & telecommunications 
      65-67 Financial intermediation  52  Finance & insurance 
70  Real estate activities  70-74 Real estate, renting and business activities  514  Information & data processing services 
71  Renting of machinery and equipment        53  Real estate & rental & leasing 
72  Computer and related activities        54  Professional, scientific, & technical 
services 
74  Other business activities        55  Management of companies & enterprises 
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  entry rate  exit rate  net entry rate 
 #  of  obs. Mean s.d. Min Max Mean s.d. Min Max  Mean  s.d.  Min Max
  Y e a r                       
1997  252  6.5 4.2 0 39 2.0 1.4 0  8  4.6 4.6 -6 38
1998  252  6.1 3.6 0 26 1.7 1.1 0  7  4.4 3.8 -5 25
1999  280  6.3 4.2 0 33 2.7 3.0 0 19 3.7 4.7  -17 33
2000  280  5.8 4.0 0 25 3.0 2.9 0 18 2.8 4.1 -8 22
2001  280  5.4 4.8 0 46 3.3 3.5 0 20 2.2 5.1  -20 36
2002  252  4.0 2.9 0 17 2.5 2.0 0 17 1.4 3.3  -11 15
2003 252 2.1  2.1 0  11 2.8  3.1 0  30  -0.6  4.3  -30 9 
  Country                      
BE  196  4.7 2.7 0 14 1.7 0.9 0  7  3.0 2.7 -4 13
DE  196  4.2 3.5 0 33 3.0 2.6 0 14 1.3 4.4  -12 33
ES  196  8.3 4.6 1 39 2.0 1.0 0  9  6.3 5.0 -3 38
FR  196  4.5 2.2 0 14 2.0 2.2 0 20 2.5 3.3  -20 14
IR  196  3.0 4.1 0 20 1.4 3.4 0 30 1.6 5.9  -30 20
IT  196  3.5 2.7 0 21 3.0 1.3 1  8  0.5 3.3 -7 19
NL  196  6.2 3.4 0 25 1.2 0.8 0  5  5.1 3.4 -2 25
PT  196  4.9 4.6 0 34 1.8 2.0 0 17 3.1 5.1  -17 33
UK  196  5.7 3.4 0 21 4.1 1.7 0 12 1.7 4.2 -9 20
US 84  10.0  5.4 4  46 9.7  3.0 5  19  0.3  4.7  -6  36
  I n d u s t r y                       
Food  &  beverages  66  4.3 2.2 0 11 2.2 2.2 0 10 2.2 2.6 -6  8 
Tobacco 66 4.3  7.1 0  46 3.3 4.3 0 17 0.9 7.5  -17 36
Textile  66  3.8 2.1 0  9  3.0 2.8 0 16 0.9 3.4  -16 6 
Wearing  66  5.1 3.9 0 17 4.4 5.2 0 30 0.8 5.7  -30 16
Leather  66  4.0 2.9 0 11 3.1 2.7 0 13 1.0 3.5  -10 10
Wood  66  3.7  2.1 0 9 2.0  2.1 0 9 1.8  2.6  -7 8 
Paper  66  3.8  2.0 0 8 2.7  1.6 0 8 1.2  2.7  -8 7 
Printing  66  4.7 2.3 0  9  2.6 2.4 0 11 2.1 2.8 -5  8 
Refined  petroleum  66  4.6 3.7 0 20 2.9 2.4 0  9  1.7 4.7 -8 20
Chemical  products  66  4.5  2.1 0 9 2.7  1.6 0 8 1.7  2.5  -6 7 
Rubber  &  plastics  66  4.3 3.0 0 13 2.7 1.9 0 10 1.8 3.3  -10 9 
Non metallic mineral products  66  4.1  2.2 0  9  2.1  1.7 0  7  2.0  2.5  -6  7 
Basic  metals  66  4.5 2.9 0 13 2.5 1.8 0 10 2.0 2.7  -10 7 
Fabricated metal products  66  4.3  2.0 0  9  2.3  1.9 0  11  2.1  3.0  -11 8 
Machinery  &  equipment  66  4.4 2.4 0 10 2.5 1.7 0  8  2.0 2.8 -5  8 
Office machinery & computers  66  6.0  7.6 0  39 3.5  5.1 0  20  2.6  8.7  -20 38
Electrical  machinery  66  4.8 2.5 0 13 2.7 1.9 0  9  2.1 3.0 -6 12
Radio  &  television  66  5.6 3.8 0 17 2.9 2.3 0 11 2.7 4.4 -7 17
Instruments  66  4.4 2.2 0 10 2.1 2.0 0  9  2.4 3.0 -9  9 
Motor  vehicles  66  4.2 2.2 0 10 2.6 2.1 0 10 1.6 2.9  -10 9 
Other transport equipment  66  5.8  2.9 0  12 2.8  2.3 0  10  2.9  3.5  -6  10
Other  manufacturing  66  4.6 2.4 0 10 2.2 2.1 0 10 2.5 2.9 -5  9 
Electricity, gas & water supply  66  7.7  4.2 0  15 1.8  1.7 0  8  5.9  4.3  -3  14
Construction  66  6.6 3.4 0 14 2.4 2.6 0 12 4.3 3.9 -5 13
Wholesale & retail, repairs  66  5.1  2.4 0  11 2.0  2.0 0  10  3.1  2.8  -4  11
Transport  &  telecommunications  66  7.0 5.8 0 34 1.8 2.8 0 14 5.2 5.9 -4 33
Post & telecommunications  66  11.5  7.1 0  33 2.6  3.1 0  15  9.0  7.5  -9  33
Real estate & business activities  66  8.7  4.6 0  19 2.0  2.7 0  12  6.7  5.1  -7  18
Sources: Entry-exit data set, own calculations. 
Notes:   a) First 11 months for 2003, 1999-2001 for the US.  
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  Entry rate  Exit rate  Net entry rate 
 Inter-group  Intra-group  Inter-groupIntra-groupInter-groupIntra-group
 Country 
Variance 5834  24789 5798 7325 6066 33697
% 19.0  81.0  44.2 55.8 15.3 84.7
 Industry 
Variance 5380  25243  562 12561 6444 33319
% 17.6  82.4  4.3 95.7 16.2 83.8
Year 
Variance 3942  26681  512 12611 5245 34518
% 12.9  87.1  3.9 96.1 13.2 86.8
Sources: Entry-exit data set, own calculations. 
Notes:   a) First 11 months for 2003, 1999-2001 for the US. 
 
Table A7. Coefficient of correlation (ρ ) between entry and exit rates 
Year  ρ   Industry  ρ   Industry  ρ  
1997 -0.12***           
1998  -0.08  Food & beverages   0.30**      
1999   0.18*  Tobacco   0.20  Electrical machinery   0.03 
2000   0.33*  Textile   0.02  Radio & television   0.02 
2001   0.26* Wearing    0.26** Instruments  -0.05 
2002   0.19  Leather   0.22*** Motor vehicles   0.09 
2003 -0.34* Wood    0.22*** Other transport equipment   0.15 
Country  ρ   Paper  -0.18  Other manufacturing   0.21*** 
BE   0.12  Printing   0.25**  Electricity, gas & water supply   0.11 
DE  -0.01  Refined petroleum  -0.16  Construction   0.18 
ES -0.19*  Chemical products   0.10  Wholesale & retail, repairs   0.18 
FR -0.18*  Rubber & plastics   0.09  Transport & telecommunications   0.18 
IR -0.27*  Non metallic mineral products   0.15  Post & telecommunications   0.09 
IT -0.35*  Basic metals   0.39*  Real estate & business activities   0.07 
NL   0.11  Fabricated metal products  -0.13      
PT  -0.03  Machinery & equipment   0.09      
UK -0.31*  Office machinery & computers  0.12      
US   0.52*            
Sources: Entry-exit data set, own calculations. 
Notes:   a) First 11 months for 2003, 1999-2001 for the US. 
  b) * (**, ***) statistically significant at the 1 (resp. 5, 10) % level.  
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Table A8. Entry and exit rate correlations 
Entry Rate Correlation 
 BE DE  ES  FR  IE IT NL  PT  UK  US 
B E     1               
DE   0.58*    1              
ES   0.45*   0.48*    1            
FR   0.27*   0.22*   0.43*    1          
IE   0.43*   0.44*   0.39*   0.27*    1         
IT   0.48*   0.62*   0.54*   0.29*   0.50*    1      
NL   0.39*   0.28*   0.16**   0.01   0.46*   0.37*    1    
PT   0.41*   0.42*   0.24*   0.08   0.26*   0.36*   0.67*   1     
UK   0.58*   0.63*   0.58*   0.23*   0.53*   0.69*   0.44*   0.39*  1   
US   0.15   0.33*   0.41*   0.39*   0.13   0.29**   -0.03   0.38*  0.13   1 
Exit Rate Correlation 
  BE DE  ES  FR  IE IT NL  PT  UK  US 
B E     1               
DE    0.09    1             
ES   0.40*   -0.18**    1            
FR   0.15**   0.16**   -0.02   1             
IE   -0.14***   -0.29*   0.14**   -0.07   1           
IT   0.03   -0.03   0.25*   0.32*   0.51*    1      
NL   0.02   0.16**   -0.09   -0.03   -0.20*   -0.18**   1    
PT   -0.03   0.23*   -0.04   0.35*   0.13***  0.24*   0.04   1     
UK   0.22*   0.04   0.32*   0.21*   0.22*   0.44*   -0.10   0.22*  1   
US   -0.14   0.13   -0.25**   0.10   0.02   0.37*   -0.28**  0.10   0.43*  1 
Sources: Entry-exit data set, own calculations. 
Notes:   a) First 11 months for 2003, 1999-2001 for the US. 
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LPPE  Industry 
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
Food & beverages  4.34 1.07 4517 4428 0.03 0.01 0.31 0.13 2.78 3.30 -0.16 1.72 44061 14842 
Tobacco 2.78 1.38 154 203 0.03 0.02 0.99 1.24 4.52 14.22 -4.24 6.50 44061 14842 
Textile 3.50 0.97 1490 1608 0.03 0.01 0.26 0.19 0.11 4.78 -4.30 3.95 31235 12176 
Wearing 2.12 1.02 305 350 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.14 -0.19 7.14 -5.58 5.57 25195 10640 
Leather 2.80 1.21 165 238 0.03 0.01 0.22 0.26 -0.26 8.03 -4.47 7.65 28040 10731 
Wood 5.00 2.02 699 957 0.03 0.01 0.66 0.41 3.67 6.19 -0.33 3.71 30578 10775 
Paper 7.11 1.96 2062 3088 0.02 0.01 1.44 2.58 3.86 11.22 -0.98 3.00 59371 16969 
Printing 5.67 1.80 2177 2624 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.11 3.87 4.54 -0.50 3.46 53359 37498 
Refined petroleum  4.17 2.43 1268 1818 0.03 0.03 0.79 0.64 29.97 197.18 -2.62 6.54 145038 56685 
Chemical products  6.26 1.32 5207 6843 0.02 0.01 3.93 1.82 3.55 5.63 -1.54 2.76 112841 76847 
Rubber & plastics  6.50 1.71 1930 2432 0.03 0.02 0.86 0.46 3.88 4.95 0.57 3.72 42773 15198 
Non metallic mineral products  7.19 2.02 1787 1749 0.03 0.01 0.52 0.32 3.33 5.64 -0.59 3.51 45953 14185 
Basic metals  5.25 1.97 2069 2358 0.03 0.01 0.57 0.34 0.85 13.30 -2.27 4.15 55443 18808 
Fabricated metal products  4.69 1.45 2524 2541 0.03 0.01 0.38 0.18 3.72 5.24 0.42 3.18 35490 14522 
Machinery & equipment  4.08 1.02 2780 3622 0.03 0.01 1.59 0.66 3.10 5.30 -0.39 4.07 39965 14265 
Office machinery & computers  4.18 2.23 757 1132 0.02 0.01 7.57 8.13 4.19 43.81 1.91 48.44 578186 432127 
Electrical machinery  4.57 1.33 1546 1394 0.03 0.02 3.40 3.96 3.29 7.08 0.23 4.33 72690 93543 
Radio & TV  6.89 2.88 3437 6085 0.03 0.01 7.38 3.45 4.89 11.17 -0.92 6.08 278704 343653 
Instruments 4.53 2.08 1806 2838 0.04 0.02 4.97 3.34 5.92 12.27 -0.03 4.75 33395 11827 
Motor vehicles  5.74 2.63 4177 4133 0.03 0.01 2.53 1.42 6.60 16.27 -0.10 5.37 53942 23625 
Other transport equipment  3.72 1.79 1167 1602 0.13 0.89 6.39 3.82 4.86 14.90 -1.09 7.27 41490 15450 
Other manufacturing  4.14 0.86 781 550 0.03 0.01 0.36 0.26 2.00 4.49 -1.50 3.69 30749 11170 
Electricity, gas, water supply   16.83 4.96 12367 18017 0.03 0.01 0.30 0.27 3.20 5.46 -2.71 3.89 150477 47346 
Construction 3.08 1.25 4849 5491 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.04 4.45 5.75 0.56 3.92 31129 9415 
Wholesale, retail trade  6.85 0.77 28058 48364 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.17 4.67 2.73 0.96 1.69 31951 9659 
Land & other transport  13.88 3.44 19817 18986 0.03 0.01 0.22 0.29 4.84 3.52 0.81 2.46 45467 10845 
Post & telecom  20.41 6.39 22137 34004 0.03 0.01 0.70 0.51 6.71 5.77 -0.05 3.64 77263 26119 
Real estate, renting & busin. act.  22.18 11.19 71536 63908 0.03 0.01 0.34 0.17 7.35 2.98 5.03 4.58 71519 26324 
Sources: STAN and ANBERD (OECD), own calculations. 
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 mean  s.d.  mean  s.d.  mean s.d.  mean s.d. mean s.d.  mean  s.d.  mean  s.d. 
BE  6.38 4.22 1564 3573 0.04 0.02 1.44 2.31 2.56 8.66 -1.69 5.56 88106 96396
DE  8.15  7.56 12041 35240  0.03 0.01 2.20 3.57 1.52 11.50 -3.09  5.51  88136 156977
FR  7.69 6.83 8417  21955 0.03 0.01 2.23 3.11 2.35 9.13 -1.23 3.61 99932 171194
IR  -  - - -  - - - - - - -  -  107679 252026
IT  7.84 5.47 4863  11152 0.03 0.01 1.33 2.35 4.09 11.11 -0.74 3.51 63459 68637
NL  7.30 7.13 1904 5157 0.03 0.01 2.22 5.62 3.97 10.72 -0.26 5.64 67672 72295
PT 9.58  10.00  875  1696  0.07 0.55 - - 20.31 134.89 0.67  29.11  43022 57553
ES 4.12  2.11  592  662  0.03 0.01 0.98 1.58 5.34 9.62 0.95  5.24  60177 87803
UK  5.25 3.87 2286 3615 0.03 0.01 2.07 2.23 2.80 6.91 -2.88 5.39 55938 90287
USA  5.49  4.20 23926 40251  0.03 0.01 3.39 4.12 3.30 6.67 -0.73  3.78 143868 268537
Sources: STAN and ANBERD (OECD), own calculations. 
 












 mean  s.d.  mean  s.d.  mean s.d.  mean s.d. mean s.d.  mean s.d.  mean  s.d. 
1990  6.64 5.89  4982 14296  0.03 0.01 2.34 3.79 - - - -  -  -
1991  6.96 6.33  5697 16369  0.03 0.01 2.55 3.78 4.91 12.43 -0.71 5.16  -  -
1992  6.69 6.36  5914 17301  0.03 0.01 2.17 3.26 3.15 8.45 -3.51 5.27  -  -
1993  6.29 5.81  5813 17927  0.03 0.01 2.13 3.27 0.44 9.65 -3.35 4.79  -  -
1994  6.03 5.62  6192 19868  0.03 0.01 1.91 3.04 6.22 10.66 -2.15 4.88  -  -
1995  6.52 6.01  6322 20491  0.06 0.56 1.85 3.11 6.24 11.06 -0.68 5.28  -  -
1996  6.58 5.72  6589 21131  0.03 0.03 1.93 3.73 10.41 122.58 -0.75 6.60  -  -
1997  6.66 5.69  7020 22607  0.03 0.02 1.78 3.34 4.76 8.66 0.16 4.74  59296  53986
1998  6.69 5.16  7923 24800  0.03 0.01 1.75 3.27 4.72 11.61 0.03 7.50  67467  82817
1999  6.63 5.50  8500 27258  0.03 0.01 1.75 3.35 2.76 25.36 1.18 27.50  80030  131043
2000  6.42 5.57  9156 29497  0.03 0.02 1.68 3.38 5.53 15.42 0.29 4.35  93678  179365
2001  6.91 5.65 10305 30303  0.03 0.01 1.63 2.61 2.37 8.26 0.06 4.56 108523  238657
2002  8.13 6.18 11141 31743  0.03 0.02 - - 0.80 6.12 -1.17 3.56  -  -
Sources: STAN and ANBERD (OECD), own calculations. 
 
Table A12. Entry barriers: Correlation coefficients 
 CI  GFCF  RI  RDI  ∆ VA  ∆ L  LPPE Scal  Conc  Differ Segmen 
Capital  Intensity  1.00                   
GFCF  0.47*  1.00               
Resource  Intensity  -0.04***  -0.04***  1.00              
R&D  Intensity  -0.09*  -0.06*  -0.09* 1.00            
Value Added Growth  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.01  1.00             
Employment Growth  0.22*  0.20*  0.02  -0.01  0.20* 1.00          
LPPE  0.07**  0.04 -0.09* 0.34*  -0.01  0.02 1.00      
Scale economies  0.03  0.28*  0.38*  -0.15*  -0.02  0.02 -0.06***  1.00       
Concentration   0.14*  0.16*  0.15*  -0.04  -0.04  0.01 -0.02  0.32*  1.00     
Differentiation 0.20*  0.19*  0.07*  0.06** -0.04  0.03 -0.07***  -0.01  0.56*  1.00   
Segmentation 0.09*  0.15*  0.17*  -0.03  0.01  0.03 0.08**  0.27*  0.52*  0.07*  1.00 
Sources: STAN, ANBERD (OECD) and Davies and Lyons (1996), own calculations. 
Notes: * (**, ***) statistically significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level. 
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Sources: Entry-exit data set, own calculations. 
Notes:   a) First 11 months for 2003, 1999-2001 for the US. 
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Figure A2. Minimum scale by industry 
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Source: Martins et al. (1996), own calculations. 
 
Figure A3. Concentration ratio by industry (1993) 
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Figure A4. Concentration ratio by industry (1987) 
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Source: Davies and Lyons (1996), own calculations. 
 
Figure A5. Differentiation by industry 
 



















Source: Martins et al. (1996), own calculations.  
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Figure A6. Segmentation by industry 
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Source: Martins et al. (1996), own calculations. 
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Table A13. Economy-wide regulation indicators 
YEAR    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Source
1. Ease of starting a new business 
BE  4.6 5.0 5.3 5.7 6.0 6.4 4.2 5.2 6.2
DE  5.0 5.3 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.4 5.1 5.5 5.9
FR  3.4 3.8 4.1 4.5 4.8 5.2 3.5 3.7 3.9
IE  7.6 7.5 7.3 7.2 7.0 6.9 6.4 6.2 6.0
IT  4.1 4.3 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.1 4.4 4.2 4.0
NL  7.5 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.6 6.1 6.7 7.3
PT  4.3 4.6 4.9 5.1 5.4 5.7 5.1 3.8 2.5
SP  5.3 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.7 4.6 5.2 5.8
UK  8.1 8.0 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.5 7.2 6.9
Starting a new  
business is  
generally easy 
US  8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.1 8.0 7.9
Fraser 
2. Trade 
BE  8.7 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.5 9.2 9.2 9.2
DE  8.7 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.5 9.2 9.2 9.2
FR  8.7 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.5 9.2 9.2 9.2
IE  8.7 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.5 9.2 9.2 9.2
IT  8.7 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.5 9.2 9.2 9.2
NL  8.7 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.5 9.2 9.2 9.2
PT  8.7 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.5 9.2 9.2 9.2
SP  8.7 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.5 9.2 9.2 9.2
UK  8.7 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.5 9.2 9.2 9.2
Mean tariff rate 
US  8.8 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2
Fraser 
BE  8.3 8.3 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2
DE  8.3 8.3 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.5 7.9 8.2 8.5
FR  7.7 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.4 6.9 7.7 8.5
IE  8.9 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.3 7.7 7.1
IT  7.0 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.6 7.7 7.0 6.7 6.4
NL  8.9 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.2 9.3 8.5 8.2 7.9
PT  8.2 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.7 8.9 8.0 7.1
SP  7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.9 7.3 6.7







US  7.8 7.9 7.9 8.0 8.0 8.1 7.7 6.8 5.9
Fraser 
3. State involvement in the economy 
BE  3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.8
DE  4.3 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 2.3 2.3 2.3
FR  2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 3.4 3.4 3.4
IE  5.1 4.9 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
IT  2.3 2.7 3.1 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.6
NL  2.0 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.8 4.2 4.2 4.2
PT  6.5 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.9 5.9
SP  5.1 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.8 5.8 5.8
UK  5.3 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.6 6.3 6.3 6.3
Transfers and 
subsidies as a 
% of GDP 
US  6.3 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.7 6.6
Fraser 
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Table A13. Economy-wide regulation indicators (cont.) 
YEAR    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 source
BE  6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
DE  6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
FR  4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
IE  10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
IT  6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
NL  10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
PT  6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
SP  4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
UK  8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Government 
enterprises and 
investment as a 
% of GDP 
US  8.0 8.4 8.8 9.2 9.6 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Fraser 
3. State involvement in the economy 
BE  5.0 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8 6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
DE  9.0 8.8 8.6 8.4 8.2 8.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
FR  8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
IE  9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 7.0 6.0 5.0
IT  6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
NL  7.0 7.2 7.4 7.6 7.8 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0
PT  6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
SP  6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
UK  9.0 8.8 8.6 8.4 8.2 8.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Price controls: 
extent to which 
businesses are 
free to set their 
own prices 
US  9.0 8.8 8.6 8.4 8.2 8.0 8.0 7.0 6.0
Fraser
4. Administrative burdens on business 
BE  6.5 7.0 7.5 7.9 8.4 8.9 3.5 6.8 10.0
DE  6.5 6.9 7.3 7.7 8.1 8.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
FR  6.3 6.7 7.0 7.4 7.7 8.1 6.3 6.5 6.7
IE  7.6 7.7 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.9 5.3 6.5 7.7
IT  4.7 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.8 6.8 6.8
NL  7.4 7.7 8.1 8.4 8.8 9.1 5.5 6.3 7.1
PT  5.5 5.8 6.2 6.5 6.9 7.2 4.8 5.8 6.8
SP  6.4 6.7 7.0 7.3 7.6 7.9 7.0 7.3 7.6









US  7.5 7.6 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.2 6.5 6.8 7.1
Fraser
5. Regulatory quality 
BE  7.2 7.2 7.2 7.1 6.8 6.5 7.1 7.8 8.4
DE  7.7 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.5 7.7 8.0 8.2 8.4
FR  7.0 7.0 6.9 6.9 6.7 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0
IE  7.5 7.7 7.9 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.2
IT  6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.9 7.3 7.7
NL  8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.4 8.8 8.7 8.7 8.7
PT  7.5 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.2 7.1 7.5 8.0 8.4
SP  6.7 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.9
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Table A14. Correlation matrix of economy-wide PMR indicators 
 civ5 aii4 bi4  b1  c1  ci5 ciii5 rqs 
civ5    1          
aii4   0.03   1             
bi4   0.38*   0.01   1           
b1   0.34*   0.03  -0.24**   1         
c1   0.73*   0.02   0.34*   0.17***  1       
ci5   0.50*  -0.15   0.45*   0.03   0.21**   1     
ciii5  0.52*   0.25**   0.31*  -0.03   0.16   0.39*   1   
rqs   0.54*   0.16   0.33*   0.26*   0.65*   0.21**   0.26*   1 
Sources: Fraser and Worldbank databases, own calculations. 
Notes:   * (**, ***) statistically significant at the 1% (resp. 5% and 10%) level; 
civ5 = ease of starting a new business; aii4 = mean tariff rate;  
bi4 = hidden import barriers; b1 = transfers and subsidies as a % of GDP; 
c1 = government enterprises and investment as a % of GDP; 
ci5 = price controls; ciii5 = time spent with bureaucracy; 
  rqs = regulatory quality.  
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Table A15. Industry-specific product market reform indicators (1998) 
Country ISIC rev.3  Industry sector 
Summary 
indicators 





BE  40_41  Electricity, gas & water  4.3  3.0 
BE  50_51  Sale maintenance & wholesale     
BE 52  Retail  trade  7.2  7.2 
BE 60_63  Transport  9.0  9.0 
BE 64  Post  &  Telecom  5.0  5.2 
BE 74  Other  business  services  7.6  7.6 
FR  40_41  Electricity, gas & water  2.2  1.9 
FR  50_51  Sale maintenance & wholesale     
FR 52  Retail  trade  5.4  5.4 
FR 60_63  Transport  8.8  8.8 
FR 64  Post  &  Telecom  5.0  5.5 
FR 74  Other  business  services  8.1  8.1 
IT  40_41  Electricity, gas & water  2.2  2.1 
IT  50_51  Sale maintenance & wholesale     
IT 52  Retail  trade  6.6  6.6 
IT 60_63  Transport  8.6  8.6 
IT 64  Post  &  Telecom  5.5  5.2 
IT 74  Other  business  services  8.2  8.2 
NL  40_41  Electricity, gas & water  2.8  3.2 
NL  50_51  Sale maintenance & wholesale     
NL 52  Retail  trade  7.5  7.5 
NL 60_63  Transport  9.1  9.1 
NL 64  Post  &  Telecom  6.8  7.2 
NL 74  Other  business  services  8.9  8.9 
SP  40_41  Electricity, gas & water  5.3  4.7 
SP  50_51  Sale maintenance & wholesale  8.6   
SP 52  Retail  trade  7.7  7.7 
SP 60_63  Transport  8.9  8.9 
SP 64  Post  &  Telecom  6.1  5.9 
SP 74  Other  business  services  7.1  7.1 
PT  40_41  Electricity, gas & water  4.0  4.3 
PT  50_51  Sale maintenance & wholesale     
PT 52  Retail  trade  8.2  8.2 
PT 60_63  Transport  8.9  8.9 
PT 64  Post  &  Telecom  4.8  4.5 
PT 74  Other  business  services  7.1  7.1 
US  40_41  Electricity, gas & water  5.5  4.4 
US  50_51  Sale maintenance & wholesale     
US 52  Retail  trade  9.1  9.1 
US 60_63  Transport  9.4  9.4 
US 64  Post  &  Telecom  8.4  8.9 
US 74  Other  business  services  8.0  8.0 
Source: OECD, own calculations. 
Notes: 
a)  including all dimensions of regulation covered in an industry; 
b)  including all dimensions of regulation covered in an industry except public ownership.  
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Table A16. Restrictions on foreign direct investment 
CTY year  manufacturing electricity construction distribution transport telecoms business services total
BE 1981  8.5  0.0  8.5  7.8  3.9  0.0  8.5  7.1
BE 1986  8.5  0.0  8.5  7.8  3.9  0.0  8.5  7.1
BE 1991  8.5  0.0  8.5  7.8  3.9  0.0  8.5  7.1
BE 1998  9.8  7.3  9.8  9.1  7.6  7.0  9.8  9.1
FR 1981  9.5  9.5  9.5  8.8  5.8  0.0  9.5  8.2
FR 1986  9.5  9.5  9.5  8.8  5.8  0.0  9.5  8.2
FR 1991  9.5  9.5  9.5  8.8  5.8  2.1  9.5  8.3
FR 1998  9.8  4.8  9.8  9.1  8.2  7.8  9.8  9.2
DE 1981  7.5  0.0  7.5  6.5  3.3  0.0  4.9  5.1
DE 1986  8.6  0.0  8.6  7.6  4.4  0.0  7.1  6.9
DE 1991  9.3  0.0  9.3  7.4  6.0  0.0  8.8  7.8
DE 1998  9.8  0.0  9.8  8.8  7.5  7.5  9.6  8.9
IE 1981  8.5  0.0  8.5  8.0  3.9  0.0  8.5  6.5
IE 1986  9.0  0.0  9.0  8.5  5.9  0.0  9.0  7.3
IE 1991  9.0  0.0  9.0  8.5  5.7  0.0  9.0  7.5
IE 1998  9.8  0.0  9.8  9.3  9.0  8.8  9.8  9.3
IT 1981  9.5  0.0  9.5  8.8  4.4  0.0  9.5  7.4
IT 1986  9.5  0.0  9.5  8.8  4.4  0.0  9.5  7.4
IT 1991  9.5  0.0  9.5  8.8  4.4  0.0  9.5  7.4
IT 1998  9.8  0.0  9.8  9.1  8.4  9.3  9.8  9.0
NL 1981  9.0  0.0  9.0  9.0  3.9  0.0  9.0  7.4
NL 1986  9.0  0.0  9.0  9.0  3.9  0.0  9.0  7.4
NL 1991  9.0  0.0  9.0  9.0  4.4  0.0  9.0  7.6
NL 1998  9.8  0.0  9.8  9.8  8.3  8.6  9.8  9.2
PT 1981  5.5  0.0  7.5  6.8  2.6  0.0  7.3  4.3
PT 1986  9.0  0.0  9.0  8.3  3.6  0.0  8.8  7.1
PT 1991  9.0  0.0  9.0  8.3  7.1  4.0  8.8  7.9
PT 1998  9.3  1.8  9.3  8.6  7.3  6.5  9.1  8.4
SP 1981  8.5  0.0  8.5  8.0  5.3  1.0  8.3  6.6
SP 1986  9.0  0.0  9.0  8.5  5.4  1.1  8.8  7.1
SP 1991  9.0  0.0  9.0  8.5  6.3  4.5  8.8  7.8
SP 1998  9.3  4.3  9.3  8.8  6.3  7.3  9.0  8.3
UK 1981  8.5  0.0  9.5  8.8  5.7  0.0  9.5  7.9
UK 1986  8.5  0.0  9.5  8.8  5.7  8.5  9.5  8.2
UK 1991  8.5  0.0  9.5  8.8  6.7  8.5  9.5  8.4
UK 1998  9.8  9.8  9.8  9.1  8.4  9.8  9.8  9.4
US 1981  9.8  5.3  9.8  9.8  3.2  6.3  9.8  8.3
US 1986  9.8  5.3  9.8  9.8  3.2  6.3  9.8  8.3
US 1991  9.5  5.0  9.5  9.5  4.6  6.0  9.5  8.3
US 1998  9.5  5.0  9.5  9.5  4.6  6.0  9.5  8.3
Source: OECD, own calculations. 
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APPENDIX 3. Empirical findings: Additional results 
 
Table A17. Principal component factors and scores on Fraser PMR indicators 
principal component factors 
Factor Name  Eigenvalue  Cumul.  R²   
1 REG1  2.55 0.64 
2 REG2  0.72 0.82 
3 REG3  0.48 0.94 
4 REG4  0.25 1.00 
Factor loadings 
Variable REG1  REG2  REG3  REG4 
ciii5 0.77  0.51 0.34  0.21 
ci5 0.80  0.17  -0.58  0.06 
civ5 0.91  -0.06  0.15  -0.39 
rqs 0.72  -0.66  0.10  0.21 
Nob 427       
Notes:   ciii5 = time spent with bureaucracy; ci5 = price controls;    
civ5 = ease of starting a new business; rqs = regulatory quality.  
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Table A18. Interaction terms between PMR and industry effects  
(over time ‘averaged’ sample) 
  ENTRY RATE  EXIT RATE 
  Variable  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
 LCAP  -0.42*  -2.95   0,11   0,74 
 LRD  -0.15** -2.49 -0,17** -2,29 
Food products and beverages  -0.11**  -2.29   0,75*   12,75 
Tobacco products   1.23*   7.97   2,85*   15,93 
Textiles   0.08   0.57   0,20**   2,08 
Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing -0.08  -0.16   0,28   1,12 
Tanning and dressing of leather  -0.03  -0.06   0,04   0,29 
Wood and products of wood    0.07   0.59   0,32**   2,17 
Pulp, paper and paper products  -0.19 -1.36  -0,32 -1,38 
Publishing, printing etc    0.28   1.08   0,04   0,52 
Coke, refined petroleum products    0.41*   3.47   0,19**   2,31 
Chemicals and chemical products   0.27*   2.89   0,11   0,97 
Rubber and plastic products   0.18   1.43   0,13   1,49 
Other non-metallic and mineral    0.17   1.15   0,22**   2,51 
Basic metals   0.29**   2.52   0,21   1,12 
Fabricated metal products   0.00   0.02   0,26   1,45 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.   0.15   1.34   0,27**   2,14 
Office machinery and computers  -0.28* -2.92  -0,06  -0,35 
Electrical machinery and apparatus   0.18*   2.98   0,17   1,43 
Radio, television and communication   0.02   0.25   0,08   0,85 
Medical, precision and optical   0.06   0.86   0,33*   3,95 
Motor vehicles, trailers    0.18*   8.13   0,07   0,62 
Other transport equipment   0.18*   3.16   0,19   1,20 
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.   0.22*   2.83   0,17   1,60 
Electricity, gas & water supply   0.30***   1.77   0,37   0,81 
Construction  -0.12  -0.94   0,22**   2,07 
Wholesale & retail trade; repairs   0.09   1.21   0,05   0,47 
Transport & storage  -0.05  -0.47   0,71*   5,68 
Post and telecommunications   0.00   0.00   0,00   0,00 
Real estate; renting & business    0.21   1.63   0,49   1,08 
 R²a  0.26 0.22 
 F-statistic  F(26, 71) = 3.8*  F(26, 71) = 3.5 
 Hausman-statistic  χ ²(6) = 62.6*  χ ²(4) = 14.6* 
 Nob  128 128 
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the  
  1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level; 
  Nob = number of observations; R²a = adjusted R-squared. 
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Table A19. Interaction terms between PMR and country effects (average over time) 
  ENTRY RATE  EXIT RATE 
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
LCAP   0.09   0.79  -0.29***  -1.84 
LRD  -0.08** -2.06   0.00  -0.08 
Belgium   0.77**   2.18   3.65*   7.29 
Germany  -0.52* -4.91  -0.35* -3.90 
France   0.55**   2.26   1.91*   5.30 
Italy   0.40*   7.09   0.14**   2.10 
Spain   34.41*   3.25  -108.67*  -8.73 
United Kingdom   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
R²a
  0.28 0.27 
F-statistic  F(26, 89) = 2.9*  F(26, 89) = 2.4* 
Hausman statistic  χ ²(3) = 1.1  χ ²(3) = 1.2 
Nob  128 128 
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level;  
  Nob = number of observations; R²a = adjusted R-squared. 
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Table A20. Interaction terms between PMR and industry effects (full sample) 
  ENTRY RATE  EXIT RATE 
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
ER_t-1   0.86*   19.12   0.44*   7.20 
LCAP   0.04   1.37  -0.10**  -2.26 
LRD   0.01   1.52   0.01   0.81 
Food products and beverages   0.22***   1.64   0.48   0.73 
Tobacco products  -5.90* -19.28  -4.15* -12.64 
Textiles   0.01   0.26   0.09   1.24 
Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing  -0.01 -0.11  -0.03 -0.13 
Tanning and dressing of leather   0.02   0.22   0.19   0.80 
Wood and products of wood    0.05   0.99   0.16**   2.22 
Pulp, paper and paper products   0.13**   2.28  -0.03  -0.21 
Publishing, printing etc    0.10**   2.04  -0.09  -0.62 
Coke, refined petroleum products    0.01   0.20   0.27*   3.73 
Chemicals and chemical products   0.05   1.61   0.07   1.40 
Rubber and plastic products   0.04   0.59   0.17*   4.62 
Other non-metallic and mineral    0.05**   2.13   0.08   1.17 
Basic metals   0.17*   3.20   0.11   1.49 
Fabricated metal products  -0.01  -0.30   0.13**   1.79 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.   0.04   0.98   0.20*   4.24 
Office machinery and computers   0.00   0.00  -0.20  -1.11 
Electrical machinery and apparatus   0.04   1.57   0.09   1.31 
Radio, television and communication   0.01   0.16   0.08   1.25 
Medical, precision and optical   0.04   0.81   0.13   1.56 
Motor vehicles, trailers    0.00  -0.09   0.10   1.10 
Other transport equipment   0.07**   2.21   0.13   1.32 
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.   0.04   0.91   0.09   1.20 
Electricity, gas & water supply   0.04   0.70   0.14**   2.04 
Construction  -0.01  -0.43   0.18**   1.98 
Wholesale & retail trade; repairs  -0.04**  -1.86   0.02   0.22 
Transport & storage   0.51*   3.01  -0.87*  -2.82 
Post and telecommunications   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
Real estate; renting & business    0.04   0.80   0.15*   2.89 
R²a  0.67 0.28 
F-statistic  F(52, 355) = 7.9*  F(52, 355) = 3.4* 
Hausman statistic  χ ²(9) = 26.5*  χ ²(9) = 6.0 
Nob  427 427 
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level;  
  Nob = number of observations; R²a = adjusted R-squared.  
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Table A21. Interaction terms between PMR and country effects (full sample) 
  ENTRY RATE  EXIT RATE 
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
ER_t-1   0.72*   11.15   0.15*   2.33 
LCAP   0.06   0.99  -0.21*  -2.67 
LRD  -0.03 -1.53    0.00 -0.10 
Belgium  -0.09*  -2.90   0.32*   4.53 
Germany  -0.01  -0.14   0.00   0.00 
France  -0.05 -0.19  -0.61 -1.65 
Italy   0.13*   3.36  -0.02  -0.38 
Spain  -0.43*  -2.61   1.43*   4.60 
United Kingdom   0.04**   2.06   0.27*   8.23 
R²a
  0.68 0.27 
F-statistic   F(26, 373) = 7.6*  F(26, 373) = 3.8* 
Hausman statistics  χ ²(6) = 3.6  χ ²(8) = 3.6 
Nob  427 427 
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level; 
  Nob = number of observations; R²a = adjusted R-squared. 
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Table A22. Impact of Individual PMRs and Entry Barriers on Entry and Exit Rates 
(full sample) 
Entry rate  Exit rate  Entry rate  Exit rate   
Variable  Coeff. t-statistic Coeff.  t-statistic 
 
Variable  Coeff. t-statistic Coeff. t-statistic 
LER1   0.77*   13.81   0.39*   5.97  LER1   0.81*   15.42   0.42*   6.15 
LCAP  -0.04 -0.82  -0.22* -3.34  LCAP  -0.04 -0.70  -0.19*  -2.86 
LRD   0.02   1.34  -0.01  -0.38  LRD   0.01   0.84  -0.01  -0.17 
b1  -0.01*  -2.73   0.01**   2.06  ciii5   0.00   0.22   0.02   0.85 
R²a
  0.68 0.26    0.67 0.25 
F-statistic   F(26, 382) = 2.5*  F(26, 382) = 1.0    F(26, 382) = 2.2*  F(26, 382) = 0.92 
H-statistic  χ ²(4) = 2.8  χ ²(5) = 4.2    χ ²(4) = 0.71  χ ²(4) = 2.5 
LER1   0.81*   15.59   0.41*   6.14  LER1   0.80*   15.11   0.36*   5.70 
LCAP  -0.04 -0.77  -0.21* -3.16  LCAP  -0.02 -0.43  -0.11 -1.75 
LRD   0.01   0.92   0.00   0.04  LRD   0.01   0.38  -0.04  -1.54 
aii4  -0.15* -5.21  -0.03  -0.43  civ5   0.03**   2.16   0.16*   8.93 
R²a
  0.67 0.25    0.68 0.31 
F-statistic   F(26, 382) = 2.2*  F(26, 382) = 0.93    F(26, 382) = 2.2*  F(26, 382) = 1.2 
H-statistic  χ ²(4) = 0.23  χ ²(4) = 2.5    χ ²(4) = 0.41  χ ²(4) = 8.5*** 
LER1   0.82*   15.75   0.40*   5.71  LER1   0.78*   14.00   0.36*   5.68 
LCAP   0.01   0.25  -0.17*  -2.36  LCAP   0.00  -0.05  -0.08  -1.16 
LRD  -0.01 -0.59  -0.02  -0.67  LRD   0.00   0.26  -0.03  -0.93 
bi4   0.11*   3.84   0.10***   1.67  RQS   0.07*   2.71   0.23*   6.82 
R²a
  0.68 0.25    0.68 0.30 
F-statistic   F(26, 382) = 2.2*  F(26, 382) = 0.98*    F(26, 382) = 2.2*  F(26, 382) = 1.1 
H-statistic  χ ²(4) = 2.0  χ ²(4) = 2.5    χ ²(4) = 0.36  χ ²(4) = 7.1 
LER1   0.83*   15.27   0.38*   5.56  LER1   0.81*   15.60   0.41*   6.09 
LCAP   0.00  -0.04  -0.16*  -2.32  LCAP  -0.04 -0.77  -0.21*  -3.17 
LRD   0.01   0.43  -0.01  -0.54  LRD   0.01   0.88   0.00  -0.07 
ci5   0.03*   2.34   0.06*   2.49  RESFDI   0.01   0.53   0.03   1.26 
R²a
  0.68 0.26    0.68 0.25 
F-statistic   F(26, 382) = 2.2*  F(26, 382) = 0.96    F(26, 382) = 2.2*  F(26, 382) = 1.0 
H-statistic  χ ²(4) = 0.16  χ ²(4) = 2.3    χ ²(4) = 8.1  χ ²(5) = 4.2 
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level; R²a = 
adjusted R-squared; 
b1 = transfers and subsidies as a % of GDP; aii4 = mean tariff rate; bi4 = hidden import barriers; 
ci5 = price controls; ciii5 = time spent with bureaucracy; civ5 = ease of starting a new business; 
RQS = regulatory quality; RESFDI = restrictions on foreign direct investment. 
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Table A23. Growth of output (production) equation 
 
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level; Nob = 
number of observations; 
  Equations 1-5: OLS; R²a = adjusted R-squared;  
  Equation 5*: 2SLS; R²a = centred R-squared; Sargan-Hansen J statistic of overidentification test of all 
instruments and P-value in brackets; 
  Nir = number of overidentifying restrictions. 
 
Dependent variable: ∆ lny_t 
 1 2 3 4 5  5* 
  coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
ENTRY RATE 
C  -0.02  -0.65   0.04   2.82   0.05*   3.00   0.02**   2.21  -0.01  -0.48  -0.00  -0.05 
ER_t   1.15**   2.17           2.15**   2.05   2.10***   1.86   2.19**   2.04 
ER_t-1       0.10   0.54      -1.44  -1.61  -1.24  -1.50  -1.42***  -1.74 
ER_t-2          0.00    0.01  -0.15  -0.70  -0.31  -1.22  -0.24  -0.99 
Industry       X  X 
Country       X  X 
Year       X  X 
R²a  0.08 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.29 0.35 
F-statistic  F(1, 660) = 4.72**  F(1, 660) = 0.29  F(1, 480) = 0.00  F(3, 478) = 2.76**  F(38, 443) = 4.81*  F(38, 424) = 4.77* 
Nob  662 662 482 482 482 482 
Sargan        20.44  (0.37) 
N i r         1 9  
EXIT RATE 
C   0.04*   4.77   0.06*   5.64   0.06*   5.03   0.07*   4.53   0.01   0.38   0.03   1.27 
XR_t -0.01  -0.04           0.24   0.81   0.17   0.39   0.15   0.36 
XR_t-1      -0.70** -2.06      -0.82** -2.51  -0.86***  -1.87  -0.79***  -1.73 
XR_t-2        -0.78***  -1.75  -0.65***  -1.73  -0.40  -1.07  -0.45  -1.26 
Industry       X  X 
Country       X  X 
Year       X  X 
R²a  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.23 
F-statistic  F(1, 660) = 0.00  F(1, 660) = 4.25**  F(1, 480) = 3.07*** F(3, 478) = 2.57*** F(38, 443) = 5.27*  F(38, 424) = 5.24* 
Nob  662 662 482 482 482 482 
Sargan        16.04  (0.65) 
N i r         1 9   
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Table A24. Interaction terms between entry and exit rates and industry effects 
  ∆  output eq.  ∆  labour productivity eq. 
 ER  XR  ER  XR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
{ER; XR}_t     0.53***  1.69     0.42  1.04 
{ER; XR}_t-1  -0.68 -1.27      -0.09 -0.37  0.29  0.74 
{ER; XR}_t-2  -0.25 -1.31  -0.24 -0.79  0.55* 2.44     
Constant  0.02 0.81  0.02 1.34  0.02 0.84  0.04***  1.75 
Food products and beverages  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Tobacco products  0.51 0.84  -1.61 -1.04  -0.28 -1.37  -0.57 -1.38 
Textiles  -0.36 -0.61  -2.81*  -4.82  -0.53 -1.33  -1.41**  -2.42 
Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing 0.52 0.79  -1.77*  -4.15  -0.21 -0.62  -0.48 -0.99 
Tanning and dressing of leather  -0.30 -0.44  -2.83*  -3.42  -0.03 -0.06  -0.63 -0.93 
Wood and products of wood   1.16** 2.07  -0.87  -0.96  -0.58 -1.44  -1.36 -1.49 
Pulp, paper and paper products  1.37** 2.36  -0.58  -1.00  -0.39 -1.11  -0.63 -0.78 
Publishing, printing etc   1.02*** 1.79 -0.83  -1.27  -0.08 -0.21  -0.57 -0.79 
Coke, refined petroleum products   4.44* 4.10  1.86  1.50  -1.51 -0.87  -3.27***  -1.70 
Chemicals and chemical products  1.37** 2.43  -0.59  -1.06  -0.17 -0.61  -0.68 -1.19 
Rubber and plastic products  0.74 1.47  -1.28**  -2.02  -0.53** -2.43  -1.42*  -2.69 
Other non-metallic and mineral   1.30** 2.19  -0.73  -0.89  -0.64** -2.08  -1.37***  -1.92 
Basic metals  0.62 0.98  -2.12*  -2.60  -0.51 -1.62  -1.47**  -2.08 
Fabricated metal products  0.94 1.60  -1.37**  -2.03  -0.47 -1.30  -1.19***  -1.77 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  0.81 1.49  -1.30***  -1.90  -0.65*** -1.78  -1.73**  -2.19 
Office machinery and computers  2.74** 2.18  -0.93*  -2.77  3.15*  8.73  3.34*  2.75 
Electrical machinery and apparatus  0.93 1.61  -1.01 -1.33  -0.37 -1.30  -0.90 -1.43 
Radio, television and communication  1.88* 2.57  0.78  0.42  6.90* 7.79  16.49*  7.78 
Medical, precision and optical  1.08*** 1.88 -0.73  -0.99  -1.03* -2.70  -2.65* -2.71 
Motor vehicles, trailers   1.02*** 1.81 -0.62  -1.01  -0.69** -2.00  -1.68** -2.29 
Other transport equipment  1.22** 2.24  -0.71  -0.61  -0.48 -1.21  -1.03 -1.03 
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  1.21** 2.06  -0.91  -1.21  -0.46 -1.39  -1.24***  -1.69 
Electricity, gas & water supply  1.02*** 1.93 -0.10  -0.14  0.25  0.97 1.74**  1.84 
Construction  1.27** 2.40  -0.66***  -1.63  -0.40 -1.47  -1.36***  -1.71 
Wholesale & retail trade; repairs  1.34* 2.50  -0.37  -0.61  -0.77* -2.88  -1.78**  -2.18 
Transport & storage  1.56* 2.62  -0.21  -0.21  -0.41* -2.54  -1.23  -1.12 
Post and telecommunications  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Real estate; renting & business   1.43* 2.69  0.88  1.12  -0.77* -3.45  -3.40* -2.91 
R²a  0.35 0.13 0.46 0.32 
F-stat  F(37, 444) = 6.60* F(37, 444) = 5.68* F(37, 610) = 8.04* F(37, 610) = 4.20* 
nob  482.00 482.00 648.00 648.00 
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level;  
  Nob = number of observations; R²a = adjusted R-squared. 
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Table A24. Interaction terms between entry and exit rates and industry effects (cont.) 
  ∆  employment eq.  ∆  R&D eq. 
  ER  ER  ER ER ER 
 (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
{ER; XR}_t     2.66***  1.81      -1.24  -1.56  -1.44*** -1.79
{ER; XR}_t-1  -1.07* -2.47      -1.91*** -1.63     0.75  0.57
{ER; XR}_t-2  -0.24 -1.55  -0.20 -0.63 1.10 1.57 0.11 0.08     
Constant  0.01  0.52 -0.03***  -1.77 0.05  0.90 0.12** 2.10  0.14** 2.28
Food products and beverages  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00
Tobacco products  -0.17  -0.33 -0.03**  -2.23 -0.03 -0.02 2.18  0.71  -0.04 -0.02
Textiles  -0.30 -0.78 -0.02*  -2.92 3.46***  1.76 2.49 0.91  0.77 0.27
Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing  0.32  0.62 -0.02**  -2.36 5.01 1.15 3.16 0.78  3.84 0.93
Tanning and dressing of leather  0.29  0.74 -0.02**  -2.41 0.22  0.09 -3.12 -0.41  -6.85 -1.14
Wood and products of wood   1.01*  2.73  -0.01  -1.41 -0.30 -0.15 -2.65 -1.23  -4.34 -1.62
Pulp, paper and paper products  1.09*  3.02  -0.01  -1.52 -1.46 -0.67 -4.05 -1.30  -3.61 -1.31
Publishing, printing etc   0.97** 2.11  -0.02  -1.62 1.33  0.47 -0.05 -0.01  -3.32 -0.72
Coke, refined petroleum products   1.35* 2.93  -0.01 -0.98 1.93 0.90 1.91 1.10  1.12 0.45
Chemicals and chemical products  1.16* 3.19  -0.01 -1.54 2.31**  2.13 1.82 1.17  0.29 0.19
Rubber and plastic products  1.18* 3.22  -0.01 -1.47 0.99 0.82 0.20 0.08 -0.73  -0.29
Other non-metallic and mineral   1.23*  3.41  -0.01  -1.36 2.23  1.34 -0.05 -0.02  -1.31 -0.39
Basic metals  1.10*  2.66  -0.01  -1.56 1.11  1.03 -0.95 -0.54  -2.37 -1.24
Fabricated metal products  1.54* 4.05  -0.01 -1.05 2.64***  1.76 0.93 0.42 -0.56  -0.25
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  1.41* 3.66  -0.01 -1.30 2.13**  1.96 2.53 1.42  0.63 0.30
Office machinery and computers  4.10* 3.72  -0.02 -1.50 1.72**  2.19 0.03 0.02  1.19 0.77
Electrical machinery and apparatus  0.97* 2.53  -0.02 -1.59 1.45 1.02 1.32 0.62 -0.28  -0.13
Radio, television and communication  1.45* 3.66  -0.01 -1.29 1.79***  1.64 2.18 1.39  0.50 0.28
Medical, precision and optical  1.39* 3.67  -0.01 -1.19 1.81 1.56 2.87 1.26 -0.13  -0.06
Motor vehicles, trailers   1.07* 2.90  -0.02***  -1.65 2.04 1.33 1.33 0.69  0.26 0.11
Other transport equipment  1.38* 3.45  -0.01 -1.13 1.90 1.60 1.45 0.55  0.84 0.44
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  1.11* 2.70  -0.01 -1.50 3.21***  1.67 2.84 0.74  0.86 0.22
Electricity, gas & water supply  0.69  1.58 -0.02**  -2.08 1.48  0.52 -1.23 -0.14  -7.78 -1.30
Construction  1.57* 4.19  -0.01 -1.25 3.07 1.20 0.32 0.09 -1.63  -0.35
Wholesale & retail trade; repairs  1.38* 3.66  -0.01 -1.30 7.55 1.47 5.97 0.72  5.27 0.57
Transport & storage  1.98*  4.31  -0.01 -0.93 5.36  1.18 12.94 1.01  12.31 0.91
Post and telecommunications  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00
Real estate; renting & business   1.68* 4.11  -0.01 -1.27 3.26**  2.02 5.33 1.25  4.62 0.76
R²a  0.59 0.38  0.03  0.00  0.00 
F-stat  F(37, 426) = 8.26*F(37, 426) = 6.14*F(35, 388) = 1.03F(35, 388) = 1.28 F(35, 388) = 1.09
Nob  464.00 464.00  424.00  424.00  424.00 
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level;  
  Nob = number of observations; R²a = adjusted R-squared. 
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Table A25. Interaction terms between entry and exit rates and country effects 
  ∆  output eq.  ∆  labour productivity eq.   
  ER  XR  ER  XR  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
{ER; XR}_t         0.11   0.24       0.13   0.52     
{ER; XR}_t-1   0.33  -0.40        -0.34  -1.38  -0.54  -1.60     
{ER; XR}_t-2   0.18  -0.42  -0.62  -1.22   0.18   0.91           
Constant  -0.02  -0.84   0.00  -0.08   0.03   1.46   0.03**   2.26     
Germany   0.10   0.32  -0.82***  -1.91   0.51   1.24   0.62   1.39     
France   0.37   1.26  -0.77  -1.54   0.28   1.26   0.57***  1.78     
Ireland           1.35**  2.35   7.50   1.12     
Italy   0.08   0.20  -0.94  -1.52   0.30   0.86   0.00  -0.01     
Portugal   2.86**   2.25  -3.88**  -1.93   0.81**  2.31   2.53*   2.46     
Spain   0.63**   2.25   0.13   0.20   0.07   0.37  -0.22  -0.50     
United Kingdom -0.35  -1.26  -1.66*  -4.58   0.24   1.16   0.49   1.45     
R²a  0.32 0.17  0.57 0.55   
F-stat  F(37, 444) = 4.82*  F(37, 444) = 4.97* F(37, 610) = 9.21* F(37, 610) = 9.60*  
Nob  482 482  648 648   
  ∆  Employment eq.  ∆  R&D eq. 
  ER  ER  ER  ER  ER 
  (5)  (5)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
{ER; XR}_t      2.00    1.55     -1.88** -2.29  -1.63** -2.15 
{ER; XR}_t-1  -0.83**  -2.09       0.02   0.02     0.98   0.65 
{ER; XR}_t-2  -0.07  -0.41  -0.80  -1.38   0.65   0.91   0.10   0.07     
Constant   0.01   0.70  -0.02  -1.22   0.07   1.07   0.07***  1.63   0.07***   1.80 
Germany   0.45   1.54  -0.01***  -1.89  -1.67  -1.29   1.06   0.89  -0.15  -0.14 
France   0.56***   1.85  -0.01  -1.50  -1.91  -1.47 -2.45*  -2.53 -3.14 -1.62 
Italy   0.63**   2.00  -0.01  -1.48  -1.64  -0.99   0.04   0.02  -0.96  -0.49 
Portugal   3.24**   2.16  -0.01**  -2.02             
Spain   1.10*   2.76  -0.00  -0.99  -1.16  -0.80 -1.54 -0.64 -3.42 -1.21 
United Kingdom  0.16   0.46  -0.01*  -2.57  -1.82  -1.45 -0.85 -0.71 -2.24 -1.52 
R²a  0.47 0.34  0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-stat  F(37, 426) = 7.20*  F(37, 426) = 4.23* F(35, 388) = 0.86 F(35, 388) = 1.02  F(35, 388) = 1.03 
Nob  464 464  424 424 424 
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level;  
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Table A26. Growth of labour productivity equation  
Dependent variable: ∆ lnlp_t 



























C   0.02***   1.69   0.02   1.44   0.02   1.57   0.01    1.00 -0.01  -0.34 -0.04***  -1.77 
ER_t   0.38   1.41           0.62   1.14   0.60***   1.70   0.62***   1.78 
ER_t-1       0.42***   1.81      -0.47 -0.82  -0.30 -0.96  -0.32 -1.05 
ER_t-2           0.42**   2.12   0.42   1.42   0.14   0.69   0.16   0.84 
Industry         X  X 
Country         X  X 
Year         X  X 
R²a  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.56 0.59 
F-
statistic  F(1, 862) = 1.98 
F(1, 862) = 
3.26***  F(1, 646) = 4.51**
F(3, 644) = 
2.40***  F(38, 609) = 8.84*  F(38, 590) = 8.88*
Nob  864 864 648 648 648 648 
Sargan        25.45  (0.15) 
Nir        19 
EXIT RATE 
C   0.03*   3.56   0.04*   4.46   0.04   3.30   0.04*   3.00   0.00   0.27  -0.02  -1.35 
XR_t   0.50***   1.63           0.80**   2.36   0.16   0.59   0.17   0.65 
XR_t-1       0.00   0.01      -0.77 -1.50  -0.36 -1.02  -0.39 -1.11 
XR_t-2           0.28   0.56   0.21   0.39   0.68**   2.10   0.65**   2.06 
Industry         X  X 
Country         X  X 
Year         X  X 
R²a  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.55 0.58 
F-
statistic  F(1, 862) = 2.66*  F(1, 862) = 0.00  F(1, 646) = 0.32 
F(3, 644) = 
2.23***  F(38, 609) = 9.21*  F(38, 590) = 9.18*
Nob  864 864 648 648 648 648 
Sargan        24.72  (0.17) 
Nir        19 
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level; Nob = 
number of observations; 
Equations 1-5: OLS; R²a = adjusted R-squared;  
Equation 5*: 2SLS; R²a = centred R-squared; Sargan-Hansen J statistic of overidentification test of all 
instruments and P-value in brackets; 
Nir = number of overidentifying restrictions. 
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Table A27. Growth of employment equation 
Dependent variable: ∆ lnl_t 



























C  -0.06***  -1.80  -0.01  -0.60   0.00   0.23  -0.01  -1.24   0.00   0.08   0.01   0.56 
ER_t   1.08***   1.70           2.64***   1.88   2.67**   2.01   2.71**   2.12 
ER_t-1       0.15   0.70      -2.24*** -1.83  -2.20**  -2.10  -2.25**  -2.18 
ER_t-2        -0.04  -0.17    0.00    0.02  -0.29  -1.09  -0.29  -1.15 
Industry         X  X 
Country         X  X 
Year         X  X 
R²a  0.09 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.43 0.48 
F-
statistic 
F(1, 628) = 
2.88***  F(1, 628) = 0.49  F(1, 462) = 0.03  F(3, 460) = 1.63  F(38, 425) = 5.52*  F(38, 406) = 5.46*
Nob  630 630 464 464 464 464 
Sargan        9.19  (0.97) 
Nir        19 
EXIT RATE 
C   0.00   0.42   0.01   0.55   0.02***   1.75   0.03   1.62   0.01   0.21   0.02   0.96 
XR_t  -0.20  -0.77        -0.18  -1.06 -0.45  -0.92 -0.43  -0.93 
XR_t-1     -0.34  -0.84     -0.26 -0.83  -0.43 -0.81  -0.46 -0.88 
XR_t-2        -0.96**  -2.18  -0.83** -2.24  -0.71  -1.43  -0.74  -1.39 
Industry         X  X 
Country         X  X 
Year         X  X 
R²a  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.20 
F-
statistic  F(1, 628) = 0.59  F(1, 628) = 0.71  F(1, 462) = 4.75** F(3, 460) = 1.73  F(38, 425) = 8.49*  F(38, 406) = 8.51*
Nob  630 630 464 464 464 464 
Sargan        12.51  (0.86) 
Nir        19 
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level; Nob = 
number of observations; 
Equations 1-5: OLS; R²a = adjusted R-squared;  
Equation 5*: 2SLS; R²a = centred R-squared; Sargan-Hansen J statistic of overidentification test of all 
instruments and P-value in brackets; 
Nir = number of overidentifying restrictions. 
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Table A28. Growth of physical capital investment 
Dependent variable: ∆ lni_t 



























C   0.01   0.54   0.02   0.98   -0.00  -0.10  -0.01  -0.35  -0.10  -1.49   0.00   0.05 
ER_t   0.41   0.76           0.28   0.37   0.48   0.56   1.07   1.07 
ER_t-1       0.21   0.45       0.15   0.14  -0.18 -0.12  -1.10 -0.67 
ER_t-2           0.45   0.86   0.22   0.36  -0.04  -0.08   0.26   0.41 
Industry         X  X 
Country         X  X 
Year         X  X 
R²a  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.14 
F-
statistic  F(1, 558) = 0.57  F(1, 558) = 0.20  F(1, 419) = 0.73  F(3, 417) = 0.33  F(37, 383) = 2.47*  F(37, 364) = 2.54*
Nob  560 560 421 421 421 421 
Sargan        22.68  (0.25) 
Nir        19 
EXIT RATE 
C   0.09*   5.75   0.09*   3.05   0.04   1.06   0.11**   2.16  -0.08  -0.91   0.03   0.44 
XR_t  -2.13*  -3.46        -1.23**  -2.26 -0.35  -0.49 -0.62  -0.85 
XR_t-1     -2.03***  -1.68     -2.31*** -1.75  -2.16  -1.28  -1.61  -0.97 
XR_t-2          -0.79  -0.43   0.31   0.19   1.95   0.79   1.90   0.82 
Industry         X  X 
Country         X  X 
Year         X  X 
R²a  0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.16 
F-
statistic  F(1, 558) = 11.94* 
F(1, 558) = 
2.84***  F(1, 419) = 0.18  F(3, 417) = 4.18*  F(37, 383) = 2.40*  F(37, 364) = 2.41*
Nob  560 560 421 421 421 421 
Sargan        22.08  (0.28) 
Nir        19 
  Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level; Nob = 
number of observations; 
    Equations 1-5: OLS; R²a = adjusted R-squared;  
    Equation 5*: 2SLS; R²a = centred R-squared; Sargan-Hansen J statistic of overidentification test of all 
instruments and P-value in brackets; 
    Nir = number of overidentifying restrictions. 
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Table A29. Growth of R&D investments 
 
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level; Nob = 
number of observations; 
  Equations 1-5: OLS; R²a = adjusted R-squared;  
  Equation 5*: 2SLS; R²a = centred R-squared; Sargan-Hansen J statistic of overidentification test of all 
instruments and P-value in brackets; 
  Nir = number of overidentifying restrictions.
Dependent variable: ∆ lnr_t 
 1 2 3 4 5  5* 
  coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
ENTRY RATE 
C   0.01   0.36   0.04   1.25   0.03   0.86   0.03   0.55   0.06   0.80   0.06   0.81 
ER_t   0.73   0.97           2.66**   2.19   3.06**   2.30   3.20**   2.41 
ER_t-1       0.25   0.45      -3.05*  -2.52  -2.83**  -2.24  -2.84**  -2.28 
ER_t-2           0.29   0.41   0.86   1.27   1.60***   1.95   1.51**   1.95 
Industry       X  X 
Country       X  X 
Year       X  X 
R²a  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.09 
F-statistic F(1,  571) = 0.95  F(1, 571) = 0.20  F(1, 422) = 0.17  F(3, 420) = 2.29*** F(36, 387) = 1.03  F(36, 368) = 1.04 
Nob  573 573 424 424 424 424 
Sargan        29.24  (0.06) 
N i r         1 9  
EXIT RATE 
C   0.09*   3.77   0.08*   3.18   0.07***   1.61   0.10*   1.99   0.13**   2.36   0.14*   2.63 
XR_t -1.41* -2.47         -1.50* -2.33 -0.98  -1.09 -1.37  -1.49 
XR_t-1     -1.31*** -1.81        0.33   0.32   1.22   0.89   1.56   1.07 
XR_t-2          -1.00  -0.66  -0.95  -0.62   0.68   0.47   0.10   0.07 
Industry       X  X 
Country       X  X 
Year       X  X 
R²a  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 
F-statistic F(1,  571) = 6.12*  F(1, 571) = 3.28***  F(1, 422) = 0.43  F(3, 420) = 1.99  F(36, 387) = 1.09  F(36, 368) = 1.10 
Nob  573 573 424 424 424 424 
Sargan        29.81  (0.05) 
N i r         1 9   
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Table A30. Physical capital intensity equation 
Dependent variable: capint3_t 



























C   5.60*   13.11   5.63*   11.78   5.77*   10.70   4.90*   8.58   5.09*   6.95   5.05*   7.25 
ER_t   16.24***  1.87           4.99   0.28   4.67   0.52   7.41   0.87 
ER_t-1       15.02   1.63       34.84***  1.74  -6.08  -0.53  -7.38  -0.67 
ER_t-2          12.52    1.25  -8.58 -1.06  -4.97 -0.91  -5.08 -0.94 
Industry         X  X 
Country         X  X 
Year         X  X 
R²a  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.81 0.83 
F-
statistic 
F(1, 677) = 
3.49***  F(1, 530) = 2.65  F(1, 395) = 1.57 
F(3, 393) = 
2.28*** 
F( 37, 359) = 
40.48* 
F(37, 340) = 
40.25* 
Nob  679 532 397 397 397 397 
Sargan        29.44  (0.06) 
N i r         1 9  
EXIT RATE 
C   8.38*   20.57   8.83*   17.56   8.99*   13.95   10.83*   13.97   5.51*   10.23   5.67*   10.84 
XR_t  -70.97*  -6.69        -39.45*  -3.57 -13.62**  -2.33 -14.83*  -2.52 
XR_t-1     -93.13*  -6.25      -50.55*  -3.06 -9.77  -1.20 -12.53 -1.50 
XR_t-2         -105.15* -4.92  -82.08*  -4.27 -3.69  -0.36 -7.36  -0.69 
Industry         X  X 
Country         X  X 
Year         X  X 
R²a  0.06 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.81 0.83 
F-
statistic  F(1, 677) = 44.78*  F(1, 530) = 39.09*  F(1, 395) = 24.19* F(3, 393) = 16.65*
F( 37, 359) = 
40.25* 
F(37, 340) = 
40.29* 
Nob  679 532 397 397 397 397 
Sargan        23.64  (0.21) 
N i r         1 9  
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level; Nob = 
number of observations; 
  Equations 1-5: OLS; R²a = adjusted R-squared;  
  Equation 5*: 2SLS; R²a = centred R-squared; Sargan-Hansen J statistic of overidentification test of all 
instruments and P-value in brackets; 
  Nir = number of overidentifying restrictions. 
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Table A31. R&D intensity equation 
Dependent variable: rdint_t 



























C   1.46*   9.29   1.47*   8.28   1.39*   7.22   1.35*   5.54   0.29   1.23   0.29   1.32 
ER_t   1.37   0.61           9.93   1.37  -6.25  -1.32  -7.79***  -1.66 
ER_t-1       0.89   0.36      -10.18  -1.33   1.98   0.35   3.36   0.60 
ER_t-2           1.68   0.66   3.01   0.99  -2.46 -0.92  -3.12 -1.18 
Industry         X  X 
Country         X  X 
Year         X  X 
R²a  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.77 
F-
statistic  F(1, 664) = 0.37  F(1, 516) = 0.13  F(1, 371) = 0.43  F(3, 369) = 0.88 
F(36, 336) = 
18.89* 
F(36, 317) = 
18.82* 
Nob  666 518 373 373 373 373 
Sargan        16.50  (0.62) 
N i r         1 9  
EXIT RATE 
C   1.25*   8.47   1.25*   7.53   1.15*   5.01   0.85*   3.30   0.17   0.77   1.91   1.55 
XR_t  10.82**    2.15          10.44***   1.85  -2.55 -0.79  -1.99 -0.65 
XR_t-1       11.02***  1.83       0.28   0.04  -4.47 -1.17  -4.87 -1.30 
XR_t-2           14.97   1.49   15.03   1.43  -3.30  -0.53  -1.12  -0.18 
Industry         X  X 
Country         X  X 
Year         X  X 
R²a  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.74 0.77 
F-
statistic  F(1, 664) = 4.62** 
F(1, 516) = 
3.34***  F(1, 371) = 2.23 
F(3, 369) = 
2.33*** 
F(36, 336) = 
18.74* 
F(36, 317) = 
18.67* 
Nob  666 518 373 373 373 373 
Sargan        19.36  (0.31) 
N i r         1 7  
Notes:  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors; * (**, ***) significant at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) level; Nob = 
number of observations; 
  Equations 1-5: OLS; R²a = adjusted R-squared;  
  Equation 5*: 2SLS; R²a = centred R-squared; Sargan-Hansen J statistic of overidentification test of all 
instruments and P-value in brackets; 
  Nir = number of overidentifying restrictions.  
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Table A32. Explanatory power of instruments (first-stage regressions) 
Variable  Shea Partial R²  Partial R²  F(28, 422) 
ER_t 0.55  0.69  43.8* 
ER_t-1 0.57  0.78  72.1* 
ER_t-2 0.72  0.83  96.8* 
XR_t 0.49  0.51  21.2* 
XR_t-1 0.53  0.54  24.2* 
XR_t-2 0.35  0.37  10.9* 
n. obs.  482 
Instruments 
b1_(t,t-1,t-2); aii4_(t,t-1,t-2); bi4_(t,t-1,t-2); ci5_(t,t-1,t-2);   
ciii5_(t,t-1,t-2); civ5_(t,t-1,t-2); RQS_(t,t-1,t-2); RESFDI_(t,t-
1,t-2); A_(t,t-1,t-2); N_(t,t-1,t-2); D_(t,t-1,t-2); NE_(t,t-1,t-2); 
NER_(t,t-1,t-2); TURN_(t,t-1,t-2) 
Notes :  
* Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
b1 = transfers and subsidies as a % of GDP; aii4 = mean tariff rate;  
bi4 = hidden import barriers; ci5 = price controls; ciii5 = time spent with bureaucracy;  
civ5 = ease of starting a new business; RQS = regulatory quality;  
RESFDI = restrictions on foreign direct investment; A = number of active firms;  
N = number of new firms; D = number of exiting firms; NE = number of net entries;  
NER = net entry rate; TURN = firm turnover. 
 
 